EXPERT AUTHORITY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: MEDIA INTERMEDIARIES, PROFESSIONAL NORM VIOLATION, AND THE MARKET FOR EXPERTISE

Noah A. Benjamin-Pollak and Arvind Karunakaran

Stanford University, USA

ABSTRACT

We examine the social processes that shape the market for expertise in the public sphere. Specifically, we develop a model of expert amplification to examine the role of professional norms and media intermediaries in skewing the selection and representation of experts to the public. Our model of expert amplification unpacks three interrelated processes: anticipatory selecting-out, a process where experts opt out of public discourse due to the anticipated penalties for professional norm violation; selective promotion, a process where supply-side intermediaries such as press officers, talent agents, public relations, and other communications specialists act to market a subset of experts to the media; and preferential selection, a process where demand-side intermediaries (e.g., media organizations) decide which subset of experts should be invited to their platform to discuss topics that are of interest and relevance to the public. Together,

Expertise In and Around Organizations: The Changing Constitution and Ecology of Expertise
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Volume 97, 249–269

ISSN: 0733-558X/doi:10.1108/S0733-558X20250000097011

we examine how these processes amplify a certain demographic subset of experts over others in a cumulative manner and what the consequences are for the selection and representation of experts to the public and to the legitimacy of expert authority, more generally.

Keywords: Expertise; expert authority; professional norm violation; intermediaries; media organizations; expertise dissemination

The process by which expertise is disseminated beyond the professions that produce it is becoming an important area of focus in the social sciences (Ekström, 2016; Eyal, 2019). This process, which we call the market for expertise in the public sphere, is complex, with multiple heterogeneous categories of participants (Eyal, 2019; Heimstädt et al., 2023; McLuhan, 2017; Postman, 2005; Preda, 2023). Gaining a better understanding of the practices and behaviors of under-explored participants in this market for expertise – such as the intermediaries who repackage expertise for public consumption and other actors, such as publicists, who help experts[1] get their work before a broader audience – will help improve our understanding of expertise and expert authority in the public sphere (Childress, 2017; Menon, 2017; Zavyalova et al., 2017).

Toward that end, this paper combines insights from the sociology of professions and organizational sociology to understand the impact of the actions of third parties (i.e., neither experts nor the public) on the functioning of the market for expertise (Eyal, 2022). We argue that the processes through which the market for expertise for public consumption is assembled shape the type of experts selected and represented in the public sphere. Specifically, we examine the processes that shape the supply of and demand for expertise in the public sphere and elaborate on how such processes lead to a demographically skewed market for expertise. Together, we refer to these processes as *expert amplification*.

In particular, our model focuses on the role that media intermediaries, in conjunction with the anticipatory avoidance of professional norm violations by experts, play in contributing to the processes of expert amplification (Abbott, 1981, 1988; Childress, 2017; Spencer, 1970; Weber et al., 2004; Zuckerman, 2017).[2] Expert amplification is constituted by three interrelated processes that significantly impact the functioning and demographic makeup of the market for expertise in the public sphere: *anticipatory selecting-out*, a process where experts opt out of public discourse due to the anticipated penalties for professional norm violation; *selective promotion*, a process by which supply-side intermediaries such as talent agents, press officers, public relations functionaries, and other communications professionals act to market a subset of experts to the media; and *preferential selection*, a process where demand-side intermediaries such as media organizations decide which subset of experts should be featured on their platforms to discuss topics that are of interest to the public. These intermediaries have more influence on the public discourse than was previously considered and

have a role similar to that of cultural gatekeepers in creative industries (Childress, 2017; Godart et al., 2023). In particular, due to their ability to pick between a broad pool of experts and to significantly constrain the behavior of these experts, understanding how intermediaries make decisions is vital to understanding the operation of the market for expertise and discerning their impact on the selection and representation of experts to the public.

This article focuses on supply- and demand-side intermediaries' roles in the expert amplification process. These intermediaries have their own goals and incentives that push them to want to work with some experts but not others. The experts these intermediaries find appealing are more likely to become part of the public discourse. However, experts are not equally appealing to intermediaries (Macharia, 2020). The goals and incentives of intermediaries significantly skew the sex, race, and age distribution of amplified experts.

Additionally, research shows that third-party evaluations of experts can impact perceptions of them and their behaviors (Botelho & Gertsberg, 2022). Studies have also shown that intermediaries can influence "in-house" experts, causing them to drift from a more professional to a more public-friendly style of communication (Ekström, 2016). Additionally, some experts are changing their focus from the professional realm to the public discourse, intending to significantly engage with the public and impact issues they care about. These ideas suggest that rather than being confined to influencing the public discourse by impacting the makeup of the subset of amplified experts, the effects of expert amplification can reverberate both downstream and upstream, changing how experts talk about their work and potentially shaping the structure and direction of their research (Demortain, 2023; Ekström, 2016; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Menon, 2017; Zavyalova et al., 2012, 2017).

Notably, these skews in the demographic makeup of public experts are seen in many different places (Macharia, 2020). In the United Kingdom, four male experts appeared on flagship television and radio programs for every female expert (Howell & Singer, 2017). In Canada, both women and racialized minorities are underrepresented as expert sources on public affairs television, and racialized minority women are even more underrepresented (Cukier et al., 2019). Around the world, the severe underrepresentation of female experts in media barely changed between 1995 and 2015 (Macharia, 2020). Put simply, as the most agentic participants in a transaction that significantly influences the public discourse on important topics, the preferences of intermediaries – particularly demand-side intermediaries in the media – matter. Because our theoretical model accounts for the actions of media intermediaries such as journalists, bookers (for television and radio programs), and communications professionals, this research extends prior work on the dissemination of expertise and helps us better explain the functioning of the marketplace for expertise (Abbott, 1988; Lamont, 2018; Preda, 2023) and how it produces severe representation and recognition gaps between different groups of experts (Lamont, 2018). We elaborate on these processes below.

ROLE OF MEDIA INTERMEDIARIES IN SHAPING THE SELECTION AND REPRESENTATION OF EXPERTS TO THE PUBLIC

Scholars have generally conceptualized experts (e.g., scientists, doctors, lawyers, etc.) as agentic individuals whose decisions are the primary factor in shaping the structure and composition of the market for expertise in the public sphere (Heimstädt et al., 2023; Preda, 2023). However, most experts lack the time and skillsets to command public attention through communication channels such as their websites. Relatedly, practitioners and the public are generally uninterested in expertise that is intended for a professional audience (e.g., scientists within a research field), such as scientific articles or judicial decisions. Basically, if expertise is packaged for consumption by specific audiences, people outside of those audiences will largely ignore it (Barraclough, 2004; Demortain, 2023; Singleton-Green, 2010; Tapp, 2005). Because of this gap, experts usually interact with the public indirectly. Most commonly, these interactions occur through media organizations, such as *CNN* and the *New York Times*, which repackage expertise for public consumption. We view these media organizations as *demand-side intermediaries* in the market for expertise. However, these organizations have different goals and incentives from experts and the public, creating an alignment problem.

At the same time, experts cannot decide the terms of their interactions with demand-side intermediaries. Instead, demand-side intermediaries generally insist on controlling interactions on platforms they own in areas such as length, general content, and format (Hartman, 1984). Additionally, experts usually lack the skillset, contacts, and time to pursue media appearances. Since public appearances, though often encouraged by employers (e.g., universities), are not typically considered by them in annual reviews, evaluations for entry into partnerships (e.g., law, finance, consulting), or by academic tenure committees, there is a significant opportunity cost to pursuing them. Due to these factors, many interactions between experts and media organizations are mediated by *supply-side intermediaries* such as communications and public relations professionals. Because these supply-side intermediaries do not typically work for the experts directly (instead, the expert's employer, such as universities and scientific labs in industry, typically hires them), they act according to their own interests and incentives. Consequently, the incentives of these supply-side intermediaries play an important role in shaping the market for expertise. Most of these professionals represent numerous experts, such as the employees of a law firm, an entire faculty/department, or all the authors signed to a publisher. Since they can choose between such a large and heterogeneous group of experts and lack the time to work with more than a small percentage, they have significant choices regarding whom they want to represent. Because of these factors, communications professionals are focused on their own interests, which are more aligned with their employer's interests than the interests of the experts they represent at a particular moment in time. We argue that these processes skew the demographic makeup of successful participants in the public market for expertise.

A MODEL OF EXPERT AMPLIFICATION

Fig. 1 illustrates our model of the supply-side and demand-side processes that shape *expert amplification* in the market for expertise.

As we describe in the model, the universal set of experts is every expert working on a specific topic. These experts are influenced by professional purity norms, affecting which of them *anticipatorily select-out* and thus represented in the public sphere, and which experts *select-in* to participate in public discourse (Abbott, 1981, 1988; Zuckerman, 2017). Those who select-in can go in one of two directions. First, they can be represented by supply-side intermediaries, such as communications professionals, who *selectively promote* them to media organizations. Second, they can be *preferentially selected* to speak to the public on a particular platform by demand-side intermediaries (i.e., media organizations) based on their own economic incentives, such as increasing viewership metrics (e.g., Television ratings, YouTube views, etc.) or generating attention for the intermediary on social media.

Additionally, some experts are not selected by either group of intermediaries. These experts must attract public attention independently, which is often challenging because they lack the relevant skillset or platform to do so.

Finally, we call the sub-set of experts who make public appearances *amplified experts* and argue that they occupy a privileged position in the market for expertise relative to their unamplified peers. Because of the incentives of the demand-side intermediaries who act as gatekeepers for public appearances on their platforms, when an expert is amplified, they are significantly more likely to make *further* public appearances than their unamplified colleagues. This acts as a reinforcing dynamic in our model, reverberating upward from the public to affect intermediaries and experts (as indicated by the double-ended *amplify* arrow) (Demortain, 2023; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

Our model has two main types of consequences: those that affect experts' authority and those that impact the market for expertise and its participants. In terms of



Fig. 1. Supply-side and Demand-side Processes that Shape the Market for Expertise in the Public Sphere.

expert authority, because of the incentives of intermediaries to represent experts who have had successful public appearances and possess credentials and public reputations, amplified experts tend to have more professional experience. However, they are significantly less diverse than selected-in experts, who are, in turn, significantly less diverse than the universal set of experts. This fact also means that the artificially limited pool of amplified experts sees an outsized impact on public trust when there is a scandal. These demographics of amplified experts mean that more amplified experts tend to be status-quoits. Additionally, non-represented experts are very likely to select-out due to difficulties navigating the market for expertise.

Finally, the skewed demographics of the market for expertise significantly impact the public's perceptions of expert authority. Put simply, intermediaries in the public market for expertise *preferentially select* and *selectively promote* a subset of experts and ignore others for reasons unrelated to inherent quality. Their collective decisions often have an impact that runs counter to the public's interest in getting the most accurate information (instead of the information that happens to be delivered by the experts most appealing to intermediaries). We further elaborate on our model below.

SUPPLY-SIDE PROCESSES: NORM VIOLATION, ANTICIPATORY SELECTING-OUT, AND SELECTIVE PROMOTION

We start by unpacking our arguments on the supply-side processes that determine which experts select-in versus anticipatorily select-out of the public discourse on topics related to their expertise. We will then discuss the role of *selective promotion* by supply-side intermediaries in shaping the market for expertise. These supply-side processes significantly influence which experts are amplified to the public and which ones are not, significantly impacting the public's trust/distrust in experts and expert authority more broadly.

Research on the sociology of professions explains how professional status and norm violations work inside and outside of professions (Abbott, 1981, 1988). Abbott (1981), for instance, examines the fundamental misalignment between public and professional status rankings. According to him, while public status is obtained through communicating with the public and attempting to solve public problems, intraprofessional status is obtained through maintaining professional purity, which implies minimizing contact with the public and their problems. The gap between these two paths to attaining status, as Abbott (1981) argues, is typically irreconcilable. Therefore, certain members of a profession prioritize maintaining their intraprofessional status over the desire to speak with the public. This choice means that some experts in professions seek to minimize violations of the "purity norm" within their profession (Zuckerman, 2017). This decision, in turn, limits their motivation to appear in the public sphere and disseminate knowledge that could speak to – and even potentially address – the problems confronted by the public. This phenomenon significantly impacts the demographic makeup of the subset of experts participating in public discourse.

Abbott (1981) further discusses how public and intraprofessional status hierarchies function in law and medicine. He starts by noting the inherent disconnect between the public and professional status hierarchies in medicine. The public admires frontline professionals who treat patients, distrusts "political doctors" in the American Medical Association, and ignores researchers because they "don't care about people." However, within the profession, researchers have high status, whereas frontline professionals such as family doctors and general practitioners do not. These professionals lose and gain status with their peers primarily based upon their "degree of contact with non-order" (Abbott, 1981, 1988). Abbott further discusses a similar phenomenon in law where the public highly regards criminal defense lawyers, while the legal profession views them as having lower-status in the professional hierarchy. Conversely, the professionally high-status securities, tax, and patent lawyers are reviled by the public and considered agents of corporate interests.

We use the term *anticipatory selecting-out* to describe the process of deciding not to appear in the public sphere due to concerns about the negative consequences of one's appearance (e.g., being viewed by colleagues as "not serious scholars" who break professional norms). In other words, anticipatory selecting-out occurs when experts remove themselves from participating in public discourse in anticipation of intraprofessional status loss and other penalties related to professional norm violation. Such anticipatory selecting-out limits the diversity of experts available to disseminate scientific knowledge to a broader audience and shape public discourse on scientific consensus.

Zuckerman (2017), further building upon Abbott (1981), offers additional insights into the consequences of professional boundary crossing. These insights help expand our understanding of the processes skewing the demographics of the subset of experts participating in public discourse. An important insight from Zuckerman (2017) is that boundary crossing is less likely to negatively affect high-status professionals and can instead enhance their status. Since high-status professionals have demonstrated their competence and commitment to their professional peers (and to their field, more generally), boundary crossing can enhance their professional status because it can potentially benefit the profession. Professional peers' understanding of their competence and commitment means that their boundary crossing and speaking with the public are interpreted as being in the profession's interest (e.g., expanding its scope and jurisdiction, working toward securing more funding) rather than risk devaluing the profession's credentials or softening its jurisdictional boundaries.

Nonetheless, the intraprofessional status loss and related penalties for purity norm violation are often perceived by experts as being applied unevenly based on nominal characteristics such as the experts' gender, race, and professional tenure (Botelho & Gertsberg, 2022; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). These perceived differences, in turn, influence experts' decisions around potentially norm-violating actions. For example, the tenure and seniority of experts (e.g., for influential professionals such as tenured professors and partners at law firms) can act to mitigate intraprofessional status loss and other associated career impacts of professional purity norm violations. In contrast, relatively lower-status professionals (such as

legal associates, medical residents, postdoctoral fellows, and early-career faculty) find it difficult to mitigate the penalties for purity norm violation, consequently being more likely to anticipatorily select-out from the public market for expertise. In addition, since experts who are women and racial/ethnic minorities believe they are likely to be penalized more severely for purity norm violations due to existing conscious and unconscious biases (e.g., perceived as "not committed to their discipline," "not serious scholars," etc.), they are incentivized to anticipatorily select-out to preempt such penalties. These perceived – and likely actual – consequences for purity norm violation demographically skew the subset of experts who select-in to participate in public discourse (Abbott, 1981; Zuckerman, 2017).

These perceptions of differential consequences for purity norm violation also drive much of the race, sex, and tenure-based differences in the rates at which experts select-in versus anticipatorily select-out of public discourse. Because there are potential benefits to one's profession from speaking to the public that may balance out the negatives of categorical impurity and boundary crossing, the degree of professional censure for these purity norm violations is often influenced by how one's peers interpret the motivations behind their public appearances. This interpretation of motivations is a salient mechanism driving race-, sex-, and tenure-based differences in perceived consequences for purity norm violation.[3]

Tenure and professional stature/seniority most likely significantly impact these processes. As noted by Zuckerman (2017), purity norm violations by higher-status experts (e.g., tenured and more experienced scientists) are more likely to be interpreted positively as attempts to expand the jurisdiction of a profession. This effect occurs because seniority is interpreted as evidence of a more significant commitment to the profession compared to less senior experts. Likewise, attributions of existing stereotypes in interpreting the motivations of public appearances by female versus male experts – that is, being driven by negative traits such as vanity for women versus an array of more prosocial traits, such as outreach and expanding the field's influence, for men (Howell & Singer, 2017; Moss-Racusin & Rudman, 2010; Smith & Huntoon, 2014) – also drive the differences in consequences for purity norm violation between these groups. We believe that negative interpretations of behavior based on racial stereotypes could be a similar mechanism behind race-based differences in perceived consequences for professional purity norm violation.

Relatedly, the expert's profession matters as well. Professions such as finance, law, and political science that are more regularly in communication with the public and/or have more of a revolving door between academia, government, and industry may have lower levels of consequences for purity norm violation. Conversely, other professions that are more removed from the public tend to have greater consequences – both perceived and actual – for purity norm violation. More generally, due to the perceived differences in the consequences for purity norm violation, experts select-out at different rates, shaping their availability and representation in the public sphere.

In addition, the professional socialization of these experts further reinforces these processes (e.g., senior professionals advising junior colleagues to avoid such

purity norm violations). Relatedly, the ambiguity and complexity of the incentive structures for participation in public discourse highly advantage more informed and networked experts who can better evaluate the mixed signals from their peers and employers (Butler et al., 2015).

All of these supply-side processes result in a significantly smaller subset of experts participating in public discourse due to anticipatory selecting-out. Nonetheless, even among those willing to participate in public discourse, actual participation rates are unequal because supply-side intermediaries influence such rates through selective promotion.

Supply-side intermediaries are heterogeneous groups of communications professionals that represent many experts in interactions with extra-professional groups such as the media and the public. These communications professionals, such as talent agents, press officers, public relations functionaries, and publicists, are generally more skilled at communication with the media. However, a lot of their power comes from experts intentionally selecting-out of communicating with demand-side intermediaries due to a lack of comfort, time, or skillsets. Because of this lack of experience and skillsets, experts who try to gain the attention of demand-side intermediaries without the assistance of supply-side intermediaries are typically unsuccessful. Instead, supply-side intermediaries usually facilitate or handle unsolicited communications with demand-side intermediaries.

However, these supply-side intermediaries have their own independent set of goals and incentives. They generally are not directly employed by the expert but by the expert's employer. Thus, supply-side intermediaries are incentivized to enhance the status of their employer rather than aiding the experts. For instance, supply-side intermediaries are disincentivized from selectively promoting publicly controversial experts and projects. Supply-side intermediaries represent the entire subset of selected-in experts at their employer, so they will spend the most time and effort promoting those experts they perceive as likely to benefit themselves and their employer most significantly through their conversations with the public. The most common benefits envisioned are either increased attention and reputation or monetary benefits (e.g., attracting future clients, increasing alumni donations, or increasing book sales). Additionally, organizations provide their own internal contexts, with an ability to subtly influence over time the sorts of expertise that are valued. This is especially true of individuals moving from one organizational context to another, such as academics moving from their home department's lab and classroom to their institution's press office (Anteby & Holm, 2021).

How might a supply-side intermediary interact with the subset of available experts to decide whom to selectively promote? An expert might go to a supply-side intermediary and ask them to promote a particular topic or piece of expertise. Alternatively, a supply-side intermediary can get a request from a demand-side intermediary (i.e., news media organizations) for an expert in a particular subject and then be able to promote someone of their choosing from the available experts at their employer. Alternatively, the demand-side intermediary may request a particular expert, in which case the supply-side intermediary would facilitate that contact. Finally, a supply-side intermediary can decide to promote a piece of expertise they hear about from a third party, such as an administrator or donor,

on their own initiative. Regardless, the supply-side intermediary has significant agency because they can usually choose whom to promote from the selected-in experts at their employer and how much energy to expend on that promotion.

The agentic power of supply-side intermediaries to decide which experts to selectively promote significantly impacts which experts are successful in gaining public attention. Despite the dynamics of anticipatory selecting-out, there are a large number of experts who are interested in speaking to the public and a variety of different press outlets that can facilitate such interactions. Deciding which outlet to approach is challenging and time-consuming, and there are not that many supply-side intermediaries around. However, because promotion is the focus of their duties, supply-side intermediaries gain expertise in their role, such as an understanding of what outlets are easiest to approach and which ones are not worth their time, an understanding of what is and is not newsworthy, and other knowledge that helps them evaluate what expertise is worth the effort of promoting. However, it is challenging for experts to gain similar competency in what is a side duty, something that is unlikely to significantly benefit them in their main profession.

Supply-side intermediaries' choices of which experts to selectively promote skew the demographics of the subset of amplified experts because they are incentivized in several ways: First, to promote higher-status experts and disciplines within their workplace. Second, to promote experts and disciplines that garner more public attention. Third, to promote experts that align with demand-side intermediaries' incentives because their relationships with demand-side intermediaries are more important to them. Finally, they are incentivized to promote experts they have previously engaged with and know are "easy to work with," both for themselves and their media contacts on the demand-side. These biases combine to make supply-side intermediaries and their promotion tactics an additional force in amplifying a subset of experts over others. The subset of experts is skewed in favor of tenure (because more tenured experts are likely to appeal to demand-side intermediaries), status within their own organization, and in favor of higher-status areas – both in terms of public and interprofessional status – of expertise over lower-status areas.

These supply-side processes make the subset of promoted and amplified experts more status-quoist and less diverse. Additionally, the lack of diversity within the subset of promoted and amplified experts increases the risk of public disregard for expertise and expert authority. It also means there is more significant damage to trust in experts when one of the relatively few public experts is implicated in a scandal (Adut, 2008).

DEMAND-SIDE PROCESSES: ROLE OF MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS

While supply-side processes significantly affect the market for expertise, the most significant underexplored impacts come from demand-side intermediaries (i.e., media organizations such as *CNN*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *The New York*

Times). They have a more significant impact because most experts wishing to disseminate their expertise to the public must utilize demand-side intermediaries, whereas experts can bypass supply-side intermediaries and still appear before the public on intermediated platforms. Experts attempting to bypass demand-side intermediaries and disseminate knowledge through their primary channels (e.g., channels controlled by themselves or their employers) tend to be ignored by a public that demands interaction on its own terms (Abbott, 1981, 1988; Arnoldi, 2007; Heimstädt et al., 2023; Zuckerman, 2017). Relatedly, experts who attempt to relate to the public using professional vehicles such as legal decisions or academic journal articles are also likely to be ignored.

In that regard, *preferential selection* by demand-side intermediaries plays an important role (Roulet & Clemente, 2018; Zavyalova et al., 2017). Demand-side intermediaries such as media organizations select experts to appear on their platforms according to their own goals and incentives. Specifically, they tend to economize on information processing costs and use heuristics such as which experts are "good-on-TV" or "quotable." These heuristics create a dynamic that reinforces the demographic skews from the supply-side processes of anticipatory selecting-out and selective promotion. Because they control the primary platforms for disseminating expertise to the public, demand-side intermediaries play the most significant role in selecting and representing experts in the public sphere.

Moreover, there is a significant gap between discussions in scientific literature and discussions that are understandable and interesting to the public. The public requires experts to meet them on their terms (Abbott, 1988; Zuckerman, 2017). Therefore, demand-side intermediaries serve an important role in giving experts and their work a public audience in return for shaping their work for better public consumption and using their time to discuss issues of interest to the public. For the demand-side intermediary, an expert who is not primarily discussing things of interest to the public is not economically valuable. Additionally, experts who are not compelling or informative to the public in terms of how they discuss their area of expertise are also not valuable. Finally, experts who do not comply with the format requirements – such as operating within the time requirements of a T.V. news segment and not using too much technical jargon – of the media they are trying to appear on are also not valuable. In most cases, experts that are not valuable to demand-side intermediaries are not allowed to appear on their platforms. This gatekeeping role, granted in return for bringing a large audience to the experts, gives the demand-side intermediaries a substantial role in shaping the selection and representation of experts to the public (Boczkowski, 2010).

These organizations can set the terms by which experts interact with a public audience who otherwise would be unable or unwilling to evaluate the range of expert opinions on a given topic. Additionally, while experts can directly interact with the public, the public is largely uninterested in these un-mediated interactions. Because of these demand-side processes, which experts are preferentially selected by demand-side intermediaries and which ones are not, meaningfully impact the content and direction of public discourse. Demand-side intermediaries' selection criteria for these mediated interactions are influenced by several factors that skew the subset of amplified experts. In this paper, we will generally

discuss the context of television, but similar dynamics likely play out in other media contexts involving intermediaries such as radio, newspapers, podcasts, and other media (Lamont, 2018).

A TV newscast is our specific context. For local and lower-budget national newscasts, a producer is generally responsible for selecting experts in addition to their other duties. Only a few programs, like national morning shows (i.e., Good Morning America) and national news programs (i.e., 'Sunday Shows'), are likely to have an employee (a "booker," in industry parlance) solely dedicated to selecting guests. Also, some of the hosts on shows like NBC's Today prefer to select their own experts. Finally, some focused outlets have shared dedicated bookers across multiple shows (Hartman, 1984).

What dynamics drive the preferential selection process for demand-side intermediaries? We believe that four main factors explain the preferential selection process: (1) time constraints and information costs (i.e., the speed of events and cost in employee hours often means the availability and prior vetting are primary factors in expert selection, driving *repeat-bookings*), (2) information deficits (i.e., demand-side intermediaries cannot evaluate expertise well), (3) medium constraints (i.e., the skills needed to be successful on television have little overlap with the skills needed for success in an expert occupation such as academia or law), and (4) desire for exclusivity (i.e., television shows prefer novel views on a topic rather than people who have already talked with a competitor[4]).

An employee of the demand-side intermediary preferentially selecting experts likely has a film and video production background and little to no formal training in evaluating experts. Their selection process, especially for the same-day selections driven by the news cycle, is based heavily on the availability and "who can put a complete thought about that topic into a reasonably short and interesting statement" (Hartman, 1984; see also Josephson, 2021). Availability is by far the most important criterion. The news cycle moves fast, and demand-side intermediaries generally need a quote or interview within a few hours, far too little time to find and evaluate a new expert on a topic, especially when they lack the skillset to evaluate experts and because many experts will say no due to anticipatory selecting-out. As Josephson (2021) reflects on these dynamics: "who is available? This is the true reality of booking. For day-of-air bookings, you do not always get the perfect guest—you get the guest who is available at the exact moment your busy correspondent is also available" (Josephson, 2021). Additionally, extensive vetting may not be possible, and a producer's ability to correctly evaluate and differentiate experts within a profession is minimal. These factors combine to create an environment with significant incentives toward conservatism in expert selection. Therefore, demand-side intermediaries tend to preferentially select the same experts repeatedly, often referred to as repeat-booking.

Additionally, the time pressure of the news cycle often interacts with the desire to get a different expert than your competitors. Outside of the most competitive bookings (such as newsworthy celebrities or politicians), demand-side intermediaries will not book experts who have appeared on a competitor recently (Hartman, 1984). This desire for exclusivity is one of the reasons that new experts are preferentially selected.

The other significant incentive driving demand-side intermediaries' preferential selections is reducing information processing costs. This incentive is influential in several different ways. First, search costs are much lower for repeat-bookings because demand-side intermediaries know that the expert has been vetted and is willing to speak to the media (Abbott, 1981, 1988; Zuckerman, 2017). Finding a new expert, in contrast, will likely require vetting and contacting a number of experts before finding a suitable expert who is available. Going with someone new also risks selecting an expert who is not "good-on-TV." In addition, repeat-bookings are generally either local to the area (where the experts can be brought into the studio) or are known to be able to appear remotely without technical difficulties. Delays and other technical difficulties on live television are highly problematic; therefore, demand-side intermediaries are incentivized to reduce the risk of such problems by repeat-booking the same set of experts. Supply- and demand-side intermediaries' accounts that we read told us that repeat-bookings were the default choice and represented the overwhelming majority of expert appearances. The incentive to repeat-book is one of the significant factors in the expert amplification process. Finally, a repeat-booking has a known ability to function competently within the television format and potentially is known to be "good-on-TV." Being good-on-TV for experts involves the ability to disseminate complex technical information to the public in a charismatic manner (Arnoldi, 2007; Hartman, 1984; Josephson, 2021). Put even more simply, for an expert, being "good-on-TV" means being credible and engaging to the audience when discussing your subject of expertise (in print media, there is a similar phenomenon around "being quotable"). While "being good-on-TV" sounds simple, it is actually quite challenging for experts and depends significantly on the subject being discussed. Experts who are "good-on-TV" are willing to engage the public on their own terms rather than comply with their professions' norms. To be "good-on-TV," experts need to avoid using professional jargon and explain issues in a simple manner to an audience with very different levels of knowledge than those the experts are used to interacting with. They also need to speak less formally than they are used to and answer questions in a different format. Finally, the time format for T.V. is incredibly brief, with the aired portions of interviews sometimes being under a minute and almost always under 5 minutes. The need to speak in a non-ordered way to be "good-on-TV" drives anticipatory selecting-out and skews the demographics of amplified experts.

In comparison, being not "good-on-TV" is easy to understand. Lacking comfort with the format, it should be the default for most academic experts. This lack of comfort could result in heavy use of jargon and qualifiers (e.g., "it depends"), explanations that are unintelligible to the average member of the public, and, worst of all, a lack of preparedness for the brief time window of a T.V. segment. The average T.V. newscast is ~22 minutes (with eight minutes of commercials). Given the requirements for traffic, weather, sports, top stories, and other segments, giving expert interviewees more than a few minutes to speak is usually impossible. Additionally, as discussed above, to get the experience needed to be "good-on-TV," it helps to already be "good-on-TV." Given all of these factors, experts known to be "good-on-TV" are more likely to be preferentially selected than those who are not good-on-TV.

Demand-side intermediaries in the print media have a similar preferential selection dynamic to being "good-on-TV" called "being quotable." The dynamics around quotable sources are nearly identical. Once print journalists find a quotable expert, they preferentially select them as a background source or quote whenever they cover their topic of expertise. Fundamentally, these relationships are based on trust, with the journalists trusting a small list of "go-to people." They gravitate toward big names because they grant a quote gravitas and instant credibility with their audience. But, more importantly, once they have someone whose expertise they trust and who produces good quotes, they will go back to them repeatedly. While a journalist might want more sources or to differentiate and diversify their sourcing pool, doing so is difficult due to time pressures as well as the challenge of evaluating expertise outside of their area of core competency.

From the supply-side intermediaries' perspective, while they may try to push specific experts, those experts still have to be competent in the media context (i.e., quotable or "good-on-TV"). Their ability to promote an expert who does not possess those qualities is minimal.

There is another factor that influences repeat-bookings: experts' location. The ability to meet in person for an interview, especially on visual media, is helpful. Especially prior to the pandemic, producers were wary of remote appearances due to concerns about technical difficulties. For example, shows in New York would look for New Yorkers who could come into the studio or be interviewed at their homes or offices by an employee. More rural local news broadcasts would often look to nearby universities for experts. University affiliation is also highly salient. Local news broadcasts would often preferentially select experts from nearby universities due to their audience credibility. Similarly, national broadcasts look for experts with nationally relevant credentials, such as affiliations with well-known firms, important government agencies, or top universities.

In addition, repeatedly booked experts gain greater visibility in the public sphere, enabling them to accrue public status as an authority on a topic or subject. However, the public's conception of an expert's area of expertise is often significantly broader than that of their fellow experts. In other words, someone the public sees as a "Russia Expert" could be a political scientist with expertise in USSR-USA nuclear disarmament talks. However, this fact may not stop them from being asked about and opining on a tangentially related topic, such as Vladimir Putin's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This is the sort of purity norm violation many experts worry about, causing anticipatory selecting-out. While there is a floor regarding what the public and media will accept as adequate credentials to appear on T.V. and speak with authority on a topic, that floor is relatively low (e.g., a professional degree or doctorate in a related field). This floor is especially low compared to what fellow experts would consider expertise within a profession. This low floor for expertise combines with dynamics of preferential selection – such as availability – to incentivize repeat-booking of the same expert on a variety of tangentially related topics. Relatedly, experts who worry about purity norm violations and are not preferentially selected may be more likely to

anticipatorily select-out in response to this kind of norm-violating discourse in their area of expertise.

The low floor for credentials also helps us understand who is allowed to spread scientific misinformation through the media. For example, television networks generally do not allow totally uncredentialed guests to participate in important medical debates such as the effectiveness of vaccines (outside of public figures such as politicians and celebrities). Instead, they bring on people who may practice in an unrelated area but have publicly relevant credentials. For example, a guest's M.D. or PhD significantly protects the network from criticism, and the public generally lacks the sophistication to understand that, say, an emergency medicine specialist lacks sufficient expertise in immunology to credibly discuss vaccine science in a professional context. These factors help explain why experts regularly question orthodoxies on TV that they would be considered unqualified to debate professionally. Relatedly, this low credential floor may be part of what is inspiring lay people to participate in science outside of institutional norms and ideals as allies of expertise (Berr, 2024).

Many experts who wish to avoid the penalties for purity norm violation need to speak at a level of depth that does not fit within the structure of a newscast that would invite them. Additionally, this level of depth is not necessarily appreciated or desired by the demand-side intermediary or its audience. At the same time, using simplified explanations when communicating with the public can constitute a violation of professional purity norms, potentially resulting in intraprofessional status loss, especially for some experts who are women and racialized minorities and perceive greater negative consequences for professional norm violations, and thus tend to anticipatorily select-out of the subset of available experts (Abbott, 1981, 1988; Eyal, 2022). This anticipatory selecting-out of experts unwilling to speak in the manner required by demand-side intermediaries and the public skews the demographics of amplified experts in favor of experts who face lower penalties for non-order.

Together, these factors combine to create a reinforcing dynamic where demand-side intermediaries face significant incentives to select the same experts repeatedly (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Thus, the demographics of the preferentially selected subset of experts are increasingly out of touch with a rapidly diversifying population of experts. As experts leave their professions due to factors such as retirement, the media slowly selects new experts. If new experts do well in their initial public appearances, they will be promoted and preferentially selected more frequently through repeat-booking (when their topic becomes newsworthy, when a preferred expert is busy, etc.). Thus, the subset of amplified experts does change, but this process is very slow and tends to favor the status-quo, skewing toward conservatism and characterized by a lack of both epistemic and demographic diversity (Lamont, 2018). Relatedly, the underrepresentation of female experts in media barely changed between 1995 and 2015 despite significant increases in gender diversity within the universal set of experts (e.g., in universities and industry research labs) and presumably within the subset of experts selecting-in (Macharia, 2020; Zhou & Gao, 2021).

CONSEQUENCES, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Adding *selective-promotion* and *preferential selection* to our model significantly improves our understanding of the public market for expertise (Abbott, 1981, 1988; Eyal, 2022; Heimstädt et al., 2023). Demand-side intermediaries in the media and supply-side intermediaries such as communications professionals are influencing the selection and representation of expertise in the public sphere in hitherto understudied ways, with significant implications for the legitimacy of expert authority in the "hearts and minds" of the public. The incentives that drive intermediaries' decision-making, such as the desire to repeat-book, and the desire to preferentially select experts who are "good-on-TV" or "quotable" significantly skew which experts speak to the public.

Similarly, the incentives that drive the decision-making of intermediaries have significant impacts on who discusses important topics, how those topics are discussed, and ultimately the composition of the subset of amplified experts (Abbott, 1981, 1988; Ekström, 2016; Menon, 2017; Zavyalova et al., 2017). The inefficiencies imposed by supply- and demand-side intermediaries on the market for expertise are not purely theoretical problems. They have significant real-world implications. Due to the dynamics causing experts to be selectively promoted, preferentially selected, and ultimately amplified at different rates, public discussion of topics underrepresents diverse perspectives relative to their representation in the universal set of experts.

Additionally, amplified experts are, on average, significantly older than the universal set of experts and the subset of experts that have selected-in, meaning the viewpoints the public hears are more status-quoist, and the product of a more limited set of circumstances and backgrounds. Relatedly, an increasingly diverse public is further alienated by discussions between a subset of experts who are significantly "older, whiter, and male" and thus unrepresentative of the demographic composition of the public (Macharia, 2020). Ultimately, this makes the perspectives the public hears from experts more homogenous and potentially risks damaging the public's trust in expertise and expert authority.

To elaborate, supply- and demand-side intermediaries play an important role in amplifying experts stratified along the dimensions of seniority, race, and gender. Their clear preferences for experts they have worked with before, who are more senior, and who are from influential institutions/professions means that the subset of experts who regularly interact with the media is older, whiter, and more male than the universal set of experts. These skewed demographics have significant implications for the public's trust in experts and expert authority, especially among groups that are less represented in the subset of amplified experts (Huising, 2015; Menon, 2017). Ultimately, these groups are being denied representation to participate and shape the public discourse. This underrepresentation is not just a problem in the present. Because of the seniority skew and reinforcing dynamics of expert amplification, people who select-out in the present may significantly diminish their ability to become amplified in the future (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Additionally, while the broader public is

being denied the ideas and perspectives of these under-amplified experts, the public is likely also being overexposed to amplified groups of experts and their dated theories and conservatism in ideas.

Additionally, scandals involving the relatively few amplified experts damage public trust in this artificially small subset of experts. Furthermore, the over-representation of certain academic disciplines and the underrepresentation of others limits the perspectives the public gets. Experts who fail to secure representation from intermediaries generally lack the skillset and platform needed to meaningfully participate in public discourse. This means that the preferences and incentives of intermediaries are potentially the most significant factor influencing public discussions on topics they know little about.

Notably, these processes do not amplify worse experts at the expense of better ones or vice versa; rather, because participants are acting according to incentives that are unrelated to underlying expert quality, they produce results that are not correlated with quality. So rather than producing a higher-quality subset of amplified experts or a lower-quality subset of amplified experts – in comparison to the universal set of experts – expert amplification produces a subset of amplified experts of varying quality because it amplifies experts based upon factors that are uncorrelated with quality. This has significant consequences, especially as the public finds it difficult to make accurate, independent evaluations of expert quality and instead uses a variety of shortcuts, such as popularity and the endorsements of intermediaries (Benjamin-Pollak & Karunakaran, in preparation), for evaluating quality.

The conceptual nature of this paper imposes a number of limitations. First, our mechanism is based on perceptions of negative consequences for actions driving behavior based upon the work on professional status and purity norms theorized by Abbott (1981) in his classic work on status and strain in professions. The core idea is that *belief* in the potential negative consequences of violating professional norms is sufficient to drive the "selecting-out" behavior of experts. Relatedly, given the focus of the paper on purity norms and norm violations, we chose to focus on certain types of communication with the public at the expense of others for clarity in our theorizing and simplicity of our model. This is especially true on the supply-side, where there are a large number of potential pathways and roles that can be involved in the process of expert amplification. In our view, whether something goes through a press officer, a publicist, someone employed by an academic department, a law firm, or a publisher does not majorly impact the theoretical processes at play. Additionally, we believe that while the incentives of these people can differ based on their professional role and affiliation, the impact of the gap in incentives between supply-side intermediaries and experts remains similar as long as the gap persists. Ultimately, we are more focused on these misalignments of incentives rather than the specific incentives of any participant.

One of the most significant alternative pathways for expertise dissemination is social media. As an alternative pathway for expertise, social media is not differentiated enough to be worth splitting off and discussing separately from the primary processes of this paper. We believe that these pathways for speaking with the public work similarly to the one outlined in this paper. Being successful at social

media for an expert generally involves treating it more like a job (in terms of lack of topic control and time investment). Ironically, the more like a job it becomes, the less direct expertise they can produce and the more they have to source from other experts. The more "professional" they become in social media, the more they should be treated like an intermediary due to a similar set of behavioral incentives that begin to affect them. For scientists interested in participating in a non-intermediated fashion, this is a "superstar market" where one person may get a lot of attention, but the vast majority do not (Rosen, 1981). Conversely, just because an expert such as a scientist is a social media celebrity does not mean they are also professionally respected. As scholarship has repeatedly shown, public and professional status are often misaligned with each other (Abbott, 1981, 1988) Additionally, the recent migration of many scientists from X (formerly Twitter) to other social networks such as Threads and Bluesky has further fragmented this communication channel.

To summarize, there can be other pathways through which expert amplification can happen. We are focusing on what we view as the most common and theoretically relevant pathway. While media presence is an important element of the market for expertise in the public sphere, it is only one element. Integrating the works of scholars looking at public understanding and public trust in science is an important direction for future research (Gauchat, 2012; Horst et al., 2016).

CONCLUSION

Examining the supply- and demand-side processes in the public market for expertise, and focusing on the role that intermediaries on the supply- and demand-side play in shaping the selection, representation, and amplification of experts in the public sphere, is of vital importance to understanding the public's rising distrust in experts and expert authority (Ekström, 2016; Huising, 2015, 2024; Menon, 2017; Preda, 2023) – what scholars refer to as the "crisis of expertise" (Eyal, 2019, 2022). Skews due to which experts are penalized for their professional norm violations, which ones are not, which experts are amplified by intermediaries, and which ones are not impact not only the representation of experts in the public sphere, but also which perspectives and topics get discussed and become part of the public discourse, ultimately damaging expert authority with a public that is increasingly alienated from the experts they see in the media. Together, these supply-side and demand-side processes influence the content and structure of critical debates about "matters of concern" (Latour, 2004) that are societally relevant and important, thus shaping the public discourse and contributing to public's increasing distrust of expertise and expert authority (Eyal, 2019; Heimstädt et al., 2023).

NOTES

1. For the purposes of this paper, when we talk about experts we are discussing individuals with a specific, valuable skillset operating within professions organized around that

skillset – for example, doctors, lawyers, or scientists. But our level of analysis is slightly more specific, meaning we believe that these phenomena are occurring in professions such as epidemiology, securities law, and low-temperature physics.

2. Note that our model is based upon the anticipatory avoidance of specific behaviors by individuals due to their perceptions of receiving negative consequences for those behaviors as they are believed to violate professional norms. The logic here is that differing views about the negative consequences will drive variation in the rates of anticipatory avoidance (e.g., Abbott, 1981).

3. While the discussion of why selection based upon demographic characteristics skews the demographics of amplified experts and why it matters will mostly take place below as we explore the impacts of demand-side intermediaries, we think it may be useful to briefly summarize these arguments here to avoid confusion. While a process that privileges high-status experts having negative impacts seems counterintuitive, it does have two significant downsides. First, while amplification selects for high-status actors, it does not select for the quality or appropriateness of expertise. In fact, while amplification is not necessarily correlated with expertise quality (selecting on other criteria), the process is actually misaligned with expertise appropriateness because lower-status experts will refuse to cross professional boundaries due to worries about professional norm violation and impurity, but higher-status ones do not have the same perceived penalties for impurity. Rather than looking for the best expert to speak on a topic within a professional context, intermediaries instead select for public status because their audience have a relatively poor understanding of professional expertise and its boundaries. For example, inviting Anthony Fauci to talk about infectious diseases (his specialty) is appropriate, but bringing him on to discuss psychiatry or mental health issues would be a disservice to the public despite his high status.

4. Note that for the purposes of our paper, there are three types of experts that we will not be discussing because other dynamics drive their selection; retained experts, competitive expert selections, and government officials. Retained experts, meaning experts paid a substantial fee to appear regularly for a media organization, are governed by different dynamics due to being compensated and contracted. Competitive expert selections, people who are in demand by the media that they have near-total agency in terms of their appearances, are also governed by different dynamics and uncommon among professional experts (usually only senior politicians and major celebrities fall under this category). Finally, when government officials appear as experts, there is often some sort of quid pro-quo, either implied or actual, for future access or a negotiation about which government employee is supplied, differentiating this from other types of expert selection (Hartman, 1984).

REFERENCES

Abbott, A. (1981). Status and status strain in the professions. *American Journal of Sociology*, *86*(4), 819–835. https://doi.org/10.1086/227318

Abbott, A. (1988). *The system of professions: An essay on the expert division of labor*. University of Chicago Press.

Adut, A. (2008). *On scandal: Moral disturbances in society, politics* (Vol. *31*). Cambridge University Press.

Anteby, M., & Holm, A. L. (2021). Translating expertise across work contexts: U.S. puppeteers move from stage to screen. *American Sociological Review*, *86*(2), 310–340. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122420987199

Arnoldi, J. (2007). Universities and the public recognition of expertise. *Minerva*, *45*(1), 49–61.

Barraclough, K. (2004). Why doctors don't read research papers. *BMJ*, *329*(7479), 1411.

Benjamin-Pollak, N. A., & Karunakaran, A. (in preparation). *Authority by popularity: How technological developments and changes in the media have given rise to a novel mechanism for evaluating expertise*.

Berr, K. (2024). Allies of expertise: How laypeople defend the epistemic authority of science online. *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*.

Boczkowski, P. J. (2010). *News at work: Imitation in an age of information abundance*. University of Chicago Press.

Botelho, T. L., & Gertsberg, M. (2022). The disciplining effect of status: Evaluator status awards and observed gender bias in evaluations. *Management Science*, *68*(7), 5311–5329.

Butler, N., Delaney, H., & Spoelstra, S. (2015). Problematizing 'relevance' in the business school: The case of leadership studies. *British Journal of Management*, *26*(4), 731–744.

Childress, C. (2017). *Under the cover: The creation, production, and reception of a novel*. Princeton University Press.

Cukier, W., Jackson, S., & Gagnon, S. (2019). The representation of women and racialized minorities as expert sources on-air in Canadian public affairs television. *Canadian Journal of Communication*, *44*(1), 25–47. https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2019v44n1a3321

Demortain, D. (2023). How scientists become experts – Or don't: Social organization of research and engagement in scientific advice in a toxicology laboratory. *Social Studies of Science*.

Ekström, M. (2016). Medical authority and ordinary expertise: The changing forms of doctors' talk in Swedish public service television 1983–2013. *Discourse, Context & Media*, *13*, 20–28.

Eyal, G. (2019). *The crisis of expertise*. John Wiley & Sons.

Eyal, G. (2022). *Mistrust in numbers: Regulatory science. Trans-science and the Crisis of Expertise*.

Gauchat, G. (2012). Politicization of science in the public sphere: A study of public trust in the United States, 1974 to 2010. *American Sociological Review*, *77*(2), 167–187.

Godart, F., Hsu, G., & Negro, G. (2023). Gatekeeping and the use of contested practices in creative industries: The case of fur in fashion. *Organization Science*, *34*(2), 637–656.

Hartman, T. (1984). Booking Guest Experts for T.V. News. *Washington Journalism Review, Unknown*, 24–28.

Heimstädt, M., Koljonen, T., & Elmholdt, K. T. (2023). Expertise in management research: A review and agenda for future research. *Academy of Management Annals*.

Horst, M., Davies, S. R., & Irwin, A. (2016). Reframing science communication. In *The handbook of science and technology studies* (pp. 881–908). MIT Press.

Howell, L., & Singer, J. B. (2017). Pushy or a Princess?: Women experts and British broadcast news. *Journalism Practice*, *11*(9), 1062–1078. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2016.1232173

Huising, R. (2015). To hive or to hold? Producing professional authority through scut work. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *60*(2), 263–299.

Josephson, J. (2021). *How to book a guest*. The Mechanics of Producing.

Lamont, M. (2018). Addressing recognition gaps: Destigmatization and the reduction of inequality. *American Sociological Review*, *83*(3), 419–444.

Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern. *Critical Inquiry*, *30*(2), 225–248.

Macharia, S. (2020). Global media monitoring project (GMMP). In *The international encyclopedia of gender, media, and communication* (pp. 1–6).

Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). 8 social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of power and status. *The Academy of Management Annals*, *2*(1), 351–398.

McLuhan, M. (2017). The medium is the message. In *Communication theory* (pp. 390–402). Routledge.

Menon, A. V. (2017). Do online reviews diminish physician authority? The case of cosmetic surgery in the U.S. *Social Science & Medicine*, *181*, 1–8.

Moss-Racusin, C. A., & Rudman, L. A. (2010). *Disruptions in women's self-promotion: The backlash avoidance model*.

Postman, N. (2005). *Amusing ourselves to death: Public discourse in the age of show business*. Penguin.

Preda, A. (2023). *The spectacle of expertise: Why financial analysts perform in the media*. Columbia University Press.

Rosen, S. (1981). The economics of superstars. *The American Economic Review*, *71*(5), 845–858.

Roulet, T. J., & Clemente, M. (2018). Let's open the media's black box: The media as a set of heterogeneous actors and not only as a homogenous ensemble. *Academy of Management Review*, *43*(2), 327–329.

Singleton-Green, B. (2010). The communication gap: Why doesn't accounting research make a greater contribution to debates on accounting policy? *Accounting in Europe*, *7*(2), 129–145.

Smith, J. L., & Huntoon, M. (2014). Women's bragging rights: Overcoming modesty norms to facilitate women's self-promotion. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *38*(4), 447–459. https://doi.org/10.1177/0361684313515840

Spencer, M. E. (1970). Weber on legitimate norms and authority. *The British Journal of Sociology*, *21*(2), 123. https://doi.org/10.2307/588403

Tapp, A. (2005). Why practitioners don? T read our articles and what we should do about it. *The Marketing Review*, *5*(1), 3–12.

Weber, M., Owen, D. S., Strong, T. B., Livingstone, R., Weber, M., & Weber, M. (2004). *The vocation lectures*. Hackett Pub.

Zavyalova, A., Pfarrer, M. D., & Reger, R. K. (2017). Celebrity and infamy? The consequences of media narratives about organizational identity. *Academy of Management Review*, *42*(3), 461–480.

Zavyalova, A., Pfarrer, M. D., Reger, R. K., & Shapiro, D. L. (2012). Managing the message: The effects of firm actions and industry spillovers on media coverage following wrongdoing. *Academy of Management Journal*, *55*(5), 1079–1101.

Zhou, E., & Gao, J. (2021). Graduate enrollment and degrees: 2010 to 2020. *Council of Graduate Schools*.

Zuckerman, E. W. (2017). The categorical imperative revisited: Implications of categorization as a theoretical tool. In *From categories to categorization: Studies in sociology, organizations and strategy at the crossroads*. Emerald Publishing Limited.