Table 3

Incumbent’s optimal strategy with low cross-resistance (ϕ<θ/2)

EntryIncumbent’s profit maximizing first-period output levelSecond-period output at equilibrium
Entry is accommodated if R<R̅X*=αc2β9β22β(2θϕ)9β2(2θϕ)2x*=αc3β2θϕX3β  ,  y*=αc3β2ϕ-θX3β
Entry is pre-empted if R̅R<RˆX*=3(βR)12θ2ϕαcθ2ϕx*=2(θϕ)(αc)3θ(βR)122β(θ2ϕ)
Entry is blockaded if RRˆX*=αc2β+θx*=αc2β+θ

Source(s): Table by author

or Create an Account

Close Modal
Close Modal