Impact of institutional voids and sociocultural norms on government ownership
| Lead-lag regression | IV-2SLS | Fixed effect (year) | Fixed effect (country) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | |
| Market conditions | −5.654*** (1.020) | −10.067*** (1.680) | −6.819*** (1.168) | −5.585*** (1.022) |
| Control of corruption | −6.670*** (0.900) | −6.300*** (0.888) | −6.563*** (0.976) | −6.255*** (0.897) |
| Property rights | −0.129*** (0.0336) | −0.083** (0.0344) | −0.119*** (0.0367) | −0.129*** (0.0336) |
| Political constraints | −6.826*** (0.907) | −7.461*** (0.910) | −8.211*** (1.053) | −7.449*** (0.998) |
| Power distance | 6.826*** (0.0506) | 7.461*** (0.0606) | 8.211*** (0.0522) | 7.449*** (0.0503) |
| Firm size | −0.248 (0.633) | −0.237 (0.635) | −0.056 (0.624) | −0.239 (0.631) |
| Firm age | 1.161*** (0.331) | 1.111*** (0.330) | 1.100*** (0.335) | 1.170*** (0.331) |
| ROA | 0.189*** (0.0233) | 0.190*** (0.0234) | 0.183*** (0.0236) | 0.190*** (0.0234) |
| Tobin’s Q | 1.739*** (0.320) | 1.811*** (0.322) | 1.678*** (0.320) | 1.723*** (0.320) |
| Board size | −0.716*** (0.0749) | −0.710*** (0.0748) | −0.729*** (0.0752) | −0.718*** (0.0750) |
| Board independence | −0.015 (0.0125) | −0.014 (0.0125) | −0.018 (0.0128) | −0.009 (0.0136) |
| Female board representation | 0.054** (0.0263) | 0.053** (0.0262) | 0.052** (0.0262) | 0.053** (0.0263) |
| Board committees | 0.814*** (0.198) | 0.771*** (0.198) | 0.839*** (0.198) | 0.804*** (0.198) |
| Audit committee | −3.431*** (0.675) | −3.433*** (0.673) | −3.676*** (0.680) | −3.339*** (0.676) |
| Shareholders’ rights | 1.795*** (0.679) | 1.749** (0.682) | 1.636** (0.668) | 1.762*** (0.677) |
| Revenue growth | −0.006 (0.00430) | −0.006 (0.00432) | −0.006 (0.00419) | −0.006 (0.00437) |
| Leverage ratio | 1.853 (1.714) | 1.902 (1.718) | 1.032 (1.707) | 1.821 (1.710) |
| GDP per capita | −2.866*** (0.692) | −0.269 (1.008) | −2.456*** (0.739) | −1.749* (0.997) |
| GPD growth | 0.168 (0.292) | 0.102 (0.293) | 0.321 (0.349) | 0.107 (0.297) |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | |||
| Country | Yes | |||
| Constant | 2.661 (3.447) | 13.407*** (3.924) | 5.554 (3.968) | −5.924 (6.941) |
| Hausman test (p-value) | 5.940 (0.110) | |||
| R2 | 0.156 | 0.154 | 0.159 | 0.156 |
| Observations | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 |
| Lead-lag regression | IV-2SLS | Fixed effect (year) | Fixed effect (country) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | |
| Market conditions | −5.654 | −10.067 | −6.819 | −5.585 |
| Control of corruption | −6.670 | −6.300 | −6.563 | −6.255 |
| Property rights | −0.129 | −0.083 | −0.119 | −0.129 |
| Political constraints | −6.826 | −7.461 | −8.211 | −7.449 |
| Power distance | 6.826 | 7.461 | 8.211 | 7.449 |
| Firm size | −0.248 (0.633) | −0.237 (0.635) | −0.056 (0.624) | −0.239 (0.631) |
| Firm age | 1.161 | 1.111 | 1.100 | 1.170 |
| ROA | 0.189 | 0.190 | 0.183 | 0.190 |
| Tobin’s Q | 1.739 | 1.811 | 1.678 | 1.723 |
| Board size | −0.716 | −0.710 | −0.729 | −0.718 |
| Board independence | −0.015 (0.0125) | −0.014 (0.0125) | −0.018 (0.0128) | −0.009 (0.0136) |
| Female board representation | 0.054 | 0.053 | 0.052 | 0.053 |
| Board committees | 0.814 | 0.771 | 0.839 | 0.804 |
| Audit committee | −3.431 | −3.433 | −3.676 | −3.339 |
| Shareholders’ rights | 1.795 | 1.749 | 1.636 | 1.762 |
| Revenue growth | −0.006 (0.00430) | −0.006 (0.00432) | −0.006 (0.00419) | −0.006 (0.00437) |
| Leverage ratio | 1.853 (1.714) | 1.902 (1.718) | 1.032 (1.707) | 1.821 (1.710) |
| GDP per capita | −2.866 | −0.269 (1.008) | −2.456 | −1.749 |
| GPD growth | 0.168 (0.292) | 0.102 (0.293) | 0.321 (0.349) | 0.107 (0.297) |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | |||
| Country | Yes | |||
| Constant | 2.661 (3.447) | 13.407 | 5.554 (3.968) | −5.924 (6.941) |
| Hausman test ( | 5.940 (0.110) | |||
| 0.156 | 0.154 | 0.159 | 0.156 | |
| Observations | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 |
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01
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