Table 3

The impact of managerial financial experience on corporate tax aggressiveness

Dependent variable = ETR1ETR1ETR2ETR2BTD1BTD1BTD2BTD2
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)
Panel A effects of the presence and proportion of financial experts in top management on tax planning
Financial_D−0.009*** −0.005* 0.002*** 0.001** 
(−2.813) (−1.958) (4.139) (2.390) 
Financial_Ratio −0.031** −0.025** 0.009*** 0.006**
 (−2.290) (−2.195) (3.584) (2.304)
SOE0.0030.0040.008**0.008**−0.001−0.001−0.001−0.001
(0.870)(0.948)(2.528)(2.520)(−1.568)(−1.637)(−0.940)(−0.970)
Size0.011***0.011***0.007***0.007***−0.001***−0.001***−0.000−0.000
(7.394)(7.279)(5.967)(5.889)(−3.054)(−2.857)(−0.778)(−0.658)
Age−0.001−0.0000.003**0.004**0.003***0.003***0.002***0.002***
(−0.284)(−0.141)(2.392)(2.543)(8.285)(8.029)(5.170)(5.014)
Tangibility0.0250.0250.030**0.030**0.008**0.007**0.006**0.006**
(1.395)(1.423)(2.097)(2.109)(2.485)(2.439)(2.070)(2.043)
Lev0.030***0.030***0.0050.005−0.004**−0.004**−0.004**−0.004**
(3.099)(3.094)(0.627)(0.622)(−2.264)(−2.261)(−2.472)(−2.470)
RD−0.705***−0.707***−0.816***−0.820***0.163***0.164***0.157***0.158***
(−6.830)(−6.840)(−9.900)(−9.937)(8.752)(8.811)(8.293)(8.336)
ROA0.140***0.141***0.257***0.258***0.041***0.040***0.044***0.044***
(4.719)(4.768)(10.449)(10.495)(5.652)(5.584)(6.753)(6.711)
Growth0.012***0.012***0.013***0.013***0.001*0.001*0.001***0.001***
(4.640)(4.657)(6.043)(6.075)(1.829)(1.793)(3.083)(3.058)
Duality0.0020.002−0.001−0.001−0.000−0.0000.0000.000
(0.540)(0.544)(−0.340)(−0.324)(−0.281)(−0.289)(0.328)(0.319)
Independence0.0400.0410.0290.0290.007*0.007*−0.001−0.001
(1.482)(1.497)(1.337)(1.343)(1.693)(1.661)(−0.192)(−0.213)
Female0.026*0.027*0.023**0.023**−0.001−0.001−0.002−0.002
(1.781)(1.804)(2.002)(2.009)(−0.255)(−0.291)(−0.987)(−1.009)
Loss−0.019**−0.019**−0.012*−0.012*0.008***0.008***0.007***0.007***
(−2.224)(−2.214)(−1.694)(−1.682)(6.771)(6.752)(5.741)(5.728)
TotalAccruals−0.012−0.013−0.072***−0.072***−0.004−0.004−0.023***−0.023***
(−0.614)(−0.635)(−4.464)(−4.463)(−0.972)(−0.963)(−6.074)(−6.067)
TMT_Age−0.017−0.0170.0150.014−0.006**−0.006*−0.002−0.002
(−0.812)(−0.811)(0.917)(0.858)(−1.990)(−1.930)(−0.573)(−0.524)
TMT_Foreign0.0230.023−0.008−0.0080.000−0.000−0.000−0.000
(1.506)(1.509)(−0.710)(−0.672)(0.054)(−0.000)(−0.156)(−0.193)
TMT_Academic0.0050.005−0.005−0.005−0.002−0.002−0.003*−0.003*
(0.510)(0.529)(−0.597)(−0.557)(−1.000)(−1.077)(−1.646)(−1.698)
_cons−0.185**−0.183**−0.210***−0.204***0.072***0.070***0.044***0.043***
(−2.168)(−2.137)(−3.101)(−3.019)(5.221)(5.115)(3.265)(3.193)
Year fixed effects?YesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Industry fixed effects?YesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Province fixed effects?YesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
SEs. Clustered atFirm, YearFirm, YearFirm, YearFirm, YearFirm, YearFirm, YearFirm, YearFirm, Year
No. of obs18,25318,25321,91221,91215,74615,74615,66715,667
Adj. R-square0.0580.0580.0660.0660.1170.1170.0980.098
Dependent variable = ETR1ETR2BTD1BTD2
(1)(2)(3)(4)
Panel B effects of CEOs with financial work experience on tax planning
Financial_CEO−0.011*−0.009*0.003***0.002*
(−1.685)(−1.661)(3.304)(1.670)
SOE0.0040.009***−0.001*−0.001
(1.037)(2.805)(−1.802)(−1.175)
Size0.011***0.007***−0.001***−0.000
(7.246)(5.822)(−2.812)(−0.562)
Age−0.0000.003**0.003***0.002***
(−0.186)(2.030)(8.098)(5.017)
Tangibility0.0250.024*0.007**0.006**
(1.420)(1.700)(2.460)(2.019)
Lev0.031***0.004−0.004**−0.004**
(3.123)(0.552)(−2.314)(−2.403)
RD−0.703***−0.929***0.163***0.165***
(−6.803)(−11.669)(8.740)(8.727)
ROA0.140***0.258***0.041***0.043***
(4.724)(10.503)(5.647)(6.563)
Growth0.012***0.013***0.001*0.001***
(4.641)(6.029)(1.812)(2.879)
Duality0.002−0.003−0.0000.000
(0.604)(−1.058)(−0.442)(0.442)
Independence0.0410.0260.007−0.001
(1.507)(1.217)(1.638)(−0.255)
Female0.026*0.023**−0.001−0.002
(1.782)(2.032)(−0.261)(−0.728)
Loss−0.019**−0.013*0.008***0.007***
(−2.229)(−1.819)(6.761)(5.708)
TotalAccruals−0.013−0.072***−0.004−0.024***
(−0.644)(−4.430)(−0.957)(−6.338)
TMT_Age−0.0140.013−0.007**−0.002
(−0.675)(0.771)(−2.183)(−0.547)
TMT_Foreign0.022−0.0100.000−0.001
(1.423)(−0.913)(0.179)(−0.452)
TMT_Academic0.004−0.004−0.001−0.003
(0.416)(−0.485)(−0.858)(−1.592)
_cons−0.195**−0.189***0.074***0.043***
(−2.277)(−2.763)(5.362)(3.148)
Year fixed effects?YesYesYesYes
Industry fixed effects?YesYesYesYes
Province fixed effects?YesYesYesYes
SEs. Clustered atFirm, YearFirm, YearFirm, YearFirm, Year
No. of obs18,25321,89915,74615,675
Adj. R-square0.0570.0670.1160.098

Note(s): This table presents the effects of various measures of TMT's financial experience on corporate tax planning. Panel A presents the results of the effects of financial expert top executives on corporate tax avoidance. The key independent variable is Financial_D, which is a binary indicator equal to one if a firm has at least one top executive with financial experience, and zero otherwise. Financial_Ratio is measured as the percentage of top executives with financial experience on the TMT. In Models (1) and (2), ETR1 is computed as the difference between the total book income tax expense and the deferred income tax expenses, scaled by pre-tax accounting income. In Models (3) and (4), ETR2 is calculated as total tax expenses divided by pre-tax accounting income. Lower values of ETR1 and ETR2 indicate a higher degree of corporate tax aggressiveness. In Models (5) and (6), BTD1 is the book-tax difference, computed as pre-tax accounting income less estimated taxable income scaled by total assets. In Models (7) and (8), BTD2 is the residual book-tax gap. Higher BTD values indicate higher avoidance levels. Panel B reports the influence of financial expert CEOs on corporate tax avoidance. Financial_CEO is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm's CEO has prior financial work experience, and zero otherwise. All independent variables are lagged by one year except for Growth and Loss. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Table A1 of the Appendix section. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively

Source(s): Authors’ own work

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