Table 3 Review of studies addressing... | Emerald Publishing

Table 3

Review of studies addressing MRLs in agri-food trade

Author(s)	Purpose	Countries	Period	MRL index	Conclusions
Xiong and Beghin (2014)	Separate demand-increase and trade-cost effects of MRL regulations	61 exporters and 21 OECD importers	2007–2012	Stringency Index ${M R L}_{j k} = \frac{1}{N} [\sum_{n_{(k)} = 1}^{N_{(k)}} \exp (\frac{{M R L}_{c o d e x, k n_{(k)}} - {M R L}_{j k n_{(k)}}}{{M R L}_{c o d e x, k n_{(k)}}})]$	MRL policies meet safety objectives without restricting trade. Tighter limits raise import demand through food-safety assurance but increase compliance costs for exporters, particularly in developing economies
Ferro et al. (2015)	Analyze restrictiveness effects on bilateral food trade	58 importing and exporting countries	2006–2011	Restrictiveness Index ${r e s t r i c}_{i p j} = \frac{1}{N (a)} [\sum_{n_{(a)} = 1}^{N_{(a)}} \frac{{Max}_{p a t} - {M R L}_{i p a t}}{{Max}_{p a t} - {Min}_{p a t}}]$	Stringent standards negatively influence firms' export decisions to targeted markets
Fiankor et al. (2021a, b)	Assess how standard differences affect trade, pricing and quality	59 importers and exporters	2005–2014	Stringency Index	Divergent MRLs reduce trade volumes and product variety. Higher costs reflect in prices without quality improvements. Effect minimal in South-South trade but pronounced in South-North exchanges
Traoré and Tamini (2021)	Estimate net effect of pesticide MRLs on mango exports	12 African exporters and 31 OECD importers	2016	Stringency Index	Strict OECD MRLs lower probability of African mangoes meeting requirements. Compliant exporters enjoy increased flows as demand-enhancement outweighs cost barriers
Shingal and Ehrich (2024)	Analyze EU MRL harmonization effects	95 importers and exporters	2013–2014	Actual Heterogeneity Index	Pre-harmonization (2005–2008) divergence hindered intra-EU exports. Post-harmonization (2009–2014) increased export probability within EU, to OECD partners and developing economies

Author(s)	Purpose	Countries	Period	MRL index	Conclusions
Xiong and Beghin (2014)	Separate demand-increase and trade-cost effects of MRL regulations	61 exporters and 21 OECD importers	2007–2012	Stringency Index ${M R L}_{j k} = \frac{1}{N} [\sum_{n_{(k)} = 1}^{N_{(k)}} \exp (\frac{{M R L}_{c o d e x, k n_{(k)}} - {M R L}_{j k n_{(k)}}}{{M R L}_{c o d e x, k n_{(k)}}})]$	MRL policies meet safety objectives without restricting trade. Tighter limits raise import demand through food-safety assurance but increase compliance costs for exporters, particularly in developing economies
Ferro et al. (2015)	Analyze restrictiveness effects on bilateral food trade	58 importing and exporting countries	2006–2011	Restrictiveness Index ${r e s t r i c}_{i p j} = \frac{1}{N (a)} [\sum_{n_{(a)} = 1}^{N_{(a)}} \frac{{Max}_{p a t} - {M R L}_{i p a t}}{{Max}_{p a t} - {Min}_{p a t}}]$	Stringent standards negatively influence firms' export decisions to targeted markets
Fiankor et al. (2021a, b)	Assess how standard differences affect trade, pricing and quality	59 importers and exporters	2005–2014	Stringency Index	Divergent MRLs reduce trade volumes and product variety. Higher costs reflect in prices without quality improvements. Effect minimal in South-South trade but pronounced in South-North exchanges
Traoré and Tamini (2021)	Estimate net effect of pesticide MRLs on mango exports	12 African exporters and 31 OECD importers	2016	Stringency Index	Strict OECD MRLs lower probability of African mangoes meeting requirements. Compliant exporters enjoy increased flows as demand-enhancement outweighs cost barriers
Shingal and Ehrich (2024)	Analyze EU MRL harmonization effects	95 importers and exporters	2013–2014	Actual Heterogeneity Index	Pre-harmonization (2005–2008) divergence hindered intra-EU exports. Post-harmonization (2009–2014) increased export probability within EU, to OECD partners and developing economies

Source(s): Authors' elaboration