Propensity score matching
| Outcome variables | Explanatory variables | Moderators | Conditions | Treated | Controls | Difference | S.E. | t-test | p < 0.05 | Matching pair no. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Government | Market conditions | 5.057 | 5.166 | −0.109 | 0.024 | −4.530 | Yes | 1,556 | ||
| (2) Government | Control of corruption | 0.130 | 0.145 | −0.016 | 0.020 | −2.590 | Yes | 1,556 | ||
| (3) Government | Property rights | 48.993 | 49.571 | −0.578 | 0.435 | −1.680 | No | 1,556 | ||
| (4) Government | Political constraints | 0.231 | 0.293 | −0.062 | 0.011 | −5.500 | Yes | 1,556 | ||
| (5) Government | Power distance | 79.433 | 76.958 | 2.475 | 0. 271 | 9.120 | Yes | 1,556 | ||
| (6) Government | Market conditions | Block ownership | High | 5.023 | 5.123 | −0.010 | 0.028 | - 3.570 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (7) Government | Control of corruption | Block ownership | High | 0.114 | 0.138 | −0.024 | 0.023 | −2.280 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (8) Government | Property rights | Block ownership | High | 48.470 | 49.426 | −0.957 | 0.507 | −2.980 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (9) Government | Political constraints | Block ownership | High | 0.225 | 0.289 | −0.064 | 0.013 | −5.060 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (10) Government | Power distance | Block ownership | High | 79.448 | 77.167 | 2.281 | 0.305 | 7.480 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (11) Government | Market conditions | Pyramid ownership | High | 5.120 | 5.152 | −0. 032 | 0.043 | −2.910 | Yes | 338 |
| (12) Government | Control of corruption | Pyramid ownership | High | 0.025 | 0.052 | −0.077 | 0.031 | −2.450 | Yes | 338 |
| (13) Government | Property rights | Pyramid ownership | High | 49.093 | 50.212 | −1.119 | 0. 755 | −2.480 | Yes | 338 |
| (14) Government | Political constraints | Pyramid ownership | High | 0.409 | 0.428 | −0.019 | 0.026 | −2.780 | Yes | 338 |
| (15) Government | Power distance | Pyramid ownership | High | 81.383 | 80.439 | 0.944 | 0.647 | 6.610 | Yes | 338 |
| Outcome variables | Explanatory variables | Moderators | Conditions | Treated | Controls | Difference | S.E. | t-test | p < 0.05 | Matching pair no. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Government | Market conditions | 5.057 | 5.166 | −0.109 | 0.024 | −4.530 | Yes | 1,556 | ||
| (2) Government | Control of corruption | 0.130 | 0.145 | −0.016 | 0.020 | −2.590 | Yes | 1,556 | ||
| (3) Government | Property rights | 48.993 | 49.571 | −0.578 | 0.435 | −1.680 | No | 1,556 | ||
| (4) Government | Political constraints | 0.231 | 0.293 | −0.062 | 0.011 | −5.500 | Yes | 1,556 | ||
| (5) Government | Power distance | 79.433 | 76.958 | 2.475 | 0. 271 | 9.120 | Yes | 1,556 | ||
| (6) Government | Market conditions | Block ownership | High | 5.023 | 5.123 | −0.010 | 0.028 | - 3.570 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (7) Government | Control of corruption | Block ownership | High | 0.114 | 0.138 | −0.024 | 0.023 | −2.280 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (8) Government | Property rights | Block ownership | High | 48.470 | 49.426 | −0.957 | 0.507 | −2.980 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (9) Government | Political constraints | Block ownership | High | 0.225 | 0.289 | −0.064 | 0.013 | −5.060 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (10) Government | Power distance | Block ownership | High | 79.448 | 77.167 | 2.281 | 0.305 | 7.480 | Yes | 1,197 |
| (11) Government | Market conditions | Pyramid ownership | High | 5.120 | 5.152 | −0. 032 | 0.043 | −2.910 | Yes | 338 |
| (12) Government | Control of corruption | Pyramid ownership | High | 0.025 | 0.052 | −0.077 | 0.031 | −2.450 | Yes | 338 |
| (13) Government | Property rights | Pyramid ownership | High | 49.093 | 50.212 | −1.119 | 0. 755 | −2.480 | Yes | 338 |
| (14) Government | Political constraints | Pyramid ownership | High | 0.409 | 0.428 | −0.019 | 0.026 | −2.780 | Yes | 338 |
| (15) Government | Power distance | Pyramid ownership | High | 81.383 | 80.439 | 0.944 | 0.647 | 6.610 | Yes | 338 |
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