Table 13

The effect of Paris agreement withdrawal

Dependent variable(1)(2)
Ln (1 + dividend)Dividend per share
Paris Agreement Withdrawal × Regulation0.4153**0.0930**
(0.1629)(0.0461)
Paris Agreement Withdrawal0.1359***0.0330***
(0.0224)(0.0087)
Regulation−0.0478−0.1035***
(0.1992)(0.0366)
PPE to Assets−0.12970.0907***
(0.1694)(0.0259)
CAPEX Ratio0.0374−0.1371***
(0.0618)(0.0278)
Leverage−0.15080.0279
(0.1002)(0.0198)
ROA0.7225**0.4360***
(0.3535)(0.0706)
Firm Size0.07150.0170***
(0.0499)(0.0041)
Market to Book Equity0.0001**0.0002
(0.0000)(0.0001)
Cash Flow to Assets−0.18220.0870*
(0.1405)(0.0444)
Net Working Capital−0.2307−0.0331
(0.1696)(0.0369)
Constant1.4276***0.0048
(0.3560)(0.0308)
Observations6,0856,061
Adjusted R-squared0.42640.0886
Year FENONO
Industry FEYESYES

Note(s): This table shows result for exogeneous shock of Donald Trump's 2017 Paris Agreement Withdrawal. The Paris Agreement Withdrawal is a dummy variable for years 2017 onwards. Ln (1 + Dividend) is the dependent variable in specification 1, and Dividend Payout Ratio is the dependent variable in specification 2. Industry fixed effects are taken into account in both specifications.  Appendix Table A1 provides an explanation of each variable. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by the symbols ***, **, and *, respectively

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