Summary of clusters from the bibliometric analysis and content analysis
| Clusters | Main references | Main insights |
|---|---|---|
| Emerging research themes (from BA) | ||
| Cluster 1: The impact of ESG factors on executive compensation structure | Jian and Lee (2015); Li et al. (2016); Dunbar et al. (2020); Karim et al. (2018); Li et al. (2021) | Firms that implement socially responsible practices are more likely to implement long-term compensation, risk-taking incentives, CSR-linked compensation |
| Cluster 2: The relationship between environmental aspects and executive compensation | Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009); Ikram et al. (2023); Stanwick and Stanwick (2001); Campbell et al. (2007); Flammer et al. (2019) | Within the ESG framework, environmental aspects appear related to the executive compensation structure |
| Cluster 3: The relationship between short-term versus long-term executive compensation and CSR performance | Mahoney and Thorne (2005); Mahoney and Thorn (2006); Sajko et al. (2021); Callan and Thomas (2014); Kang (2017) | CSR is more likely to be positively linked with a long-term oriented compensation and inversely with short-term one |
| Cluster 4: The effect of ESGBEC on ESG performance | Haque (2017); Haque and Ntim (2020); Adu et al. (2022); Cordova et al. (2021); Derchi et al. (2021); Radu and Smaili (2022) | ESGBEC is likely to improve firms’ ESG performance. However, it may have only a symbolic rather than a substantial impact, especially for environmental performance |
| Current research themes (from CA) | ||
| Cluster 5: Governance and institutional factors as drivers of ESGBEC | Aresu et al. (2023); Hong et al. (2016); Ikram et al. (2023); Li et al. (2021); Liao et al. (2021); Liu et al. (2023); Radu and Smaili (2022); Schiehll and Bellavance (2009); Yang (2023) | ESGBEC is promoted by traditional as well as sustainable features of board of directors’ factors, whilst there is a more complex relationship between ownership structure and ESGBEC |
| Cluster 6: The impact of executive compensation structure on environmental performance | Adu et al. (2022); Al-Shaer et al. (2023); Benlemlih et al. (2022); Bose et al. (2023); Cohen et al. (2023); Cordova et al. (2021); Crichton et al. (2023); Flammer et al. (2019); Gull et al. (2023); Haque (2017); Haque and Ntim (2020); Hossain et al. (2023); Oyewo (2023) | With reference to carbon emissions, studies have shown that long-term oriented forms of compensation (e.g., ESG pay as well as deferred compensation) tend to have a symbolic rather than substantive impact, unless they are US companies |
| Cluster 7: The impact of CEO power on the ESG performance | Buchanan et al. (2021); Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013); Jouber (2019); Kang (2017); Pucheta-Martínez and Gallego-Álvarez (2021); Rehman and Hamdan (2023); Sajko et al. (2021) | Summarizing, the evidence regarding the impact of CEO power on ESG performance appears to be positive |
| Cluster 8: The impact of ESGBEC on ESG disclosure | Cordova et al. (2021); Dalla Via and Perego (2020); Haque and Jones (2020); Nandy et al. (2023); Tamimi and Sebastianelli (2017); Velte (2023) | Overall, the authors provided evidence of a positive impact of ESGBEC on ESG disclosure |
| Cluster 9: The impact of ESGBEC on firm value | Chouaibi et al. (2021); Elbardan et al. (2023); El Ghoul et al. (2011); Flammer et al. (2019); Liu et al. (2023); Mio et al. (2023); Nandy et al. (2023); Ramirez et al. (2022); Zouari-Hadiji and Chouaibi (2021) | In brief, the studies provided mixed evidence of the effect of ESGBE on firm value |
| Cluster 10: The impact of ESGBEC on financial performance | Bachmann et al. (2020); Cavaco et al. (2020); Cohen et al. (2023); D’Apolito et al. (2019); Khenissi et al. (2022); Tsang et al. (2021) | To summarize, the collective findings suggest limited support for the hypothesis proposing financial benefits for companies from ESGBEC |
| Clusters | Main references | Main insights |
|---|---|---|
| Cluster 1: The impact of ESG factors on executive compensation structure | Firms that implement socially responsible practices are more likely to implement long-term compensation, risk-taking incentives, CSR-linked compensation | |
| Cluster 2: The relationship between environmental aspects and executive compensation | Within the ESG framework, environmental aspects appear related to the executive compensation structure | |
| Cluster 3: The relationship between short-term versus long-term executive compensation and CSR performance | CSR is more likely to be positively linked with a long-term oriented compensation and inversely with short-term one | |
| Cluster 4: The effect of ESGBEC on ESG performance | ESGBEC is likely to improve firms’ ESG performance. However, it may have only a symbolic rather than a substantial impact, especially for environmental performance | |
| Cluster 5: Governance and institutional factors as drivers of ESGBEC | ESGBEC is promoted by traditional as well as sustainable features of board of directors’ factors, whilst there is a more complex relationship between ownership structure and ESGBEC | |
| Cluster 6: The impact of executive compensation structure on environmental performance | With reference to carbon emissions, studies have shown that long-term oriented forms of compensation (e.g., ESG pay as well as deferred compensation) tend to have a symbolic rather than substantive impact, unless they are US companies | |
| Cluster 7: The impact of CEO power on the ESG performance | Summarizing, the evidence regarding the impact of CEO power on ESG performance appears to be positive | |
| Cluster 8: The impact of ESGBEC on ESG disclosure | Overall, the authors provided evidence of a positive impact of ESGBEC on ESG disclosure | |
| Cluster 9: The impact of ESGBEC on firm value | In brief, the studies provided mixed evidence of the effect of ESGBE on firm value | |
| Cluster 10: The impact of ESGBEC on financial performance | To summarize, the collective findings suggest limited support for the hypothesis proposing financial benefits for companies from ESGBEC | |
Source(s): Authors’ own work
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