Moderating effect of block government ownership at the 20% threshold on the impact of institutional voids and sociocultural norms on government ownership
| Lead-lag regression | IV-2SLS | Fixed effect (year) | Fixed effect (country) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | |
| Block government ownership | −96.667*** (4.492) | −94.353*** (4.550) | −96.309*** (4.489) | −96.666*** (4.488) |
| Market conditions | −0.871*** (0.240) | −1.376*** (0.784) | −0.880*** (0.239) | −0.989*** (0.239) |
| Market conditions × Block government ownership | −8.053*** (1.060) | −7.451*** (1.073) | −7.993*** (1.056) | −8.023*** (1.057) |
| Control of corruption | −2.850*** (0.378) | −2.844*** (0.376) | −3.372*** (0.423) | −2.264*** (0.383) |
| Control of corruption × Block government ownership | −1.026*** (0.313) | −0.924*** (0.310) | −0.951*** (0.313) | −1.074*** (0.315) |
| Property rights | −0.061*** (0.0115) | −0.023* (0.0128) | −0.079*** (0.0132) | −0.060*** (0.0115) |
| Property rights × Block government ownership | −0.174*** (0.0554) | −0.191*** (0.0552) | −0.173*** (0.0551) | −0.179*** (0.0554) |
| Political constraints | −1.018*** (0.331) | −0.355 (0.333) | −1.312*** (0.402) | −0.242 (0.356) |
| Political constraints × Block government ownership | −11.865*** (1.785) | −11.576*** (1.780) | −11.883*** (1.780) | −11.807*** (1.781) |
| Power distance | 0.165*** (0.0208) | 0.085*** (0.0296) | 0.174*** (0.0212) | 0.158*** (0.0206) |
| Power distance × Block government ownership | 0.024*** (0.00147) | 0.024*** (0.00148) | 0.024*** (0.00147) | 0.023*** (0.00149) |
| Firm size | −0.290 (0.246) | −0.304 (0.244) | −0.314 (0.250) | −0.275 (0.244) |
| Firm age | 0.758*** (0.148) | 0.733*** (0.148) | 0.798*** (0.150) | 0.769*** (0.148) |
| ROA | 0.010 (0.00990) | 0.012 (0.00996) | 0.009 (0.00996) | 0.011 (0.00991) |
| Tobin’s Q | 0.675*** (0.140) | 0.723*** (0.142) | 0.674*** (0.141) | 0.658*** (0.139) |
| Board size | −0.279*** (0.0328) | −0.278*** (0.0327) | −0.279*** (0.0329) | −0.281*** (0.0328) |
| Board independence | 0.017*** (0.00627) | 0.017*** (0.00626) | 0.019*** (0.00645) | 0.024*** (0.00681) |
| Female board representation | 0.037*** (0.00934) | 0.036*** (0.00931) | 0.036*** (0.00932) | 0.036*** (0.00933) |
| Board committees | 0.189** (0.0942) | 0.198** (0.0940) | 0.213** (0.0942) | 0.178* (0.0941) |
| Audit committee | −1.071*** (0.290) | −1.093*** (0.290) | −1.123*** (0.292) | −0.963*** (0.293) |
| Shareholders’ rights | 0.931*** (0.264) | 0.922*** (0.262) | 0.953*** (0.268) | 0.887*** (0.261) |
| Revenue growth | −0.002 (0.00305) | −0.002 (0.00300) | −0.002 (0.00299) | −0.002 (0.00296) |
| Leverage ratio | 0.097 (0.710) | 0.129 (0.709) | 0.138 (0.720) | 0.055 (0.705) |
| GDP per capita | −1.906*** (0.179) | −0.326 (0.480) | −2.003*** (0.187) | −0.485 (0.388) |
| GPD growth | −0.125 (0.136) | −0.039 (0.134) | −0.240 (0.161) | −0.218 (0.138) |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | |||
| Country | Yes | |||
| Constant | −3.185** (1.307) | 1.018 (1.681) | −1.913 (1.432) | −14.181*** (3.198) |
| Hausman test (p-value) | 6.134 (0.111) | |||
| R2 | 0.823 | 0.823 | 0.824 | 0.824 |
| Observations | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 |
| Lead-lag regression | IV-2SLS | Fixed effect (year) | Fixed effect (country) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | |
| Block government ownership | −96.667 | −94.353 | −96.309 | −96.666 |
| Market conditions | −0.871 | −1.376 | −0.880 | −0.989 |
| Market conditions × Block government ownership | −8.053 | −7.451 | −7.993 | −8.023 |
| Control of corruption | −2.850 | −2.844 | −3.372 | −2.264 |
| Control of corruption × Block government ownership | −1.026 | −0.924 | −0.951 | −1.074 |
| Property rights | −0.061 | −0.023 | −0.079 | −0.060 |
| Property rights × Block government ownership | −0.174 | −0.191 | −0.173 | −0.179 |
| Political constraints | −1.018 | −0.355 (0.333) | −1.312 | −0.242 (0.356) |
| Political constraints × Block government ownership | −11.865 | −11.576 | −11.883 | −11.807 |
| Power distance | 0.165 | 0.085 | 0.174 | 0.158 |
| Power distance × Block government ownership | 0.024 | 0.024 | 0.024 | 0.023 |
| Firm size | −0.290 (0.246) | −0.304 (0.244) | −0.314 (0.250) | −0.275 (0.244) |
| Firm age | 0.758 | 0.733 | 0.798 | 0.769 |
| ROA | 0.010 (0.00990) | 0.012 (0.00996) | 0.009 (0.00996) | 0.011 (0.00991) |
| Tobin’s Q | 0.675 | 0.723 | 0.674 | 0.658 |
| Board size | −0.279 | −0.278 | −0.279 | −0.281 |
| Board independence | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.019 | 0.024 |
| Female board representation | 0.037 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 |
| Board committees | 0.189 | 0.198 | 0.213 | 0.178 |
| Audit committee | −1.071 | −1.093 | −1.123 | −0.963 |
| Shareholders’ rights | 0.931 | 0.922 | 0.953 | 0.887 |
| Revenue growth | −0.002 (0.00305) | −0.002 (0.00300) | −0.002 (0.00299) | −0.002 (0.00296) |
| Leverage ratio | 0.097 (0.710) | 0.129 (0.709) | 0.138 (0.720) | 0.055 (0.705) |
| GDP per capita | −1.906 | −0.326 (0.480) | −2.003 | −0.485 (0.388) |
| GPD growth | −0.125 (0.136) | −0.039 (0.134) | −0.240 (0.161) | −0.218 (0.138) |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | |||
| Country | Yes | |||
| Constant | −3.185 | 1.018 (1.681) | −1.913 (1.432) | −14.181 |
| Hausman test ( | 6.134 (0.111) | |||
| 0.823 | 0.823 | 0.824 | 0.824 | |
| Observations | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 |
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01
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