Regression results between investment opportunities and firm performance and the moderating roles of female ownership and concentrated ownership: controlling for additional country-level variables
| Predicted sign | Dependent variable = Firm performance (PERF1) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | ||
| INVOP | + | 0.083*** | 0.072*** | 0.120*** |
| (4.199) | (3.660) | (4.422) | ||
| INVOP × FEMOWN | + | – | 0.031** | – |
| (2.083) | ||||
| INVOP × CONTROL | – | – | – | −0.054** |
| (−2.262) | ||||
| FEMOWN | ? | −0.004 | −0.027* | −0.004 |
| (−0.570) | (−1.973) | (−0.570) | ||
| CONTROL | – | −0.002 | −0.002 | 0.039** |
| (−0.646) | (−0.630) | (2.068) | ||
| SIZE | + | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| (1.321) | (1.319) | (1.283) | ||
| FAGE | ? | −0.034*** | −0.034*** | −0.034*** |
| (−6.865) | (−6.868) | (−6.872) | ||
| FOROWN | + | −0.012 | −0.012 | −0.011 |
| (−1.396) | (−1.404) | (−1.367) | ||
| FINCRED | + | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| (1.072) | (1.045) | (1.078) | ||
| EXPORT | + | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| (0.387) | (0.393) | (0.327) | ||
| FINCONS | – | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.002 |
| (−0.919) | (−0.928) | (−0.918) | ||
| BUSRISK | – | −0.017*** | −0.017*** | −0.017*** |
| (−12.356) | (−12.432) | (−12.509) | ||
| CORP | + | −0.003 | −0.003 | −0.003 |
| (−0.508) | (−0.499) | (−0.537) | ||
| EXTDEP | + | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.012 |
| (1.357) | (1.365) | (1.338) | ||
| INNOV | + | 0.010*** | 0.010*** | 0.010*** |
| (3.127) | (3.160) | (3.167) | ||
| LNGDP | ? | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| (0.107) | (0.128) | (0.110) | ||
| FINDEV | ? | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 |
| (−0.587) | (−0.586) | (−0.585) | ||
| LAW | ? | −0.028 | −0.027 | −0.028 |
| (−1.505) | (−1.486) | (−1.532) | ||
| GFC | ? | −0.031 | −0.030 | −0.030 |
| (−1.448) | (−1.433) | (−1.424) | ||
| GCORR | ? | −0.014 | −0.013 | −0.014 |
| (−0.768) | (−0.742) | (−0.759) | ||
| JUDC | ? | −0.044** | −0.045** | −0.044** |
| (−2.336) | (−2.335) | (−2.320) | ||
| ENFORCE | ? | −0.097*** | −0.097*** | −0.097*** |
| (−3.346) | (−3.325) | (−3.324) | ||
| CONSTANT | ? | 0.388*** | 0.392*** | 0.358*** |
| (3.437) | (3.487) | (3.112) | ||
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Observations | 26,402 | 26,402 | 26,402 | |
| R-squared | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | |
| Test: INVOP + INVOP × FEMOWN = 0 | 12.27*** | |||
| Test: INVOP + INVOP × CONTROL = 0 | 10.62*** | |||
| Predicted sign | Dependent variable = Firm performance ( | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | ||
| + | 0.083*** | 0.072*** | 0.120*** | |
| (4.199) | (3.660) | (4.422) | ||
| + | – | 0.031** | – | |
| (2.083) | ||||
| – | – | – | −0.054** | |
| (−2.262) | ||||
| ? | −0.004 | −0.027* | −0.004 | |
| (−0.570) | (−1.973) | (−0.570) | ||
| – | −0.002 | −0.002 | 0.039** | |
| (−0.646) | (−0.630) | (2.068) | ||
| + | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | |
| (1.321) | (1.319) | (1.283) | ||
| ? | −0.034*** | −0.034*** | −0.034*** | |
| (−6.865) | (−6.868) | (−6.872) | ||
| + | −0.012 | −0.012 | −0.011 | |
| (−1.396) | (−1.404) | (−1.367) | ||
| + | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | |
| (1.072) | (1.045) | (1.078) | ||
| + | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.003 | |
| (0.387) | (0.393) | (0.327) | ||
| – | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.002 | |
| (−0.919) | (−0.928) | (−0.918) | ||
| – | −0.017*** | −0.017*** | −0.017*** | |
| (−12.356) | (−12.432) | (−12.509) | ||
| + | −0.003 | −0.003 | −0.003 | |
| (−0.508) | (−0.499) | (−0.537) | ||
| + | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.012 | |
| (1.357) | (1.365) | (1.338) | ||
| + | 0.010*** | 0.010*** | 0.010*** | |
| (3.127) | (3.160) | (3.167) | ||
| ? | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | |
| (0.107) | (0.128) | (0.110) | ||
| ? | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 | |
| (−0.587) | (−0.586) | (−0.585) | ||
| ? | −0.028 | −0.027 | −0.028 | |
| (−1.505) | (−1.486) | (−1.532) | ||
| ? | −0.031 | −0.030 | −0.030 | |
| (−1.448) | (−1.433) | (−1.424) | ||
| ? | −0.014 | −0.013 | −0.014 | |
| (−0.768) | (−0.742) | (−0.759) | ||
| ? | −0.044** | −0.045** | −0.044** | |
| (−2.336) | (−2.335) | (−2.320) | ||
| ? | −0.097*** | −0.097*** | −0.097*** | |
| (−3.346) | (−3.325) | (−3.324) | ||
| ? | 0.388*** | 0.392*** | 0.358*** | |
| (3.437) | (3.487) | (3.112) | ||
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Industry fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Observations | 26,402 | 26,402 | 26,402 | |
| 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.041 | ||
| Test: | 12.27*** | |||
| Test: | 10.62*** | |||
Note(s): Superscript ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, two-tailed. Coefficient values (robust t-statistics) are shown with standard errors clustered at the country level. Descriptions of variables are provided in Appendix
Source(s): Authors’ own work
Sharing content requires targeting cookies to be enabled. Please update your cookie preferences to use this feature.