Results when using absolute abnormal ownership concentration
| Panel A: absolute abnormal ownership concentration and IFRS earnings | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |OWN_AB| = 1 for bottom quintile | |OWN_AB| = 1 for top quintile | |||||
| Variable | All firms | Positive earnings | Negative earnings | All firms | Positive earnings | Negative earnings |
| BPS | 0.667*** | 0.699*** | 0.648 | 0.678*** | 0.664*** | 1.001*** |
| (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.281) | (<0.001) | (0.001) | (0.004) | |
| EPS | 4.058*** | 4.156*** | 6.570 | 4.108*** | 4.460*** | 7.026 |
| (<0.001) | (0.001) | (0.184) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.156) | |
| NEG | 5.569** | 6.182** | ||||
| (0.024) | (0.034) | |||||
| |OWN_AB| | 0.714 | 0.567 | −5.048* | −0.139 | −0.224 | −1.551 |
| (0.743) | (0.850) | (0.086) | (0.914) | (0.900) | (0.784) | |
| |OWN_AB|*BPS | −0.218** | −0.231*** | 0.038 | 0.104 | 0.002 | −1.116*** |
| (0.025) | (0.009) | (0.953) | (0.241) | (0.993) | (0.003) | |
| |OWN_AB|*EPS | 1.818** | 1.940* | −4.900 | 0.199 | 0.985 | −7.747* |
| (0.025) | (0.066) | (0.337) | (0.801) | (0.447) | (0.080) | |
| Fixed effects: | ||||||
| - Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| - Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 1,621 | 1,388 | 233 | 1,621 | 1,383 | 238 |
| Within R2 | 25.5% | 24.7% | 22.9% | 27.2% | 28.0% | 37.8% |
| Panel A: absolute abnormal ownership concentration and IFRS earnings | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |OWN_AB| = 1 for bottom quintile | |OWN_AB| = 1 for top quintile | |||||
| Variable | All firms | Positive earnings | Negative earnings | All firms | Positive earnings | Negative earnings |
| BPS | 0.667*** | 0.699*** | 0.648 | 0.678*** | 0.664*** | 1.001*** |
| (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.281) | (<0.001) | (0.001) | (0.004) | |
| EPS | 4.058*** | 4.156*** | 6.570 | 4.108*** | 4.460*** | 7.026 |
| (<0.001) | (0.001) | (0.184) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.156) | |
| NEG | 5.569** | 6.182** | ||||
| (0.024) | (0.034) | |||||
| |OWN_AB| | 0.714 | 0.567 | −5.048* | −0.139 | −0.224 | −1.551 |
| (0.743) | (0.850) | (0.086) | (0.914) | (0.900) | (0.784) | |
| |OWN_AB|*BPS | −0.218** | −0.231*** | 0.038 | 0.104 | 0.002 | −1.116*** |
| (0.025) | (0.009) | (0.953) | (0.241) | (0.993) | (0.003) | |
| |OWN_AB|*EPS | 1.818** | 1.940* | −4.900 | 0.199 | 0.985 | −7.747* |
| (0.025) | (0.066) | (0.337) | (0.801) | (0.447) | (0.080) | |
| Fixed effects: | ||||||
| - Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| - Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 1,621 | 1,388 | 233 | 1,621 | 1,383 | 238 | |
| Within | 25.5% | 24.7% | 22.9% | 27.2% | 28.0% | 37.8% |
| Panel B: absolute abnormal ownership concentration and headline earnings | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |OWN_AB| = 1 for bottom quintile | |OWN_AB| = 1 for top quintile | |||||
| Variable | All firms | Positive earnings | Negative earnings | All firms | Positive earnings | Negative earnings |
| BPS | 0.371 | 0.402 | 0.770 | 0.428* | 0.432* | 0.449* |
| (0.153) | (0.131) | (0.250) | (0.056) | (0.054) | (0.051) | |
| HEPS | 6.594*** | 6.563*** | 10.018*** | 6.115*** | 6.233*** | 11.017*** |
| (<0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (<0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
| APS | −0.351 | −0.442 | 1.797 | −0.199 | 0.016 | 2.686 |
| (0.728) | (0.645) | (0.614) | (0.865) | (0.988) | (0.486) | |
| NEG | 2.964 | 3.361 | ||||
| (0.112) | (0.249) | |||||
| |OWN_AB| | −0.786 | −1.811 | −5.298* | −1.000 | −1.251 | 0.827 |
| (0.616) | (0.297) | (0.067) | (0.493) | (0.522) | (0.509) | |
| |OWN_AB|*BPS | −0.242*** | −0.311*** | 0.547 | 0.238* | 0.072 | −0.588*** |
| (0.005) | (<0.001) | (0.166) | (0.088) | (0.777) | (0.002) | |
| |OWN_AB|*HEPS | 2.783*** | 3.381*** | −14.856*** | −0.384 | 0.962 | −3.873 |
| (<0.001) | (<0.001) | (0.002) | (0.721) | (0.605) | (0.296) | |
| |OWN_AB|*APS | 0.939 | 1.119 | −0.869 | 1.916** | 1.917* | −3.874 |
| (0.119) | (0.329) | (0.856) | (0.036) | (0.088) | (0.448) | |
| Fixed effects: | ||||||
| - Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| - Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 1,621 | 1,388 | 233 | 1,621 | 1,383 | 238 |
| Within R2 | 33.8% | 32.4% | 59.6% | 33.0% | 32.9% | 70.0% |
| Panel B: absolute abnormal ownership concentration and headline earnings | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |OWN_AB| = 1 for bottom quintile | |OWN_AB| = 1 for top quintile | |||||
| Variable | All firms | Positive earnings | Negative earnings | All firms | Positive earnings | Negative earnings |
| BPS | 0.371 | 0.402 | 0.770 | 0.428* | 0.432* | 0.449* |
| (0.153) | (0.131) | (0.250) | (0.056) | (0.054) | (0.051) | |
| HEPS | 6.594*** | 6.563*** | 10.018*** | 6.115*** | 6.233*** | 11.017*** |
| (<0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (<0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
| APS | −0.351 | −0.442 | 1.797 | −0.199 | 0.016 | 2.686 |
| (0.728) | (0.645) | (0.614) | (0.865) | (0.988) | (0.486) | |
| NEG | 2.964 | 3.361 | ||||
| (0.112) | (0.249) | |||||
| |OWN_AB| | −0.786 | −1.811 | −5.298* | −1.000 | −1.251 | 0.827 |
| (0.616) | (0.297) | (0.067) | (0.493) | (0.522) | (0.509) | |
| |OWN_AB|*BPS | −0.242*** | −0.311*** | 0.547 | 0.238* | 0.072 | −0.588*** |
| (0.005) | (<0.001) | (0.166) | (0.088) | (0.777) | (0.002) | |
| |OWN_AB|*HEPS | 2.783*** | 3.381*** | −14.856*** | −0.384 | 0.962 | −3.873 |
| (<0.001) | (<0.001) | (0.002) | (0.721) | (0.605) | (0.296) | |
| |OWN_AB|*APS | 0.939 | 1.119 | −0.869 | 1.916** | 1.917* | −3.874 |
| (0.119) | (0.329) | (0.856) | (0.036) | (0.088) | (0.448) | |
| Fixed effects: | ||||||
| - Firm | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| - Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 1,621 | 1,388 | 233 | 1,621 | 1,383 | 238 | |
| Within | 33.8% | 32.4% | 59.6% | 33.0% | 32.9% | 70.0% |
Note(s): Ownership concentration for this table was sorted into quintiles based on absolute abnormal strategic shareholding. The dependent variable for all regression models is p. Variables are defined in the Appendix. The impact of absolute abnormal ownership concentration is determined with reference to the middle quintiles as the base sample. For multivariate regression results, two-tailed p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009; Cameron et al., 2011) are reported in brackets, with a correction where the covariance matrix is not positive semi-definite. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
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