The moderating role of CEO gender, age, power, tenure, and external board seats
| Variables | CEO gender (1) | CEO age (2) | CEO power (3) | CEO tenure (4) | CEO external directorships (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 0.062* | 0.022*** | 0.019*** | 0.024*** | 0.023*** |
| (0.035) | (0.008) | (0.001) | (0.008) | (0.008) | |
| OKTA | 0.045*** | 0.008*** | 0.007*** | 0.006*** | 0.008*** |
| (0.017) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.002) | |
| CEO gender | −0.003* | ||||
| (0.002) | |||||
| CEO age | 0.001*** | ||||
| (0.000) | |||||
| CEO power | 0.001*** | ||||
| (0.001) | |||||
| CEO tenure | 0.001*** | ||||
| (0.000) | |||||
| CEO external directorships | 0.001*** | ||||
| (0.000) | |||||
| OKTA * CEO gender | −0.009*** | ||||
| (0.005) | |||||
| OKTA * CEO age | −0.006*** | ||||
| (0.001) | |||||
| OKTA * CEO power | −0.005*** | ||||
| (0.000) | |||||
| OKTA * CEO tenure | −0.004*** | ||||
| (0.000) | |||||
| OKTA * CEO external directorships | −0.006*** | ||||
| (0.002) | |||||
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 (%) | 34.87 | 50.48 | 50.41 | 49.92 | 49.90 |
| F-statistics (Wald) | 6.32 | 21.63 | 23.51 | 25.63 | 22.70 |
| p-value | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Observations | 4,867 | 4,909 | 4,840 | 4,909 | 4,909 |
| Variables | CEO gender (1) | CEO age (2) | CEO power (3) | CEO tenure (4) | CEO external directorships (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 0.062* | 0.022*** | 0.019*** | 0.024*** | 0.023*** |
| (0.035) | (0.008) | (0.001) | (0.008) | (0.008) | |
| CEO gender | −0.003* | ||||
| (0.002) | |||||
| CEO age | 0.001*** | ||||
| (0.000) | |||||
| CEO power | 0.001*** | ||||
| (0.001) | |||||
| CEO tenure | 0.001*** | ||||
| (0.000) | |||||
| CEO external directorships | 0.001*** | ||||
| (0.000) | |||||
| Control variables | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 34.87 | 50.48 | 50.41 | 49.92 | 49.90 | |
| 6.32 | 21.63 | 23.51 | 25.63 | 22.70 | |
| (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
| Observations | 4,867 | 4,909 | 4,840 | 4,909 | 4,909 |
Note(s): This table presents the regression coefficients of the panel regression model. The dependent variable, Investment inefficiency, is the deviation from optimal investment and computed as the residuals from the investment model. OKTA is the ratio of organizational capital to total assets and is the independent variable of interest. CEO gender is the first moderator and is constructed as dummy variable that takes one if the CEO is female and zero otherwise. CEO age is the second moderator and is constructed as dummy variable that takes one if the CEO’s age is above the sample median and zero otherwise. CEO power is the third moderator and is constructed as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors and zero otherwise. CEO tenure is the fourth moderator. It takes the form of a dummy variable equal to one if a CEO’s tenure is above the sample median and zero otherwise. CEO external directorships is the fifth moderator, which is constructed as a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the number of external board membership seats of a CEO is above the sample median and zero otherwise. Control variables include size, ROA, slack, tangibility, firm age, leverage, Tobin’s Q, and Loss. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1. Figures in parentheses are standard errors that are clustered at the firm level for heteroscedasticity. (***) (**) (*) significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) levels
Source(s): Authors’ own work
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