| Financial mechanism | Jurisdictional carbon crediting and private finance mobilization | Carbon contracts for difference and double auction model | Grants for private sector entities with public commitment as precondition | Results-based payments for verified emissions reductions | Auctioning of put options |
| Governance (private, public) | Public and private partnership | Public and private | Public | Public | Public |
| Financial volume (targeted) | $72–$207bn through 2035 | $3.5–$4bn | Not indicated | Capitalization target of $210m | $40m |
| Type of finance provided | Results-based payments based on carbon credits | Purchase of hydrogen via auctioning that is resold through another auction within the EU. Potential price difference covered by the initiative | Grants | Results-based finance (program-based, sectoral and policy crediting) | Auctioning of tradable put options |
| Recipients targeted by the initiative and level of incentive | Public at jurisdictional level: national and subnational governments | No recipient in the strict sense; public finance covers the price difference between world market prices and the prices at which European companies would buy hydrogen | The financial incentive is provided at the private level through funding for individual nitric acid plant operators; political incentive is established at public level through national commitment as precondition for funding | Government level: national governments are incentivized and supported by grants for verified emission reductions to implement policies that create conditions for private investments in low-carbon technologies | |
| Eligibility | ETA partner countries and buyers must meet respective criteria | – | Recipient plant operators must be based in countries whose governments have committed to sustaining the mitigation activities | Governments from developing countries that have developed detailed mitigation program and respective documents | Carbon market activity proponents meeting specific criteria |
| Risk allocation | As the payments are made upon delivery of ETA credits, the risk largely remains with partner countries | Risk remains with the investors supporting the initiative, who contribute to covering the price difference | The risk is distributed across the different actors involved, who depend on each other | As the payments are made upon delivery of verified emission reductions, the risk largely remains with the partner countries; additional risk if ITMOs adversely impact NDC attainment | No risk for the successful investor who acquires the right (but not the obligation) to sell future carbon credits at prices set by the auction |
| Transparency | Key information was made available on the initiative’s website until US change of government | Website | Website | Website | Website |
| Transformative potential and scalability | The sectoral crediting approach applied by the ETA could hold significant potential for scalability, while the transformative potential could be undermined if ETA credits are misused by companies, deterring sectoral decarbonization | The approach has significant scaling potential while there is also the threat that an exclusive focus on importing green hydrogen from the developing world could replicate old dependency patterns | The approach holds considerable transformative potential while at the same time scalability being limited because of the reliance on public funding | If carefully balanced, then the combination of the two pathways (RBCF and ITMOs) could hold significant potential for both, transformative potential and scalability; risks of ITMO transfer must be carefully managed | The transformative potential and scalability is limited, as it builds on the failure of an existing policy instrument and might involve high transaction costs |