Table 5

Threat of exit on the abnormal positive management tone

VariableAbToneAbToneAbTone
(1)(2)(3)
ET1.7289**1.7643**3.5246***
(1.979)(2.070)(4.104)
Size −0.0086−0.0037
 (−0.554)(−0.237)
Lev −0.3841***−0.3058***
 (−5.140)(−4.176)
ROA −0.6329***−0.4281***
 (−3.804)(−2.614)
OCF −0.1717−0.1447
 (−1.391)(−1.198)
Growth 0.1491***0.1527***
 (9.426)(9.911)
DA 0.02040.0162
 (0.227)(0.182)
BM 0.1540**0.1190*
 (2.541)(1.940)
Age 0.09030.1246**
 (1.516)(2.110)
Dir  0.4804**
  (2.150)
Dual  0.1044***
  (4.269)
Top1  −0.1828*
  (−1.834)
Inst  −0.4391***
  (−7.259)
Big4  0.4841***
  (7.482)
Year FEYesYesYes
Industry FEYesYesYes
Constant0.0404**0.0232−0.1641
(2.090)(0.067)(−0.444)
Observations36,11636,11636,116
Adjusted R20.00140.00890.0343

Note(s): This table presents the baseline regression results that test the relation between blockholder exit threat and management tone manipulation. The dependent variable is the residual value estimated based on the model of Huang et al. (2014). These residuals do not reflect objective expectations of the company’s actual operations or future development but rather capture the results of managerial tone manipulation. The key explanatory variable is the exit threat of blockholders. Following Dou et al. (2018), we employ the interaction between blockholder competition and stock liquidity to capture the intensity of exit threat. Other variables are defined in Table 1. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

Source(s): Table by authors

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