Turnover events of financially expert top executives: Firm fixed effects estimation
| Dependent variable = ETR1 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Financial_NewlyAppointed (transition from no financial expert executives to having at least one) | −0.013* | |||
| (−1.734) | ||||
| Financial_Increment (change from presence to an incremental increase in financial expertise) | −0.014** | |||
| (−2.277) | ||||
| Financial_Departure (transition from presence to absence of financial expert executives) | −0.006 | |||
| (−0.641) | ||||
| Financial_Decrease (decline in financial expert executives) | −0.010 | |||
| (−1.502) | ||||
| SOE | 0.023 | 0.017 | 0.016 | 0.018 |
| (1.378) | (1.173) | (0.612) | (1.216) | |
| Size | 0.024*** | 0.021*** | 0.016** | 0.022*** |
| (5.008) | (5.274) | (2.051) | (5.304) | |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| (0.728) | (1.164) | (0.367) | (1.129) | |
| Tangibility | 0.087*** | 0.079*** | 0.027 | 0.079*** |
| (2.733) | (2.931) | (0.538) | (2.956) | |
| Lev | −0.037* | −0.018 | 0.028 | −0.019 |
| (−1.856) | (−1.079) | (0.880) | (−1.108) | |
| RD | 0.004 | −0.124 | −0.274 | −0.125 |
| (0.019) | (−0.727) | (−0.739) | (−0.732) | |
| ROA | 0.095* | 0.117*** | 0.186** | 0.116*** |
| (1.960) | (2.835) | (2.306) | (2.797) | |
| Growth | 0.015*** | 0.016*** | 0.015*** | 0.016*** |
| (4.538) | (5.596) | (2.908) | (5.525) | |
| Duality | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.002 |
| (0.377) | (0.379) | (0.748) | (0.417) | |
| Independence | 0.119** | 0.113** | 0.045 | 0.113** |
| (2.231) | (2.548) | (0.554) | (2.530) | |
| Female | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.034 | 0.014 |
| (0.437) | (0.511) | (0.575) | (0.483) | |
| Loss | 0.033*** | 0.033*** | 0.054*** | 0.032*** |
| (3.113) | (3.452) | (2.881) | (3.433) | |
| TotalAccruals | −0.023 | −0.009 | −0.018 | −0.010 |
| (−0.848) | (−0.398) | (−0.392) | (−0.413) | |
| TMT_Age | 0.021 | 0.008 | −0.049 | 0.005 |
| (0.462) | (0.192) | (−0.568) | (0.114) | |
| TMT_Foreign | −0.015 | −0.024 | −0.087** | −0.024 |
| (−0.541) | (−1.033) | (−2.354) | (−1.039) | |
| TMT_Academic | −0.034 | −0.020 | −0.002 | −0.020 |
| (−1.356) | (−0.897) | (−0.048) | (−0.900) | |
| _cons | −0.539*** | −0.439** | −0.052 | −0.430** |
| (−2.630) | (−2.393) | (−0.130) | (−2.342) | |
| Year fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects? | No | No | No | No |
| Province fixed effects? | No | No | No | No |
| SEs. Clustered at | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year |
| No. of obs | 14,404 | 17,999 | 5,063 | 17,999 |
| Adj. R-square | 0.163 | 0.162 | 0.184 | 0.162 |
| Dependent variable | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| −0.013* | ||||
| (−1.734) | ||||
| −0.014** | ||||
| (−2.277) | ||||
| −0.006 | ||||
| (−0.641) | ||||
| −0.010 | ||||
| (−1.502) | ||||
| 0.023 | 0.017 | 0.016 | 0.018 | |
| (1.378) | (1.173) | (0.612) | (1.216) | |
| 0.024*** | 0.021*** | 0.016** | 0.022*** | |
| (5.008) | (5.274) | (2.051) | (5.304) | |
| 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.006 | |
| (0.728) | (1.164) | (0.367) | (1.129) | |
| 0.087*** | 0.079*** | 0.027 | 0.079*** | |
| (2.733) | (2.931) | (0.538) | (2.956) | |
| −0.037* | −0.018 | 0.028 | −0.019 | |
| (−1.856) | (−1.079) | (0.880) | (−1.108) | |
| 0.004 | −0.124 | −0.274 | −0.125 | |
| (0.019) | (−0.727) | (−0.739) | (−0.732) | |
| 0.095* | 0.117*** | 0.186** | 0.116*** | |
| (1.960) | (2.835) | (2.306) | (2.797) | |
| 0.015*** | 0.016*** | 0.015*** | 0.016*** | |
| (4.538) | (5.596) | (2.908) | (5.525) | |
| 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.002 | |
| (0.377) | (0.379) | (0.748) | (0.417) | |
| 0.119** | 0.113** | 0.045 | 0.113** | |
| (2.231) | (2.548) | (0.554) | (2.530) | |
| 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.034 | 0.014 | |
| (0.437) | (0.511) | (0.575) | (0.483) | |
| 0.033*** | 0.033*** | 0.054*** | 0.032*** | |
| (3.113) | (3.452) | (2.881) | (3.433) | |
| −0.023 | −0.009 | −0.018 | −0.010 | |
| (−0.848) | (−0.398) | (−0.392) | (−0.413) | |
| 0.021 | 0.008 | −0.049 | 0.005 | |
| (0.462) | (0.192) | (−0.568) | (0.114) | |
| −0.015 | −0.024 | −0.087** | −0.024 | |
| (−0.541) | (−1.033) | (−2.354) | (−1.039) | |
| −0.034 | −0.020 | −0.002 | −0.020 | |
| (−1.356) | (−0.897) | (−0.048) | (−0.900) | |
| −0.539*** | −0.439** | −0.052 | −0.430** | |
| (−2.630) | (−2.393) | (−0.130) | (−2.342) | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| No | No | No | No | |
| No | No | No | No | |
| Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | |
| 14,404 | 17,999 | 5,063 | 17,999 | |
| 0.163 | 0.162 | 0.184 | 0.162 |
Note(s): This table reports the results of firm fixed effects estimations examining the impact of turnover events of financially expert top executives on corporate tax aggressiveness. In Column (1), Financial_NewlyAppointed is a binary variable equal to one if a firm transitions from having no financially expert top executives in the prior year to having at least one financially expert top executive in the current year, and zero otherwise. In Column (2), Financial_Increment is a binary variable equal to one if the number of top executives with financial work experience increases from the previous year, provided that the firm had at least one financially experienced executive in the prior year, and zero otherwise. In Column (3), Financial_Departure equals one if a firm transitions from having financially expert top executives in the prior year to having none in the current year, and zero otherwise. In Column (4), Financial_Decrease equals one if a firm experiences a decrease in the number of financially expert top executives compared to the previous year, and zero otherwise. All independent variables are lagged by one year except for Growth and Loss. All regressions control for year and firm fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively