Table 9 Cross-sectional analyses...

Table 9

Cross-sectional analyses

Variables	Non-family firms						Family firms
	DV=Auditor-client distance				DV=Audit fee		DV=Auditor-client distance				DV=Audit fee
	DisKM	DisMN	DisKM	DisMN	Aud_Fee	Aud_Fee	DisKM	DisMN	DisKM	DisMN	Aud_Fee	Aud_Fee
Panel A: Family firms, executive narcissism, audit distance, and audit fees
Chair_Narc	−1.013	−0.958			0.031		−1.540**	−1.581***			0.764*
Chair_Narc	(−1.203)	(−1.399)			(0.050)		(−2.482)	(−2.886)			(1.969)
CEO_Narc			−0.922	−1.696**		0.577			−1.317*	−1.185**		0.913**
CEO_Narc			(−1.154)	(−2.651)		(0.976)			(−1.949)	(−1.975)		(2.222)
Constant	1.458	2.126	1.736	2.479	3.747**	3.653**	1.517	3.170	2.195	3.803	1.215	1.314
Constant	(0.587)	(1.052)	(0.697)	(1.243)	(2.035)	(1.985)	(0.542)	(1.282)	(0.791)	(1.542)	(0.694)	(0.778)
Year_FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry_FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	214	214	214	214	214	214	222	222	222	222	222	222
Adjusted_R²	0.147	0.148	0.151	0.176	0.486	0.491	0.133	0.136	0.123	0.121	0.524	0.545

Variables	Non-family firms						Family firms
	DV=Auditor-client distance				DV=Audit fee		DV=Auditor-client distance				DV=Audit fee
	DisKM	DisMN	DisKM	DisMN	Aud_Fee	Aud_Fee	DisKM	DisMN	DisKM	DisMN	Aud_Fee	Aud_Fee
Panel A: Family firms, executive narcissism, audit distance, and audit fees
Chair_Narc	−1.013	−0.958			0.031		−1.540**	−1.581***			0.764*
Chair_Narc	(−1.203)	(−1.399)			(0.050)		(−2.482)	(−2.886)			(1.969)
CEO_Narc			−0.922	−1.696**		0.577			−1.317*	−1.185**		0.913**
CEO_Narc			(−1.154)	(−2.651)		(0.976)			(−1.949)	(−1.975)		(2.222)
Constant	1.458	2.126	1.736	2.479	3.747**	3.653**	1.517	3.170	2.195	3.803	1.215	1.314
Constant	(0.587)	(1.052)	(0.697)	(1.243)	(2.035)	(1.985)	(0.542)	(1.282)	(0.791)	(1.542)	(0.694)	(0.778)
Year_FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry_FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	214	214	214	214	214	214	222	222	222	222	222	222
Adjusted_R²	0.147	0.148	0.151	0.176	0.486	0.491	0.133	0.136	0.123	0.121	0.524	0.545

Variables	Non-big 4 auditors						Big 4 auditors
	DV=Auditor-client distance				DV=Audit fee		DV=Auditor-client distance				DV=Audit fee
	DisKM	DisMN	DisKM	DisMN	Aud_Fee	Aud_Fee	DisKM	DisMN	DisKM	DisMN	Aud_Fee	Aud_Fee
Panel B: Big 4 auditors, executive narcissism, audit distance, and audit fees
Chair_Narc	−1.429**	−1.339***			0.915**		0.102	0.181			−0.723
Chair_Narc	(−2.547)	(−2.752)			(2.330)		(0.103)	(0.266)			(−0.769)
CEO_Narc			−0.930*	−1.336***		1.155***			0.212	0.305		−0.459
CEO_Narc			(−1.713)	(−2.859)		(3.084)			(0.145)	(0.305)		(−0.326)
Constant	0.104	1.411	0.061	1.409	5.007***	4.986***	2.958	4.245**	2.718	3.380	3.678	3.844
Constant	(0.067)	(1.043)	(0.039)	(1.050)	(4.585)	(4.636)	(1.042)	(2.162)	(0.905)	(1.645)	(1.356)	(1.329)
Year_FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry_FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	348	348	348	348	348	348	88	88	88	88	88	88
Adjusted_R²	0.224	0.211	0.216	0.216	0.418	0.430	0.261	0.390	0.257	0.393	0.335	0.314

Variables	Non-big 4 auditors						Big 4 auditors
	DV=Auditor-client distance				DV=Audit fee		DV=Auditor-client distance				DV=Audit fee
	DisKM	DisMN	DisKM	DisMN	Aud_Fee	Aud_Fee	DisKM	DisMN	DisKM	DisMN	Aud_Fee	Aud_Fee
Panel B: Big 4 auditors, executive narcissism, audit distance, and audit fees
Chair_Narc	−1.429**	−1.339***			0.915**		0.102	0.181			−0.723
Chair_Narc	(−2.547)	(−2.752)			(2.330)		(0.103)	(0.266)			(−0.769)
CEO_Narc			−0.930*	−1.336***		1.155***			0.212	0.305		−0.459
CEO_Narc			(−1.713)	(−2.859)		(3.084)			(0.145)	(0.305)		(−0.326)
Constant	0.104	1.411	0.061	1.409	5.007***	4.986***	2.958	4.245**	2.718	3.380	3.678	3.844
Constant	(0.067)	(1.043)	(0.039)	(1.050)	(4.585)	(4.636)	(1.042)	(2.162)	(0.905)	(1.645)	(1.356)	(1.329)
Year_FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry_FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	348	348	348	348	348	348	88	88	88	88	88	88
Adjusted_R²	0.224	0.211	0.216	0.216	0.418	0.430	0.261	0.390	0.257	0.393	0.335	0.314

Note(s): Table 9 reports the results for cross-sectional analyses. Panel A presents how family firms moderate the association between executives' narcissism and audit distance and audit fees. Panel B shows how Big 4 auditors moderate the association between executives' narcissism and audit distance and audit fees. Coefficients are presented with t-statistics in parentheses. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. DV stands for dependent variable

Source(s): Authors' construction

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