Channel analysis: the impact of managerial financial experience in regulatory and non-regulatory authorities on tax aggressiveness
| Dependent variable = | ETR1 | ETR1 | ETR2 | ETR2 | BTD1 | BTD1 | BTD2 | BTD2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
| Regulatory financial | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.002 | −0.001 | ||||
| (0.285) | (0.065) | (0.972) | (−0.488) | |||||
| NonregulatoryFinancial | −0.010*** | −0.005** | 0.002*** | 0.001*** | ||||
| (−3.073) | (−2.061) | (4.253) | (2.687) | |||||
| RegulatoryFinancial_Ratio | 0.019 | 0.056 | 0.005 | −0.018 | ||||
| (0.260) | (0.882) | (0.440) | (−1.316) | |||||
| NonregulatoryFinancial_Ratio | −0.032** | −0.026* | 0.013*** | 0.010*** | ||||
| (−1.982) | (−1.923) | (4.531) | (3.729) | |||||
| SOE | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.008** | 0.008** | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 |
| (0.839) | (0.980) | (2.515) | (2.561) | (−1.555) | (−1.610) | (−0.909) | (−0.887) | |
| Size | 0.011*** | 0.011*** | 0.007*** | 0.007*** | −0.001*** | −0.001*** | −0.000 | −0.000 |
| (7.396) | (7.266) | (5.968) | (5.863) | (−3.066) | (−2.851) | (−0.782) | (−0.628) | |
| Age | −0.001 | −0.000 | 0.003** | 0.004** | 0.003*** | 0.003*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** |
| (−0.301) | (−0.190) | (2.386) | (2.485) | (8.283) | (8.051) | (5.191) | (5.025) | |
| Tangibility | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.030** | 0.030** | 0.008** | 0.007** | 0.006** | 0.006** |
| (1.409) | (1.421) | (2.097) | (2.113) | (2.493) | (2.456) | (2.069) | (2.049) | |
| Lev | 0.030*** | 0.030*** | 0.005 | 0.005 | −0.004** | −0.004** | −0.004** | −0.004** |
| (3.091) | (3.097) | (0.621) | (0.630) | (−2.256) | (−2.275) | (−2.469) | (−2.485) | |
| RD | −0.706*** | −0.702*** | −0.816*** | −0.816*** | 0.163*** | 0.164*** | 0.157*** | 0.158*** |
| (−6.846) | (−6.802) | (−9.899) | (−9.888) | (8.755) | (8.802) | (8.296) | (8.349) | |
| ROA | 0.139*** | 0.141*** | 0.257*** | 0.258*** | 0.041*** | 0.040*** | 0.044*** | 0.044*** |
| (4.699) | (4.767) | (10.440) | (10.491) | (5.653) | (5.554) | (6.765) | (6.699) | |
| Growth | 0.012*** | 0.012*** | 0.013*** | 0.013*** | 0.001* | 0.001* | 0.001*** | 0.001*** |
| (4.634) | (4.652) | (6.041) | (6.063) | (1.829) | (1.765) | (3.093) | (3.045) | |
| Duality | 0.002 | 0.002 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.000 | −0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| (0.536) | (0.545) | (−0.343) | (−0.324) | (−0.285) | (−0.328) | (0.325) | (0.280) | |
| Independence | 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.007* | 0.007* | −0.001 | −0.001 |
| (1.491) | (1.496) | (1.340) | (1.351) | (1.687) | (1.666) | (−0.198) | (−0.222) | |
| Female | 0.027* | 0.027* | 0.023** | 0.023** | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.002 | −0.002 |
| (1.786) | (1.803) | (2.005) | (2.018) | (−0.252) | (−0.294) | (−0.995) | (−1.028) | |
| Loss | −0.019** | −0.019** | −0.012* | −0.012* | 0.008*** | 0.008*** | 0.007*** | 0.007*** |
| (−2.225) | (−2.217) | (−1.695) | (−1.683) | (6.773) | (6.741) | (5.737) | (5.704) | |
| TotalAccruals | −0.012 | −0.013 | −0.072*** | −0.072*** | −0.004 | −0.004 | −0.023*** | −0.023*** |
| (−0.611) | (−0.647) | (−4.463) | (−4.473) | (−0.972) | (−0.952) | (−6.079) | (−6.087) | |
| TMT_Age | −0.016 | −0.016 | 0.015 | 0.015 | −0.006** | −0.006* | −0.002 | −0.002 |
| (−0.789) | (−0.754) | (0.928) | (0.925) | (−1.984) | (−1.883) | (−0.591) | (−0.486) | |
| TMT_Foreign | 0.023 | 0.023 | −0.008 | −0.008 | 0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.001 |
| (1.506) | (1.484) | (−0.711) | (−0.700) | (0.046) | (−0.033) | (−0.165) | (−0.263) | |
| TMT_Academic | 0.005 | 0.005 | −0.005 | −0.005 | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.003 | −0.003* |
| (0.485) | (0.481) | (−0.610) | (−0.618) | (−1.008) | (−1.092) | (−1.621) | (−1.693) | |
| _cons | −0.187** | −0.187** | −0.210*** | −0.209*** | 0.072*** | 0.069*** | 0.044*** | 0.042*** |
| (−2.189) | (−2.186) | (−3.109) | (−3.081) | (5.211) | (5.043) | (3.278) | (3.127) | |
| Year fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| SEs. Clustered at | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year |
| No. of obs | 18,253 | 18,253 | 21,912 | 21,912 | 15,746 | 15,746 | 15,667 | 15,667 |
| Adj. R-square | 0.058 | 0.057 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.098 | 0.099 |
| Dependent variable = | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
| 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.002 | −0.001 | |||||
| (0.285) | (0.065) | (0.972) | (−0.488) | |||||
| −0.010*** | −0.005** | 0.002*** | 0.001*** | |||||
| (−3.073) | (−2.061) | (4.253) | (2.687) | |||||
| 0.019 | 0.056 | 0.005 | −0.018 | |||||
| (0.260) | (0.882) | (0.440) | (−1.316) | |||||
| −0.032** | −0.026* | 0.013*** | 0.010*** | |||||
| (−1.982) | (−1.923) | (4.531) | (3.729) | |||||
| 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.008** | 0.008** | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | |
| (0.839) | (0.980) | (2.515) | (2.561) | (−1.555) | (−1.610) | (−0.909) | (−0.887) | |
| 0.011*** | 0.011*** | 0.007*** | 0.007*** | −0.001*** | −0.001*** | −0.000 | −0.000 | |
| (7.396) | (7.266) | (5.968) | (5.863) | (−3.066) | (−2.851) | (−0.782) | (−0.628) | |
| −0.001 | −0.000 | 0.003** | 0.004** | 0.003*** | 0.003*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | |
| (−0.301) | (−0.190) | (2.386) | (2.485) | (8.283) | (8.051) | (5.191) | (5.025) | |
| 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.030** | 0.030** | 0.008** | 0.007** | 0.006** | 0.006** | |
| (1.409) | (1.421) | (2.097) | (2.113) | (2.493) | (2.456) | (2.069) | (2.049) | |
| 0.030*** | 0.030*** | 0.005 | 0.005 | −0.004** | −0.004** | −0.004** | −0.004** | |
| (3.091) | (3.097) | (0.621) | (0.630) | (−2.256) | (−2.275) | (−2.469) | (−2.485) | |
| −0.706*** | −0.702*** | −0.816*** | −0.816*** | 0.163*** | 0.164*** | 0.157*** | 0.158*** | |
| (−6.846) | (−6.802) | (−9.899) | (−9.888) | (8.755) | (8.802) | (8.296) | (8.349) | |
| 0.139*** | 0.141*** | 0.257*** | 0.258*** | 0.041*** | 0.040*** | 0.044*** | 0.044*** | |
| (4.699) | (4.767) | (10.440) | (10.491) | (5.653) | (5.554) | (6.765) | (6.699) | |
| 0.012*** | 0.012*** | 0.013*** | 0.013*** | 0.001* | 0.001* | 0.001*** | 0.001*** | |
| (4.634) | (4.652) | (6.041) | (6.063) | (1.829) | (1.765) | (3.093) | (3.045) | |
| 0.002 | 0.002 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.000 | −0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | |
| (0.536) | (0.545) | (−0.343) | (−0.324) | (−0.285) | (−0.328) | (0.325) | (0.280) | |
| 0.041 | 0.041 | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.007* | 0.007* | −0.001 | −0.001 | |
| (1.491) | (1.496) | (1.340) | (1.351) | (1.687) | (1.666) | (−0.198) | (−0.222) | |
| 0.027* | 0.027* | 0.023** | 0.023** | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.002 | −0.002 | |
| (1.786) | (1.803) | (2.005) | (2.018) | (−0.252) | (−0.294) | (−0.995) | (−1.028) | |
| −0.019** | −0.019** | −0.012* | −0.012* | 0.008*** | 0.008*** | 0.007*** | 0.007*** | |
| (−2.225) | (−2.217) | (−1.695) | (−1.683) | (6.773) | (6.741) | (5.737) | (5.704) | |
| −0.012 | −0.013 | −0.072*** | −0.072*** | −0.004 | −0.004 | −0.023*** | −0.023*** | |
| (−0.611) | (−0.647) | (−4.463) | (−4.473) | (−0.972) | (−0.952) | (−6.079) | (−6.087) | |
| −0.016 | −0.016 | 0.015 | 0.015 | −0.006** | −0.006* | −0.002 | −0.002 | |
| (−0.789) | (−0.754) | (0.928) | (0.925) | (−1.984) | (−1.883) | (−0.591) | (−0.486) | |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | −0.008 | −0.008 | 0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.001 | |
| (1.506) | (1.484) | (−0.711) | (−0.700) | (0.046) | (−0.033) | (−0.165) | (−0.263) | |
| 0.005 | 0.005 | −0.005 | −0.005 | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.003 | −0.003* | |
| (0.485) | (0.481) | (−0.610) | (−0.618) | (−1.008) | (−1.092) | (−1.621) | (−1.693) | |
| −0.187** | −0.187** | −0.210*** | −0.209*** | 0.072*** | 0.069*** | 0.044*** | 0.042*** | |
| (−2.189) | (−2.186) | (−3.109) | (−3.081) | (5.211) | (5.043) | (3.278) | (3.127) | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | |
| 18,253 | 18,253 | 21,912 | 21,912 | 15,746 | 15,746 | 15,667 | 15,667 | |
| 0.058 | 0.057 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.098 | 0.099 |
Note(s): The table presents the empirical results on the relationship between top managers' financial experience in regulatory and non-regulatory authorities and corporate tax aggressiveness. Regulatory Financial is a dummy variable equal to one if any top managers have prior financial work experience in regulatory-oriented institutions—such as regulatory commissions, policy banks, or stock exchanges—and zero otherwise. Nonregulatory Financial equals one if any top managers previously worked in non-regulatory financial authorities, and zero otherwise. Regulatory Financial_Ratio is defined as the proportion of top managers with prior financial experience in regulatory-oriented authorities relative to the total number of top managers in the firm. Similarly, Nonregulatory Financial_Ratio measures the proportion of top managers with experience in non-regulatory financial institutions. All independent variables are lagged by one year except for Growth and Loss. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Table A1 of the Appendix section. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively