Moderating effect of pyramid government ownership on the impact of institutional voids and socio-cultural norms on government ownership
| Lead-lag regression | IV-2SLS | Fixed effect (year) | Fixed effect (country) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | |
| Pyramid government ownership | −49.274*** (0.614) | −48.734*** (0.997) | −49.249*** (0.615) | −49.507*** (0.637) |
| Market conditions | −3.409*** (1.045) | −3.036*** (1.998) | −3.708*** (1.062) | −2.492*** (1.558) |
| Market conditions × Pyramid government ownership | −2.974* (1.629) | −3.461* (1.817) | −3.009* (1.653) | −3.929*** (2.689) |
| Control of corruption | −5.674*** (1.003) | −5.216*** (1.016) | −5.674*** (1.047) | −6.653*** (1.356) |
| Control of corruption × Pyramid government ownership | −4.256*** (1.310) | −3.890*** (1.301) | −4.310*** (1.311) | −5.556** (1.919) |
| Property rights | −0.180*** (0.0369) | −0.167* (0.0396) | −0.192*** (0.0392) | −0.233*** (0.0767) |
| Property rights × Pyramid government ownership | −0.215** (0.101) | −0.212** (0.108) | −0.214** (0.101) | −0.586*** (0.141) |
| Political constraints | −5.295** (2.395) | −4.268 (2.095) | −4.914** (2.422) | −3.444*** (2.977) |
| Political constraints × Pyramid government ownership | −8.271*** (2.601) | −7.003*** (2.506) | −8.246*** (2.608) | −9.418*** (2.935) |
| Power distance | 0.470*** (0.0593) | 0.379** (0.0751) | 0.483*** (0.0600) | 0.384** (0.0632) |
| Power distance × Pyramid government ownership | 0.320*** (0.0939) | 0.216*** (0.00789) | 0.321*** (0.0950) | 0.423** (0.170) |
| Firm size | 1.843** (0.737) | 1.818** (0.746) | 1.979*** (0.741) | 1.820 (1.337) |
| Firm age | 2.030*** (0.385) | 1.955*** (0.383) | 1.958*** (0.390) | 1.643** (0.761) |
| ROA | 0.111*** (0.0306) | 0.116*** (0.0306) | 0.109*** (0.0308) | 0.173** (0.0698) |
| Tobin’s Q | 0.507 (0.331) | 0.520* (0.335) | 0.483 (0.332) | 0.548* (0.389) |
| Board size | −0.716*** (0.109) | −0.708*** (0.108) | −0.721*** (0.109) | −1.165*** (0.203) |
| Board independence | 0.023* (0.0135) | 0.020 (0.0133) | 0.022 (0.0137) | 0.009 (0.0342) |
| Female board representation | 0.098*** (0.0277) | 0.095*** (0.0276) | 0.097*** (0.0278) | 0.131*** (0.0340) |
| Board committee | −0.810*** (0.218) | −0.843*** (0.218) | −0.802*** (0.219) | −0.829** (0.402) |
| Audit committee | 1.452* (0.770) | 1.296* (0.767) | 1.378* (0.773) | 0.784 (1.591) |
| Shareholders’ rights | −0.458 (0.791) | −0.517 (0.800) | −0.566 (0.794) | −1.233 (1.344) |
| Revenue growth | 0.009 (0.00793) | 0.009 (0.00828) | 0.009 (0.00790) | 0.024*** (0.00785) |
| Leverage ratio | 0.495 (2.017) | 0.587 (2.034) | 0.016 (2.036) | 0.614* (3.027) |
| GDP per capita | −6.045*** (0.552) | −4.851 (1.241) | −6.215*** (0.571) | −5.261 (1.654) |
| GPD growth | −1.627*** (0.388) | −1.398*** (0.363) | −1.541*** (0.436) | −1.953 (0.743) |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | |||
| Country | Yes | |||
| Constant | 8.857** (4.236) | 9.259*** (5.283) | 8.232* (4.422) | 9.482*** (6.850) |
| Hausman test (p-value) | 3.402 (0.144) | |||
| R2 | 0.218 | 0.219 | 0.217 | 0.320 |
| Observations | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 |
| Lead-lag regression | IV-2SLS | Fixed effect (year) | Fixed effect (country) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | Government ownership %(t+1) | |
| Pyramid government ownership | −49.274 | −48.734 | −49.249 | −49.507 |
| Market conditions | −3.409 | −3.036 | −3.708 | −2.492 |
| Market conditions × Pyramid government ownership | −2.974 | −3.461 | −3.009 | −3.929 |
| Control of corruption | −5.674 | −5.216 | −5.674 | −6.653 |
| Control of corruption × Pyramid government ownership | −4.256 | −3.890 | −4.310 | −5.556 |
| Property rights | −0.180 | −0.167 | −0.192 | −0.233 |
| Property rights × Pyramid government ownership | −0.215 | −0.212 | −0.214 | −0.586 |
| Political constraints | −5.295 | −4.268 (2.095) | −4.914 | −3.444 |
| Political constraints × Pyramid government ownership | −8.271 | −7.003 | −8.246 | −9.418 |
| Power distance | 0.470 | 0.379 | 0.483 | 0.384 |
| Power distance × Pyramid government ownership | 0.320 | 0.216 | 0.321 | 0.423 |
| Firm size | 1.843 | 1.818 | 1.979 | 1.820 (1.337) |
| Firm age | 2.030 | 1.955 | 1.958 | 1.643 |
| ROA | 0.111 | 0.116 | 0.109 | 0.173 |
| Tobin’s Q | 0.507 (0.331) | 0.520 | 0.483 (0.332) | 0.548 |
| Board size | −0.716 | −0.708 | −0.721 | −1.165 |
| Board independence | 0.023 | 0.020 (0.0133) | 0.022 (0.0137) | 0.009 (0.0342) |
| Female board representation | 0.098 | 0.095 | 0.097 | 0.131 |
| Board committee | −0.810 | −0.843 | −0.802 | −0.829 |
| Audit committee | 1.452 | 1.296 | 1.378 | 0.784 (1.591) |
| Shareholders’ rights | −0.458 (0.791) | −0.517 (0.800) | −0.566 (0.794) | −1.233 (1.344) |
| Revenue growth | 0.009 (0.00793) | 0.009 (0.00828) | 0.009 (0.00790) | 0.024 |
| Leverage ratio | 0.495 (2.017) | 0.587 (2.034) | 0.016 (2.036) | 0.614 |
| GDP per capita | −6.045 | −4.851 (1.241) | −6.215 | −5.261 (1.654) |
| GPD growth | −1.627 | −1.398 | −1.541 | −1.953 (0.743) |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | |||
| Country | Yes | |||
| Constant | 8.857 | 9.259 | 8.232 | 9.482 |
| Hausman test ( | 3.402 (0.144) | |||
| 0.218 | 0.219 | 0.217 | 0.320 | |
| Observations | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 | 8,681 |
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01
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