Table 12

The effect of CEO age

Dependent variable(1)(2)(3)(4)
Ln (1 + dividend)Dividend payout ratio
Older CEOsYounger CEOsOlder CEOsYounger CEOs
BioRegulation−0.4304***−0.7463***−0.0482−0.0791**
(0.1130)(0.1742)(0.0463)(0.0336)
PPE to Assets1.4698***1.3168***0.0989***0.0511*
(0.1329)(0.1360)(0.0291)(0.0302)
CAPEX Ratio−4.5629***−2.3179***−0.3668***−0.6539***
(0.3400)(0.1863)(0.0344)(0.0553)
Leverage−0.8623***−0.4630***0.03990.0860***
(0.1266)(0.1295)(0.0299)(0.0298)
ROA0.45182.3762***0.1128*0.2802***
(0.5061)(0.3699)(0.0659)(0.0954)
Firm Size0.8666***0.7671***0.0104**0.0076
(0.0205)(0.0186)(0.0042)(0.0054)
Market to Book Equity−0.0004***−0.0006***−0.0007−0.0001
(0.0001)(0.0002)(0.0002)(0.0002)
Cash Flow to Assets3.3157***1.5731***0.3779***0.7481***
(0.6463)(0.3827)(0.0593)(0.1027)
Net Working Capital−0.6924***−0.7009***−0.01820.0092
(0.1712)(0.1568)(0.0346)(0.0441)
Constant−4.2665***−4.1096***0.0532*0.1552***
(0.1543)(0.1302)(0.0316)(0.0433)
Observations9,61410,1019,61410,301
Adjusted R-squared0.46180.42410.09280.1234
Year FEYESYESYESYES
Industry FEYESYESYESYES
Chow-test p-value0.0012 0.0038 

Note(s): This table shows result for the effect of CEO age. The sub samples of older and younger CEOs are developed based on the median CEO Age. Ln (1 + Dividend) is the dependent variable in specifications 1 and 2, and Dividend Payout Ratio is the dependent variable in specifications 3 and 4. Year and industry fixed effects are taken into account in all specifications.  Appendix Table A1 provides an explanation of each variable. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by the symbols ***, **, and *, respectively

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