Table 4. Results of the hierarchical...

Table 4.

Results of the hierarchical linear regression: exploitative innovation and firm performance relationship

Model	Control variables model β	Direct effect model β	Contingency model β	Configurational model β
Dependent variable: Firm performance
Constant	5.07	6.39	6.31	6.31
Control variables
Firm age	−0.15	−0.10	−0.10	−0.10
D1_ Private limited companies^a	−0.09	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06
D2_Public limited companies^b	−0.04	−0.03	−0.04	−0.04
Independent variables
Exploitative innovation		−0.54***	−0.50***	−0.50***
Centralisation		0.00	−0.01	−0.01
Interactions
Centralisation × environmental dynamism			0.08	0.08
Exploitative innovation × centralisation			0.10	0.10
Exploitative innovation × dynamism			−0.06	−0.06
Exploitative innovation × centralisation × dynamism				−0.00
R-square	0.026	0.308	0.324	0.324
Adjusted R-square	0.002	0.279	0.278	0.272
R-square change	0.026	0.283***	0.016	0.000

Model	Control variables model β	Direct effect model β	Contingency model β	Configurational model β
Dependent variable: Firm performance
Constant	5.07	6.39	6.31	6.31
Control variables
Firm age	−0.15	−0.10	−0.10	−0.10
D1_ Private limited companies^a	−0.09	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06
D2_Public limited companies^b	−0.04	−0.03	−0.04	−0.04
Independent variables
Exploitative innovation		−0.54***	−0.50***	−0.50***
Centralisation		0.00	−0.01	−0.01
Interactions
Centralisation × environmental dynamism			0.08	0.08
Exploitative innovation × centralisation			0.10	0.10
Exploitative innovation × dynamism			−0.06	−0.06
Exploitative innovation × centralisation × dynamism				−0.00
R-square	0.026	0.308	0.324	0.324
Adjusted R-square	0.002	0.279	0.278	0.272
R-square change	0.026	0.283***	0.016	0.000

Note(s):

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; Standardised βeta coefficients are reported; ^a,bFirm ownership was a categorical variable with three groups (i.e. private limited, public limited and others) and thus, two dummy variables were included in the model

Source(s): Authors’ own work

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