Descriptive statistics for organizational capital and investment efficiency
| Variable | Mean | Std. dev. | Min | Max | 25th | 75th | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OKTA | 0.193 | 0.206 | 0.000 | 1.110 | 0.054 | 0.260 | 5,742 |
| OKTC | 0.284 | 0.325 | 0.000 | 1.798 | 0.080 | 0.364 | 5,706 |
| Investment inefficiency | −0.001 | 0.005 | −0.018 | 0.030 | −0.002 | 0.001 | 5,161 |
| Size (log) | 16.513 | 1.253 | 12.735 | 19.521 | 15.961 | 17.354 | 5,742 |
| ROA | 0.010 | 0.011 | −0.110 | 0.161 | 0.041 | 0.101 | 5,685 |
| Slack | 0.144 | 0.163 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.025 | 0.189 | 5,712 |
| Tangibility | 0.625 | 0.220 | 0.067 | 1.000 | 0.468 | 0.835 | 5,742 |
| Firm age (log) | 23.864 | 12.280 | 0.000 | 50.000 | 14.000 | 35.000 | 5,479 |
| Leverage | 0.663 | 0.512 | 0.106 | 1.000 | 0.253 | 0.564 | 5,783 |
| Tobin’ Q | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.025 | 0.008 | 0.016 | 5,676 |
| Loss | 0.054 | 0.226 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5,819 |
| Industry-level growth uncertainty | 0.127 | 0.121 | 0.001 | 0.704 | 0.055 | 0.149 | 5,797 |
| CEO age | 55.763 | 7.139 | 21 | 86 | 52 | 61 | 5,769 |
| CEO gender | 0.035 | 0.182 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5,762 |
| CEO duality (power) | 0.472 | 0.499 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5,783 |
| CEO tenure | 6.420 | 6.347 | 0.000 | 49.000 | 2.000 | 10.000 | 5,745 |
| CEO external board seats | 2.382 | 2.450 | 0.000 | 29.000 | 1.000 | 3.000 | 5,273 |
| IDD | 0.365 | 0.481 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5,819 |
| Variable | Mean | Std. dev. | Min | Max | 25th | 75th | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OKTA | 0.193 | 0.206 | 0.000 | 1.110 | 0.054 | 0.260 | 5,742 |
| OKTC | 0.284 | 0.325 | 0.000 | 1.798 | 0.080 | 0.364 | 5,706 |
| Investment inefficiency | −0.001 | 0.005 | −0.018 | 0.030 | −0.002 | 0.001 | 5,161 |
| Size (log) | 16.513 | 1.253 | 12.735 | 19.521 | 15.961 | 17.354 | 5,742 |
| ROA | 0.010 | 0.011 | −0.110 | 0.161 | 0.041 | 0.101 | 5,685 |
| Slack | 0.144 | 0.163 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.025 | 0.189 | 5,712 |
| Tangibility | 0.625 | 0.220 | 0.067 | 1.000 | 0.468 | 0.835 | 5,742 |
| Firm age (log) | 23.864 | 12.280 | 0.000 | 50.000 | 14.000 | 35.000 | 5,479 |
| Leverage | 0.663 | 0.512 | 0.106 | 1.000 | 0.253 | 0.564 | 5,783 |
| Tobin’ Q | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.025 | 0.008 | 0.016 | 5,676 |
| Loss | 0.054 | 0.226 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5,819 |
| Industry-level growth uncertainty | 0.127 | 0.121 | 0.001 | 0.704 | 0.055 | 0.149 | 5,797 |
| CEO age | 55.763 | 7.139 | 21 | 86 | 52 | 61 | 5,769 |
| CEO gender | 0.035 | 0.182 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5,762 |
| CEO duality (power) | 0.472 | 0.499 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5,783 |
| CEO tenure | 6.420 | 6.347 | 0.000 | 49.000 | 2.000 | 10.000 | 5,745 |
| CEO external board seats | 2.382 | 2.450 | 0.000 | 29.000 | 1.000 | 3.000 | 5,273 |
| IDD | 0.365 | 0.481 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5,819 |
Note(s): This table presents the descriptive statistics, including mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 25th and 75th percentiles and number of observations of the empirical data for all the study variables, including the instrumental variable: Industry-level growth uncertainty. All variables are defined in Appendix 1
Source(s): Authors’ own work
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