Correlation matrix
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) | (21) | (22) | (23) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Government ownership % | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| (2) Government ownership | 0.830*** | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (3) Block government ownership (20%) | 0.887*** | 0.848*** | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| (4) Pyramid government ownership | 0.220*** | 0.443*** | 0.306*** | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||||||
| (5) Market conditions | −0.018* | −0.034** | −0.014* | −0.051*** | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||||
| (6) Control of corruption | −0.019* | −0.019* | −0.003* | −0.062*** | 0.355*** | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||||
| (7) Property rights | −0.090*** | −0.023* | −0.043*** | −0.001* | 0.117*** | 0.273*** | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||
| (8) Political constraints | −0.120*** | −0.127*** | −0.116*** | −0.072*** | −0.117*** | −0.113*** | −0.070*** | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||
| (9) Power distance | 0.078*** | 0.120*** | 0.096*** | 0.134*** | −0.026* | −0.092*** | −0.001* | 0.102*** | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||
| (10) Firm size | 0.151*** | 0.178*** | 0.142*** | 0.045*** | 0.199*** | 0.138*** | −0.063*** | −0.191*** | 0.165*** | 1.000 | |||||||||||||
| (11) Firm age | 0.048*** | 0.013 | 0.009 | −0.040*** | −0.178*** | −0.172*** | −0.168*** | 0.128*** | 0.033** | 0.138*** | 1.000 | ||||||||||||
| (12) ROA | 0.123*** | 0.107*** | 0.116*** | −0.032** | 0.027* | −0.027* | −0.068*** | −0.077*** | 0.054*** | 0.144*** | 0.133*** | 1.000 | |||||||||||
| (13) Tobin’s Q | 0.053*** | 0.021 | 0.036** | −0.072*** | 0.050*** | −0.040*** | −0.077*** | −0.117*** | −0.108*** | −0.211*** | −0.008 | 0.294*** | 1.000 | ||||||||||
| (14) GDP per capita | −0.003 | 0.072*** | 0.041*** | 0.064*** | 0.413*** | 0.329*** | 0.315*** | −0.303*** | 0.469*** | 0.258*** | −0.135*** | 0.030** | −0.020 | 1.000 | |||||||||
| (15) GPD growth | 0.043*** | 0.042*** | 0.037*** | −0.045*** | 0.329*** | 0.174*** | −0.038*** | −0.309*** | −0.011 | 0.090*** | −0.056*** | 0.054*** | 0.084*** | 0.125*** | 1.000 | ||||||||
| (16) Board size | 0.007 | 0.074*** | 0.029** | 0.040*** | 0.007 | 0.050*** | −0.002 | −0.174*** | −0.069*** | 0.395*** | 0.109*** | 0.064*** | −0.063*** | 0.011 | 0.062*** | 1.000 | |||||||
| (17) Board independence | −0.003 | 0.007 | −0.002 | −0.016 | 0.268*** | 0.177*** | 0.002 | −0.443*** | −0.030** | 0.017 | −0.067*** | 0.036*** | 0.096*** | 0.246*** | 0.125*** | 0.047*** | 1.000 | ||||||
| (18) Female board representation | 0.025** | −0.002 | 0.007 | 0.003 | −0.191*** | −0.171*** | −0.143*** | 0.125*** | −0.038*** | −0.022** | 0.102*** | 0.025** | −0.038*** | −0.197*** | −0.025** | 0.077*** | −0.069*** | 1.000 | |||||
| (19) Board committees | 0.035*** | 0.095*** | 0.042*** | 0.021* | 0.257*** | 0.231*** | 0.083*** | −0.374*** | −0.069*** | 0.367*** | 0.047*** | 0.055*** | −0.027** | 0.239*** | 0.132*** | 0.380*** | 0.302*** | −0.028 | 1.000 | ||||
| (20) Audit committee | 0.049*** | 0.073*** | 0.054*** | −0.025** | 0.071*** | 0.145*** | 0.010 | −0.375*** | −0.045*** | 0.168*** | 0.041*** | 0.096*** | 0.004 | 0.082*** | 0.118*** | 0.241*** | 0.326*** | −0.056*** | 0.719*** | 1.000 | |||
| (21) Shareholders’ rights | 0.056*** | 0.091*** | 0.062*** | 0.023** | 0.217*** | 0.099*** | 0.006 | −0.115*** | 0.105*** | 0.600*** | 0.049*** | 0.313*** | −0.049*** | 0.239*** | 0.047*** | 0.230*** | −0.001 | −0.023** | 0.215*** | 0.106*** | 1.000 | ||
| (22) Revenue growth | −0.012 | −0.009 | −0.007 | 0.011 | −0.018 | −0.011 | 0.013 | 0.003 | −0.006 | −0.011 | −0.016 | −0.018 | −0.014 | −0.019* | −0.004 | −0.015 | −0.013 | −0.005 | −0.002 | −0.003 | −0.001 | 1.000 | |
| (23) Leverage ratio | 0.019* | 0.030** | 0.016 | 0.040*** | 0.010 | −0.004 | −0.086*** | −0.058*** | −0.045*** | 0.347*** | 0.133*** | −0.270*** | −0.268*** | −0.022** | 0.038*** | 0.181*** | −0.004 | 0.030** | 0.152*** | 0.071*** | 0.260*** | −0.013 | 1.000 |
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) | (21) | (22) | (23) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Government ownership % | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| (2) Government ownership | 0.830 | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (3) Block government ownership (20%) | 0.887 | 0.848 | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| (4) Pyramid government ownership | 0.220 | 0.443 | 0.306 | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||||||
| (5) Market conditions | −0.018 | −0.034 | −0.014 | −0.051 | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||||
| (6) Control of corruption | −0.019 | −0.019 | −0.003 | −0.062 | 0.355 | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||||
| (7) Property rights | −0.090 | −0.023 | −0.043 | −0.001 | 0.117 | 0.273 | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||
| (8) Political constraints | −0.120 | −0.127 | −0.116 | −0.072 | −0.117 | −0.113 | −0.070 | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||
| (9) Power distance | 0.078 | 0.120 | 0.096 | 0.134 | −0.026 | −0.092 | −0.001 | 0.102 | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||
| (10) Firm size | 0.151 | 0.178 | 0.142 | 0.045 | 0.199 | 0.138 | −0.063 | −0.191 | 0.165 | 1.000 | |||||||||||||
| (11) Firm age | 0.048 | 0.013 | 0.009 | −0.040 | −0.178 | −0.172 | −0.168 | 0.128 | 0.033 | 0.138 | 1.000 | ||||||||||||
| (12) ROA | 0.123 | 0.107 | 0.116 | −0.032 | 0.027 | −0.027 | −0.068 | −0.077 | 0.054 | 0.144 | 0.133 | 1.000 | |||||||||||
| (13) Tobin’s Q | 0.053 | 0.021 | 0.036 | −0.072 | 0.050 | −0.040 | −0.077 | −0.117 | −0.108 | −0.211 | −0.008 | 0.294 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
| (14) GDP per capita | −0.003 | 0.072 | 0.041 | 0.064 | 0.413 | 0.329 | 0.315 | −0.303 | 0.469 | 0.258 | −0.135 | 0.030 | −0.020 | 1.000 | |||||||||
| (15) GPD growth | 0.043 | 0.042 | 0.037 | −0.045 | 0.329 | 0.174 | −0.038 | −0.309 | −0.011 | 0.090 | −0.056 | 0.054 | 0.084 | 0.125 | 1.000 | ||||||||
| (16) Board size | 0.007 | 0.074 | 0.029 | 0.040 | 0.007 | 0.050 | −0.002 | −0.174 | −0.069 | 0.395 | 0.109 | 0.064 | −0.063 | 0.011 | 0.062 | 1.000 | |||||||
| (17) Board independence | −0.003 | 0.007 | −0.002 | −0.016 | 0.268 | 0.177 | 0.002 | −0.443 | −0.030 | 0.017 | −0.067 | 0.036 | 0.096 | 0.246 | 0.125 | 0.047 | 1.000 | ||||||
| (18) Female board representation | 0.025 | −0.002 | 0.007 | 0.003 | −0.191 | −0.171 | −0.143 | 0.125 | −0.038 | −0.022 | 0.102 | 0.025 | −0.038 | −0.197 | −0.025 | 0.077 | −0.069 | 1.000 | |||||
| (19) Board committees | 0.035 | 0.095 | 0.042 | 0.021 | 0.257 | 0.231 | 0.083 | −0.374 | −0.069 | 0.367 | 0.047 | 0.055 | −0.027 | 0.239 | 0.132 | 0.380 | 0.302 | −0.028 | 1.000 | ||||
| (20) Audit committee | 0.049 | 0.073 | 0.054 | −0.025 | 0.071 | 0.145 | 0.010 | −0.375 | −0.045 | 0.168 | 0.041 | 0.096 | 0.004 | 0.082 | 0.118 | 0.241 | 0.326 | −0.056 | 0.719 | 1.000 | |||
| (21) Shareholders’ rights | 0.056 | 0.091 | 0.062 | 0.023 | 0.217 | 0.099 | 0.006 | −0.115 | 0.105 | 0.600 | 0.049 | 0.313 | −0.049 | 0.239 | 0.047 | 0.230 | −0.001 | −0.023 | 0.215 | 0.106 | 1.000 | ||
| (22) Revenue growth | −0.012 | −0.009 | −0.007 | 0.011 | −0.018 | −0.011 | 0.013 | 0.003 | −0.006 | −0.011 | −0.016 | −0.018 | −0.014 | −0.019 | −0.004 | −0.015 | −0.013 | −0.005 | −0.002 | −0.003 | −0.001 | 1.000 | |
| (23) Leverage ratio | 0.019 | 0.030 | 0.016 | 0.040 | 0.010 | −0.004 | −0.086 | −0.058 | −0.045 | 0.347 | 0.133 | −0.270 | −0.268 | −0.022 | 0.038 | 0.181 | −0.004 | 0.030 | 0.152 | 0.071 | 0.260 | −0.013 | 1.000 |
Note(s): *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01
Sharing content requires targeting cookies to be enabled. Please update your cookie preferences to use this feature.