Table 9 Regression results between...

Table 9

Regression results between private firms’ investment opportunities and firm performance: role of country-level institutional factors

Panel A: role of country-level financial development
	Dependent variable = Firm performance (PERF1)
	HIGH_FDEV	LOW_FDEV	HIGH_FDEV	LOW_FDEV	HIGH_FDEV	LOW_FDEV
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
INVOP	0.120^***	0.049	0.098^**	0.046^*	0.151^***	0.096^***
INVOP	(3.304)	(1.704)	(2.626)	(1.733)	(2.839)	(3.702)
INVOP × FEMOWN	–	–	0.066^**	0.009	–	–
INVOP × FEMOWN			(2.359)	(0.422)
INVOP × CONTROL	–	–	–	–	−0.047	−0.064^**
INVOP × CONTROL					(−1.280)	(−2.256)
FEMOWN	0.006	0.002	−0.045^*	−0.004	0.006	0.002
FEMOWN	(0.963)	(0.247)	(−1.869)	(−0.193)	(0.977)	(0.239)
CONTROL	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	0.033	0.045^**
CONTROL	(−0.927)	(−0.336)	(−0.881)	(−0.335)	(1.126)	(2.206)
Intercept	0.015	0.125^**	0.033^**	0.127^**	−0.008	0.091^*
Intercept	(1.041)	(2.435)	(2.369)	(2.543)	(−0.268)	(1.857)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,913	9,929	13,913	9,929	13,913	9,929
R-squared	0.051	0.076	0.052	0.076	0.051	0.077

Panel A: role of country-level financial development
	Dependent variable = Firm performance (PERF1)
	HIGH_FDEV	LOW_FDEV	HIGH_FDEV	LOW_FDEV	HIGH_FDEV	LOW_FDEV
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
INVOP	0.120^***	0.049	0.098^**	0.046^*	0.151^***	0.096^***
INVOP	(3.304)	(1.704)	(2.626)	(1.733)	(2.839)	(3.702)
INVOP × FEMOWN	–	–	0.066^**	0.009	–	–
INVOP × FEMOWN			(2.359)	(0.422)
INVOP × CONTROL	–	–	–	–	−0.047	−0.064^**
INVOP × CONTROL					(−1.280)	(−2.256)
FEMOWN	0.006	0.002	−0.045^*	−0.004	0.006	0.002
FEMOWN	(0.963)	(0.247)	(−1.869)	(−0.193)	(0.977)	(0.239)
CONTROL	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	0.033	0.045^**
CONTROL	(−0.927)	(−0.336)	(−0.881)	(−0.335)	(1.126)	(2.206)
Intercept	0.015	0.125^**	0.033^**	0.127^**	−0.008	0.091^*
Intercept	(1.041)	(2.435)	(2.369)	(2.543)	(−0.268)	(1.857)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,913	9,929	13,913	9,929	13,913	9,929
R-squared	0.051	0.076	0.052	0.076	0.051	0.077

Panel B: role of country-level governance
	Dependent variable = Firm performance (PERF1)
	CLAW = 1	CLAW = 0	CLAW = 1	CLAW = 0	CLAW = 1	CLAW = 0
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
INVOP	0.181^*	0.076^***	0.203^**	0.061^**	0.279^*	0.102^***
INVOP	(2.405)	(3.305)	(3.284)	(2.748)	(2.112)	(4.029)
INVOP × FEMOWN	–	–	−0.054	0.046^***	–	–
INVOP × FEMOWN			(−0.658)	(2.876)
INVOP × CONTROL	–	–	–	–	−0.163	−0.038^*
INVOP × CONTROL					(−1.217)	(−1.773)
FEMOWN	−0.023	0.006	0.017	−0.029^*	−0.022	0.006
FEMOWN	(−1.653)	(1.021)	(0.290)	(−1.840)	(−1.573)	(1.013)
CONTROL	0.010	−0.006	0.010	−0.006	0.132	0.023
CONTROL	(0.605)	(−1.390)	(0.627)	(−1.338)	(1.151)	(1.497)
Intercept	0.195	0.069^***	0.180	0.080^***	0.120	0.049^**
Intercept	(1.685)	(3.133)	(1.545)	(3.683)	(0.925)	(2.474)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,529	20,427	2,529	20,427	2,529	20,427
R-squared	0.1590	0.0576	0.1594	0.0579	0.1633	0.0578

Panel B: role of country-level governance
	Dependent variable = Firm performance (PERF1)
	CLAW = 1	CLAW = 0	CLAW = 1	CLAW = 0	CLAW = 1	CLAW = 0
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
INVOP	0.181^*	0.076^***	0.203^**	0.061^**	0.279^*	0.102^***
INVOP	(2.405)	(3.305)	(3.284)	(2.748)	(2.112)	(4.029)
INVOP × FEMOWN	–	–	−0.054	0.046^***	–	–
INVOP × FEMOWN			(−0.658)	(2.876)
INVOP × CONTROL	–	–	–	–	−0.163	−0.038^*
INVOP × CONTROL					(−1.217)	(−1.773)
FEMOWN	−0.023	0.006	0.017	−0.029^*	−0.022	0.006
FEMOWN	(−1.653)	(1.021)	(0.290)	(−1.840)	(−1.573)	(1.013)
CONTROL	0.010	−0.006	0.010	−0.006	0.132	0.023
CONTROL	(0.605)	(−1.390)	(0.627)	(−1.338)	(1.151)	(1.497)
Intercept	0.195	0.069^***	0.180	0.080^***	0.120	0.049^**
Intercept	(1.685)	(3.133)	(1.545)	(3.683)	(0.925)	(2.474)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,529	20,427	2,529	20,427	2,529	20,427
R-squared	0.1590	0.0576	0.1594	0.0579	0.1633	0.0578

Panel C: role of country-level financial constraints
	Dependent variable = Firm performance (PERF1)
	HIGH_GFC	LOW_GFC	HIGH_GFC	LOW_GFC	HIGH_GFC	LOW_GFC
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
INVOP	0.075^***	0.097^***	0.071^***	0.083^***	0.111^***	0.132^***
INVOP	(3.679)	(4.026)	(3.452)	(3.677)	(4.671)	(3.286)
INVOP × FEMOWN	–	–	0.012	0.041^**	–	–
INVOP × FEMOWN			(0.661)	(2.099)
INVOP × CONTROL	–	–	–	–	−0.050^**	−0.048
INVOP × CONTROL					(−2.137)	(−1.388)
FEMOWN	−0.003	0.004	−0.011	−0.027	−0.003	0.004
FEMOWN	(−0.440)	(0.643)	(−0.753)	(−1.521)	(−0.438)	(0.652)
CONTROL	−0.006	−0.004	−0.006	−0.004	0.030	0.032
CONTROL	(−1.169)	(−1.056)	(−1.166)	(−1.027)	(1.614)	(1.244)
Intercept	0.325^***	0.071	0.329^***	0.079	0.301^***	0.045
Intercept	(5.642)	(1.184)	(5.652)	(1.333)	(5.159)	(0.714)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,103	20,082	16,103	20,082	16,103	20,082
R-squared	0.1272	0.0549	0.1273	0.0552	0.1276	0.0552

Panel C: role of country-level financial constraints
	Dependent variable = Firm performance (PERF1)
	HIGH_GFC	LOW_GFC	HIGH_GFC	LOW_GFC	HIGH_GFC	LOW_GFC
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
INVOP	0.075^***	0.097^***	0.071^***	0.083^***	0.111^***	0.132^***
INVOP	(3.679)	(4.026)	(3.452)	(3.677)	(4.671)	(3.286)
INVOP × FEMOWN	–	–	0.012	0.041^**	–	–
INVOP × FEMOWN			(0.661)	(2.099)
INVOP × CONTROL	–	–	–	–	−0.050^**	−0.048
INVOP × CONTROL					(−2.137)	(−1.388)
FEMOWN	−0.003	0.004	−0.011	−0.027	−0.003	0.004
FEMOWN	(−0.440)	(0.643)	(−0.753)	(−1.521)	(−0.438)	(0.652)
CONTROL	−0.006	−0.004	−0.006	−0.004	0.030	0.032
CONTROL	(−1.169)	(−1.056)	(−1.166)	(−1.027)	(1.614)	(1.244)
Intercept	0.325^***	0.071	0.329^***	0.079	0.301^***	0.045
Intercept	(5.642)	(1.184)	(5.652)	(1.333)	(5.159)	(0.714)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,103	20,082	16,103	20,082	16,103	20,082
R-squared	0.1272	0.0549	0.1273	0.0552	0.1276	0.0552

Panel D: role of country-level corruption
	Dependent variable = Firm performance (PERF1)
	HIGH_GCORR	LOW_GCORR	HIGH_GCORR	LOW_GCORR	HIGH_GCORR	LOW_GCORR
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
INVOP	0.056	0.076^***	0.085^***	0.064^**	0.111^***	0.140^***
INVOP	(0.800)	(2.904)	(4.098)	(2.522)	(4.540)	(3.290)
INVOP × FEMOWN	–	–	0.028	0.034^*	–	–
INVOP × FEMOWN			(1.310)	(1.999)
INVOP × CONTROL	–	–	–	–	−0.026	−0.084^**
INVOP × CONTROL					(−1.336)	(−2.089)
FEMOWN	−0.004	0.009	−0.025	−0.016	−0.005	0.010
FEMOWN	(−0.916)	(1.355)	(−1.500)	(−1.042)	(−0.924)	(1.399)
CONTROL	−0.003	−0.009	−0.003	−0.009	0.016	0.053^*
CONTROL	(−0.786)	(−1.514)	(−0.750)	(−1.545)	(1.074)	(1.680)
Intercept	0.235^***	0.248^***	0.242^***	0.256^***	0.222^***	0.200^**
Intercept	(3.344)	(2.957)	(3.450)	(3.045)	(3.144)	(2.267)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,617	14,568	21,617	14,568	21,617	14,568
R-squared	0.1226	0.0654	0.1227	0.0656	0.1227	0.0662

Panel D: role of country-level corruption
	Dependent variable = Firm performance (PERF1)
	HIGH_GCORR	LOW_GCORR	HIGH_GCORR	LOW_GCORR	HIGH_GCORR	LOW_GCORR
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
INVOP	0.056	0.076^***	0.085^***	0.064^**	0.111^***	0.140^***
INVOP	(0.800)	(2.904)	(4.098)	(2.522)	(4.540)	(3.290)
INVOP × FEMOWN	–	–	0.028	0.034^*	–	–
INVOP × FEMOWN			(1.310)	(1.999)
INVOP × CONTROL	–	–	–	–	−0.026	−0.084^**
INVOP × CONTROL					(−1.336)	(−2.089)
FEMOWN	−0.004	0.009	−0.025	−0.016	−0.005	0.010
FEMOWN	(−0.916)	(1.355)	(−1.500)	(−1.042)	(−0.924)	(1.399)
CONTROL	−0.003	−0.009	−0.003	−0.009	0.016	0.053^*
CONTROL	(−0.786)	(−1.514)	(−0.750)	(−1.545)	(1.074)	(1.680)
Intercept	0.235^***	0.248^***	0.242^***	0.256^***	0.222^***	0.200^**
Intercept	(3.344)	(2.957)	(3.450)	(3.045)	(3.144)	(2.267)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,617	14,568	21,617	14,568	21,617	14,568
R-squared	0.1226	0.0654	0.1227	0.0656	0.1227	0.0662

Note(s): Superscript ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, two-tailed. Coefficient values (robust t-statistics) are shown with standard errors clustered at the country level. Descriptions of variables are provided in Appendix

Source(s): Authors’ own work

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