Table 7. Outcome summary of retail vs...

Table 7.

Outcome summary of retail vs institutional investors’ ESG preferential differences

(E) Environmental activities	Retail investor preferences	Institutional investor preferences	Sources
(E1) Energy Saving Initiatives	Relevant (6^th)	Relevant	Schulze et al. (2016)
(E2) Water Saving Initiatives	Irrelevant	Relevant	Christ and Burritt (2017)
(E3) Measuring carbon footprint	Irrelevant	Relevant	Toka et al. (2015)
(E4) Recycling of raw materials	Relevant (7^th)	Relevant	Silva et al. (2017)
(E5) Recyclable packaging	Irrelevant	Relevant	Klaiman et al. (2016)
(E6) Ecofriendly logistics	Irrelevant	Relevant	Govindan and Soleimani (2017); Leonidou et al. (2016)
(S) Social activities
(S1) Paying taxes	Irrelevant	Relevant	Baudet et al., 2020
(S2) Fair wages	Most important (1^st)	Relevant	Larkin et al. (2012); Vaughan-Whitehead (2010)
(S3) Profit-sharing	Irrelevant	Relevant	Huddart and Liang (2005)
(S4) Charitable giving	Irrelevant	Relevant	Godfrey (2005)
(S5) Child labor	Most important (2^nd)	Relevant	Kolk and van Tulder (2002)
(S6) Collaboration with Unions	Irrelevant	Relevant	Fjeldstad et al. (2012); Meiers, 2014
(S7) Supplier Codes of Conduct	Irrelevant	Relevant	Short et al. (2016)
(S8) Employee Health and Safety Policy	Most important (3^rd)	Relevant	Nordlöf et al. (2017)
(S9) Diversity and equal opportunities	Relevant (4^th)	Relevant	Lawrence and Turner (2016); Nielsen and Nielsen (2013)
(G) Governance activities
(G1) Board-level CSR/ESG programs	Irrelevant	Relevant	Ioannou and Serafeim (2015)
(G2) Executive compensation approved by AGM	Irrelevant	Relevant	Chng et al. (2012)
(G3) Independent board members	Irrelevant	Relevant	Desender et al. (2013); Kroll et al. (2008)
(G4) Female board members	Irrelevant	Relevant	Bear et al. (2010)
(G5) ESG/CSR policy	Irrelevant	Relevant	Cheng et al. (2014); Wang and Bansal (2012)
(G6) Cybersecurity management	Irrelevant	Relevant	Bone (2016); Tisdale (2015)
(G7) Anti-corruption policy	Relevant (5^th)	Relevant	Yang (2009)

(E) Environmental activities	Retail investor preferences	Institutional investor preferences	Sources
(E1) Energy Saving Initiatives	Relevant (6^th)	Relevant	Schulze et al. (2016)
(E2) Water Saving Initiatives	Irrelevant	Relevant	Christ and Burritt (2017)
(E3) Measuring carbon footprint	Irrelevant	Relevant	Toka et al. (2015)
(E4) Recycling of raw materials	Relevant (7^th)	Relevant	Silva et al. (2017)
(E5) Recyclable packaging	Irrelevant	Relevant	Klaiman et al. (2016)
(E6) Ecofriendly logistics	Irrelevant	Relevant	Govindan and Soleimani (2017); Leonidou et al. (2016)
(S) Social activities
(S1) Paying taxes	Irrelevant	Relevant	Baudet et al., 2020
(S2) Fair wages	Most important (1^st)	Relevant	Larkin et al. (2012); Vaughan-Whitehead (2010)
(S3) Profit-sharing	Irrelevant	Relevant	Huddart and Liang (2005)
(S4) Charitable giving	Irrelevant	Relevant	Godfrey (2005)
(S5) Child labor	Most important (2^nd)	Relevant	Kolk and van Tulder (2002)
(S6) Collaboration with Unions	Irrelevant	Relevant	Fjeldstad et al. (2012); Meiers, 2014
(S7) Supplier Codes of Conduct	Irrelevant	Relevant	Short et al. (2016)
(S8) Employee Health and Safety Policy	Most important (3^rd)	Relevant	Nordlöf et al. (2017)
(S9) Diversity and equal opportunities	Relevant (4^th)	Relevant	Lawrence and Turner (2016); Nielsen and Nielsen (2013)
(G) Governance activities
(G1) Board-level CSR/ESG programs	Irrelevant	Relevant	Ioannou and Serafeim (2015)
(G2) Executive compensation approved by AGM	Irrelevant	Relevant	Chng et al. (2012)
(G3) Independent board members	Irrelevant	Relevant	Desender et al. (2013); Kroll et al. (2008)
(G4) Female board members	Irrelevant	Relevant	Bear et al. (2010)
(G5) ESG/CSR policy	Irrelevant	Relevant	Cheng et al. (2014); Wang and Bansal (2012)
(G6) Cybersecurity management	Irrelevant	Relevant	Bone (2016); Tisdale (2015)
(G7) Anti-corruption policy	Relevant (5^th)	Relevant	Yang (2009)

Note(s):

The “Relevant” label in the “Institutional Investor Preferences” column means that published research has provided evidence that the ESG activities are relevant to these investors

Source(s): Table by authors

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