Comparison between relevant extant research and the current study
| Research | Numeric format manipulation | Summary of findings | Compare ratio vs. (%) | Different Numerators (1 / 20, 5%) | Underlying process | Boundary condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) | 1 red of 10 vs 10 red of 100 | More participants draw from the bowl with the larger number of beans | No | No | No | No |
| Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) | Ratio of large (9 red of 100 [9%]) vs small numbers (1 red of 10 [10%]) | More people chose the bowl with the larger number of red beans (9 / 100) | No | No | No | No |
| Yamagishi (1997) | 2,414 out of 10,000 vs 24.14 out of 100 | Cancer is judged as riskier when labeled as killing 2,414/ 10,000 people vs 24.14 / 100 people | No | No | No | No |
| Pacini and Epstein (1999) | Optimality at issue (choose between 1 / 10 and 7 / 100 or 9 / 100) vs optimality not at issue (choose between 1 / 10 and 1 / 100) | When optimality is not at issue, people engage in heuristic processing; when optimality is at issue, responses depend on individual differences | No | No | No | No |
| Monahan et al. (2002) | Ratio (20 / 100) vs percentage (20%) | Higher risk estimates for ratio vs percentage only for physicians working in forensic facilities; no difference for the rest | Yes | No | No | No |
| Brase (2002) | Simple frequency (1 in 3), single-event probability (0.33), relative frequency (33%) and absolute frequency (90 mil) | Simple frequencies (ratios) clearer and easier to understand than the other formats; single-event probabilities difficult to understand | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Tan et al. (2005) | Probability (5%) vs ratio (1 out of 20) of vaccine side effects | No significant difference in likelihood to accept the vaccine | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Pinto-Prades et al. (2006) | X out of 100 vs. Y out of 1000 | Risk perceived as higher when denominator is 1,000 (vs 100) | No | No | No | No |
| Keller and Siegrist (2009) | Ratio vs Pictogram vs Paling Perspective Scale (displaying the same frequency – e.g. 1:112) | Pictogram format results in significantly lower risk rating compared with Paling Perspective Scale and the ratio with numerator 1 | No | No | No | No |
| Peters et al. (2011) | Frame (positive vs negative vs combined) by format (ratio vs percentage) – 10% vs 10 / 100, 90% vs 90 / 100 | Lower risk perceptions for positive vs negative frame. Less numerate participants perceive lower risk with percentage vs ratio format; no difference for highly numerate | Yes | No | No | No |
| Slovic et al. (2000) | 10% vs 10% of 100 vs 1 / 10 vs. 10 / 100 vs 20% vs 2 / 10 vs 20 / 100 (Study 3) | Patient judged as posing higher risk in ratio vs percentage frame. Judgments of the likelihood of harming someone higher for percentage vs ratio | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Raghubir (2008) | S1: same numerator with small/large denominator S2: 90.3 / 100,000 vs. 903 / 1,000,000 S3: 0.903 / 1,000 vs. 90.3 / 1,000,000 | Smaller numerators lead to perceptions of higher risk when denominator is not salient. Larger numerators lead to higher perceived risk when the denominator is salient | No | No | No | Yes (denom. salience) |
| Our study | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Research | Numeric format manipulation | Summary of findings | Compare ratio vs. (%) | Different Numerators (1 / 20, 5%) | Underlying process | Boundary condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 red of 10 vs 10 red of 100 | More participants draw from the bowl with the larger number of beans | No | No | No | No | |
| Ratio of large (9 red of 100 [9%]) vs small numbers (1 red of 10 [10%]) | More people chose the bowl with the larger number of red beans (9 / 100) | No | No | No | No | |
| 2,414 out of 10,000 vs 24.14 out of 100 | Cancer is judged as riskier when labeled as killing 2,414/ 10,000 people vs 24.14 / 100 people | No | No | No | No | |
| Optimality at issue (choose between 1 / 10 and 7 / 100 or 9 / 100) vs optimality not at issue (choose between 1 / 10 and 1 / 100) | When optimality is not at issue, people engage in heuristic processing; when optimality is at issue, responses depend on individual differences | No | No | No | No | |
| Ratio (20 / 100) vs percentage (20%) | Higher risk estimates for ratio vs percentage only for physicians working in forensic facilities; no difference for the rest | Yes | No | No | No | |
| Simple frequency (1 in 3), single-event probability (0.33), relative frequency (33%) and absolute frequency (90 mil) | Simple frequencies (ratios) clearer and easier to understand than the other formats; single-event probabilities difficult to understand | Yes | Yes | No | No | |
| Probability (5%) vs ratio (1 out of 20) of vaccine side effects | No significant difference in likelihood to accept the vaccine | Yes | Yes | No | No | |
| X out of 100 vs. Y out of 1000 | Risk perceived as higher when denominator is 1,000 (vs 100) | No | No | No | No | |
| Ratio vs Pictogram vs Paling Perspective Scale (displaying the same frequency – e.g. 1:112) | Pictogram format results in significantly lower risk rating compared with Paling Perspective Scale and the ratio with numerator 1 | No | No | No | No | |
| Frame (positive vs negative vs combined) by format (ratio vs percentage) – 10% vs 10 / 100, 90% vs 90 / 100 | Lower risk perceptions for positive vs negative frame. Less numerate participants perceive lower risk with percentage vs ratio format; no difference for highly numerate | Yes | No | No | No | |
| 10% vs 10% of 100 vs 1 / 10 vs. 10 / 100 vs 20% vs 2 / 10 vs 20 / 100 (Study 3) | Patient judged as posing higher risk in ratio vs percentage frame. Judgments of the likelihood of harming someone higher for percentage vs ratio | Yes | Yes | No | No | |
| S1: same numerator with small/large denominator S2: 90.3 / 100,000 vs. 903 / 1,000,000 S3: 0.903 / 1,000 vs. 90.3 / 1,000,000 | Smaller numerators lead to perceptions of higher risk when denominator is not salient. Larger numerators lead to higher perceived risk when the denominator is salient | No | No | No | Yes (denom. salience) | |
| Our study | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
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