Table 5

Results where ownership concentration is closest to expectation

Abnormal ownership concentration and IFRS earningsAbnormal ownership concentration and headline earnings
VariableAll firmsPositive earningsNegative earningsAll firmsPositive earningsNegative earnings
BPS0.649***0.589***0.663***0.408*0.3410.284
 (0.001)(0.003)(0.003)(0.069)(0.115)(0.208)
EPS4.074***4.612***3.107   
 (<0.001)(<0.001)(0.350)   
HEPS   6.248***6.780***8.422***
    (<0.001)(<0.001)(0.004)
APS   0.6900.942−0.653
    (0.564)(0.444)(0.751)
NEG6.087***  4.488*  
 (0.005)  (0.081)  
OWN_AB0.6710.678−2.778−0.765−1.356−4.873*
 (0.743)(0.804)(0.116)(0.590)(0.330)(0.060)
OWN_AB*BPS−0.223**−0.181**0.246−0.261***−0.266***0.685**
 (0.046)(0.039)(0.627)(<0.001)(0.005)(0.025)
OWN_AB*EPS1.618*1.353*−1.092   
 (0.052)(0.064)(0.755)   
OWN_AB*HEPS   2.612***2.725**−9.931***
    (0.005)(0.032)(0.008)
OWN_AB*APS   0.203−0.1281.594
    (0.790)(0.900)(0.687)
Fixed effects:      
- FirmYesYesYesYesYesYes
- YearYesYesYesYesYesYes
       
N2026172729920261727299
Within R225.8%25.3%14.0%32.5%31.7%59.1%

Note(s): Ownership concentration for this table was sorted into quintiles based on abnormal strategic shareholding and OWN_AB equals 1 when abnormal ownership falls into the middle quintile and zero otherwise. The dependent variable for all regression models is p. Variables are defined in the  Appendix. The impact of abnormal ownership concentration is determined with reference to the full sample. For multivariate regression results, two-tailed p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009; Cameron et al., 2011) are reported in brackets, with a correction where the covariance matrix is not positive semi-definite. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively

Source(s): Authors’ own work

or Create an Account

Close Modal
Close Modal