Table 2

Incumbent’s optimal strategy with high cross-resistance (ϕ>θ/2)

EntryIncumbent’s profit-maximizing first-period output levelSecond-period output at equilibrium
Entry is accommodated if R<R̅X*=αc2β9β22β(2θϕ)9β2(2θϕ)2x*=αc3β2θϕX3β  ,   y*=αc3β2ϕ-θX3β
Entry is pre-empted if R̅R<RX*=αc2ϕθ3(βR)122ϕθx*=2θ(βR)12(θϕ)(αc)2βϕ
Entry is blockaded if RRX*=αc2β+θx*=αc2β+θ,  y*=0

Source(s): Table by author

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