Table 4 Results when using abnormal...

Table 4

Results when using abnormal ownership concentration

Panel A: comparison of quintile means
	Abnormal ownership concentration
Variable	Bottom quintile	Top quintile	Difference
NOSHST	22.704	76.351	−53.647***
			(<0.001)
LIQ	0.025	0.025	0.001
			(0.706)
VOL	0.029	0.029	−0.000
			(0.872)
LEV	0.191	0.185	0.006
			(0.473)
MTB	1.923	2.029	−0.106
			(0.317)
BETA	0.470	0.481	−0.010
			(0.687)
AGE	15.760	16.213	−0.452
			(0.372)
AR	1.276	1.227	0.049
			(0.498)
AF	0.469	0.459	0.010
			(0.691)
DY	0.031	0.030	0.001
			(0.660)
SIZE	15.162	15.026	0.136
			(0.179)
MAR	−0.006	0.007	−0.013
			(0.493)
ΔEPS	−0.064	−0.283	0.219
			(0.108)
NEG	0.150	0.148	0.002
			(0.889)
N	405	405

Panel A: comparison of quintile means
	Abnormal ownership concentration
Variable	Bottom quintile	Top quintile	Difference
NOSHST	22.704	76.351	−53.647***
			(<0.001)
LIQ	0.025	0.025	0.001
			(0.706)
VOL	0.029	0.029	−0.000
			(0.872)
LEV	0.191	0.185	0.006
			(0.473)
MTB	1.923	2.029	−0.106
			(0.317)
BETA	0.470	0.481	−0.010
			(0.687)
AGE	15.760	16.213	−0.452
			(0.372)
AR	1.276	1.227	0.049
			(0.498)
AF	0.469	0.459	0.010
			(0.691)
DY	0.031	0.030	0.001
			(0.660)
SIZE	15.162	15.026	0.136
			(0.179)
MAR	−0.006	0.007	−0.013
			(0.493)
ΔEPS	−0.064	−0.283	0.219
			(0.108)
NEG	0.150	0.148	0.002
			(0.889)
N	405	405

Panel B: Abnormal ownership concentration and IFRS earnings
	OWN_AB = 1 for bottom quintile			OWN_AB = 1 for top quintile
Variable	All firms	Positive earnings	Negative earnings	All firms	Positive earnings	Negative earnings
BPS	0.462**	0.449**	1.435*	0.538***	0.487**	1.278**
	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.076)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.039)
EPS	5.099***	5.729***	9.403*	5.525***	5.847***	9.306*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.076)	(<0.001)	(0.001)	(0.088)
NEG	5.086**			8.257***
	(0.039)			(0.002)
OWN_AB	1.749	2.147	−3.104	−1.472	−0.793	−1.608
	(0.500)	(0.457)	(0.360)	(0.602)	(0.833)	(0.501)
OWN_AB*BPS	0.216	0.557***	−0.798***	0.325***	0.226	−0.914
	(0.333)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(<0.001)	(0.105)	(0.162)
OWN_AB*EPS	−2.094	−3.823**	−11.997	−1.647	−1.179	−10.807
	(0.102)	(0.014)	(0.106)	(0.253)	(0.451)	(0.114)
Fixed effects:
- Firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,621	1,382	239	1,621	1,383	238
Within R²	22.9%	23.0%	35.6%	28.3%	27.5%	34.9%

Panel B: Abnormal ownership concentration and IFRS earnings
	OWN_AB = 1 for bottom quintile			OWN_AB = 1 for top quintile
Variable	All firms	Positive earnings	Negative earnings	All firms	Positive earnings	Negative earnings
BPS	0.462**	0.449**	1.435*	0.538***	0.487**	1.278**
	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.076)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.039)
EPS	5.099***	5.729***	9.403*	5.525***	5.847***	9.306*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.076)	(<0.001)	(0.001)	(0.088)
NEG	5.086**			8.257***
	(0.039)			(0.002)
OWN_AB	1.749	2.147	−3.104	−1.472	−0.793	−1.608
	(0.500)	(0.457)	(0.360)	(0.602)	(0.833)	(0.501)
OWN_AB*BPS	0.216	0.557***	−0.798***	0.325***	0.226	−0.914
	(0.333)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(<0.001)	(0.105)	(0.162)
OWN_AB*EPS	−2.094	−3.823**	−11.997	−1.647	−1.179	−10.807
	(0.102)	(0.014)	(0.106)	(0.253)	(0.451)	(0.114)
Fixed effects:
- Firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,621	1,382	239	1,621	1,383	238
Within R²	22.9%	23.0%	35.6%	28.3%	27.5%	34.9%

Panel C: abnormal ownership concentration and headline earnings
	OWN_AB = 1 for bottom quintile			OWN_AB = 1 for top quintile
Variable	All firms	Positive earnings	Negative earnings	All firms	Positive earnings	Negative earnings
BPS	0.076	0.063	0.606**	0.175	0.122	0.425
	(0.763)	(0.792)	(0.036)	(0.381)	(0.551)	(0.357)
HEPS	8.805***	9.088***	13.690***	9.122***	9.393***	13.533***
	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(0.001)	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(0.001)
APS	−0.066	0.721	1.488	0.220	0.306	1.109
	(0.965)	(0.509)	(0.587)	(0.857)	(0.807)	(0.665)
NEG	3.055			6.275**
	(0.163)			(0.015)
OWN_AB	3.145	3.820	−5.344*	−1.341	−0.678	−2.545
	(0.240)	(0.222)	(0.065)	(0.642)	(0.863)	(0.125)
OWN_AB*BPS	0.504***	0.692***	0.325***	0.553***	0.432**	−0.089
	(<0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(<0.001)	(0.020)	(0.802)
OWN_AB*HEPS	−4.664***	−5.462***	−15.339***	−3.697***	−2.986***	−11.152**
	(<0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.049)
OWN_AB*APS	1.052	−2.611	−2.906*	1.850	2.251***	−0.588
	(0.629)	(0.160)	(0.097)	(0.168)	(<0.001)	(0.792)
Fixed effects:
- Firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,621	1,382	239	1,621	1,383	238
Within R²	33.4%	31.7%	66.6%	37.6%	36.5%	69.9%

Panel C: abnormal ownership concentration and headline earnings
	OWN_AB = 1 for bottom quintile			OWN_AB = 1 for top quintile
Variable	All firms	Positive earnings	Negative earnings	All firms	Positive earnings	Negative earnings
BPS	0.076	0.063	0.606**	0.175	0.122	0.425
	(0.763)	(0.792)	(0.036)	(0.381)	(0.551)	(0.357)
HEPS	8.805***	9.088***	13.690***	9.122***	9.393***	13.533***
	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(0.001)	(<0.001)	(<0.001)	(0.001)
APS	−0.066	0.721	1.488	0.220	0.306	1.109
	(0.965)	(0.509)	(0.587)	(0.857)	(0.807)	(0.665)
NEG	3.055			6.275**
	(0.163)			(0.015)
OWN_AB	3.145	3.820	−5.344*	−1.341	−0.678	−2.545
	(0.240)	(0.222)	(0.065)	(0.642)	(0.863)	(0.125)
OWN_AB*BPS	0.504***	0.692***	0.325***	0.553***	0.432**	−0.089
	(<0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(<0.001)	(0.020)	(0.802)
OWN_AB*HEPS	−4.664***	−5.462***	−15.339***	−3.697***	−2.986***	−11.152**
	(<0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.049)
OWN_AB*APS	1.052	−2.611	−2.906*	1.850	2.251***	−0.588
	(0.629)	(0.160)	(0.097)	(0.168)	(<0.001)	(0.792)
Fixed effects:
- Firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,621	1,382	239	1,621	1,383	238
Within R²	33.4%	31.7%	66.6%	37.6%	36.5%	69.9%

Note(s): Ownership concentration for this table was sorted into quintiles based on abnormal strategic shareholding. The dependent variable for all regression models is p. Variables are defined in the Appendix. The impact of abnormal ownership concentration is determined with reference to the middle quintiles as the base sample. For multivariate regression results, two-tailed p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009; Cameron et al., 2011) are reported in brackets, with a correction where the covariance matrix is not positive semi-definite. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively

Source(s): Authors’ own work

[ViewLarge]

Sharing Unavailable