Descriptive statistics and correlationsa
| Variables | M | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Return on assets | 0.03 | 0.18 | 1.00 | |||||||||||
| 2. Return on assetst−1 | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0.50*** | 1.00 | ||||||||||
| 3. Firm age (ln) | 3.44 | 1.06 | 0.16*** | 0.17*** | 1.00 | |||||||||
| 4. Firm size (ln) | 12.73 | 1.90 | 0.24*** | 0.21*** | 0.25*** | 1.00 | ||||||||
| 5. Board size | 9.01 | 3.17 | 0.14*** | 0.13*** | 0.25*** | 0.64*** | 1.00 | |||||||
| 6. Block ownership | 0.43 | 0.23 | 0.18*** | 0.12** | 0.30*** | −0.02 | −0.01 | 1.00 | ||||||
| 7. CEO ownership | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.17*** | 0.18*** | 0.05 | −0.06* | −0.15*** | 0.59*** | 1.00 | |||||
| 8. Board heterogeneity | 0.49 | 0.10 | 0.12*** | 0.11** | 0.21*** | 0.15*** | 0.38*** | 0.06 | 0.03 | 1.00 | ||||
| 9. Firm leverage | 0.56 | 0.28 | −0.39*** | −0.14*** | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.05 | −0.01 | −0.09** | 1.00 | |||
| 10. Social category faultlines | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.12*** | 0.22*** | 0.27*** | 0.08** | 0.08** | 0.13*** | 0.01 | 1.00 | ||
| 11. Informational faultlines | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.12*** | 0.25*** | 0.44*** | −0.12*** | −0.12*** | 0.41*** | −0.07** | 0.15*** | 1.00 | |
| 12. Informational faultlines² | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.10*** | 0.21*** | 0.38*** | −0.11*** | −0.11*** | 0.34*** | −0.06* | 0.12*** | 0.95*** | 1.00 |
| Variables | M | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Return on assets | 0.03 | 0.18 | 1.00 | |||||||||||
| 2. Return on assets | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0.50*** | 1.00 | ||||||||||
| 3. Firm age (ln) | 3.44 | 1.06 | 0.16*** | 0.17*** | 1.00 | |||||||||
| 4. Firm size (ln) | 12.73 | 1.90 | 0.24*** | 0.21*** | 0.25*** | 1.00 | ||||||||
| 5. Board size | 9.01 | 3.17 | 0.14*** | 0.13*** | 0.25*** | 0.64*** | 1.00 | |||||||
| 6. Block ownership | 0.43 | 0.23 | 0.18*** | 0.12** | 0.30*** | −0.02 | −0.01 | 1.00 | ||||||
| 7. CEO ownership | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.17*** | 0.18*** | 0.05 | −0.06* | −0.15*** | 0.59*** | 1.00 | |||||
| 8. Board heterogeneity | 0.49 | 0.10 | 0.12*** | 0.11** | 0.21*** | 0.15*** | 0.38*** | 0.06 | 0.03 | 1.00 | ||||
| 9. Firm leverage | 0.56 | 0.28 | −0.39*** | −0.14*** | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.05 | −0.01 | −0.09** | 1.00 | |||
| 10. Social category faultlines | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.12*** | 0.22*** | 0.27*** | 0.08** | 0.08** | 0.13*** | 0.01 | 1.00 | ||
| 11. Informational faultlines | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.12*** | 0.25*** | 0.44*** | −0.12*** | −0.12*** | 0.41*** | −0.07** | 0.15*** | 1.00 | |
| 12. Informational faultlines² | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.10*** | 0.21*** | 0.38*** | −0.11*** | −0.11*** | 0.34*** | −0.06* | 0.12*** | 0.95*** | 1.00 |
Notes: a106 public firms (representing 804 firm-year observations) from 2006 to 2014. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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