Moderating effects of internal institutional ownership and external regulatory violation pressure
| Dependent variable = ETR1 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Financial_D × Institutional_Ownership | −0.001* | |||
| (−1.740) | ||||
| Financial_Ratio × Institutional_Ownership | −0.003* | |||
| (−1.822) | ||||
| Institutional_Ownership | −0.001*** | −0.001*** | ||
| (−3.295) | (−3.746) | |||
| Financial_D × Violation | −0.069*** | |||
| (−2.718) | ||||
| Financial_Ratio × Violation | −0.167* | |||
| (−1.674) | ||||
| Violation | 0.008 | −0.004 | ||
| (0.406) | (−0.210) | |||
| Financial_D | −0.007 | −0.008** | ||
| (−1.474) | (−2.435) | |||
| Financial_Ratio | −0.034* | −0.031** | ||
| (−1.851) | (−2.308) | |||
| SOE | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| (1.415) | (1.500) | (0.714) | (0.801) | |
| Size | 0.010*** | 0.010*** | 0.011*** | 0.011*** |
| (6.157) | (5.993) | (7.185) | (7.091) | |
| Age | 0.000 | 0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 |
| (0.124) | (0.280) | (−0.439) | (−0.290) | |
| Tangibility | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.015 | 0.015 |
| (0.525) | (0.546) | (0.789) | (0.812) | |
| Lev | 0.043*** | 0.043*** | 0.033*** | 0.033*** |
| (4.080) | (4.073) | (3.357) | (3.326) | |
| RD | −0.671*** | −0.679*** | −0.742*** | −0.742*** |
| (−6.441) | (−6.503) | (−7.213) | (−7.208) | |
| ROA | 0.118*** | 0.120*** | 0.143*** | 0.144*** |
| (3.655) | (3.736) | (4.793) | (4.825) | |
| Growth | 0.012*** | 0.012*** | 0.012*** | 0.012*** |
| (3.944) | (4.005) | (4.667) | (4.682) | |
| Duality | 0.002 | 0.002 | −0.003 | −0.003 |
| (0.609) | (0.641) | (−0.850) | (−0.830) | |
| Independence | 0.047* | 0.048* | 0.044 | 0.045 |
| (1.680) | (1.706) | (1.614) | (1.640) | |
| Female | 0.030** | 0.031** | 0.026* | 0.026* |
| (2.025) | (2.087) | (1.750) | (1.771) | |
| Loss | −0.015 | −0.015 | −0.021** | −0.021** |
| (−1.569) | (−1.537) | (−2.396) | (−2.387) | |
| TotalAccruals | −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.001 | −0.001 |
| (−0.139) | (−0.109) | (−0.055) | (−0.032) | |
| TMT_Age | −0.019 | −0.020 | −0.021 | −0.022 |
| (−0.901) | (−0.924) | (−1.031) | (−1.041) | |
| TMT_Foreign | 0.028* | 0.029* | 0.022 | 0.022 |
| (1.803) | (1.860) | (1.451) | (1.438) | |
| TMT_Academic | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| (1.054) | (1.091) | (0.544) | (0.560) | |
| _cons | −0.139 | −0.133 | −0.139 | −0.136 |
| (−1.602) | (−1.529) | (−1.564) | (−1.533) | |
| Year fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| SEs. Clustered at | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year |
| No. of obs | 17,033 | 17,033 | 18,247 | 18,247 |
| Adj. R-square | 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.058 | 0.057 |
| Dependent variable | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| −0.001* | ||||
| (−1.740) | ||||
| −0.003* | ||||
| (−1.822) | ||||
| −0.001*** | −0.001*** | |||
| (−3.295) | (−3.746) | |||
| −0.069*** | ||||
| (−2.718) | ||||
| −0.167* | ||||
| (−1.674) | ||||
| 0.008 | −0.004 | |||
| (0.406) | (−0.210) | |||
| −0.007 | −0.008** | |||
| (−1.474) | (−2.435) | |||
| −0.034* | −0.031** | |||
| (−1.851) | (−2.308) | |||
| 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.003 | |
| (1.415) | (1.500) | (0.714) | (0.801) | |
| 0.010*** | 0.010*** | 0.011*** | 0.011*** | |
| (6.157) | (5.993) | (7.185) | (7.091) | |
| 0.000 | 0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | |
| (0.124) | (0.280) | (−0.439) | (−0.290) | |
| 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.015 | 0.015 | |
| (0.525) | (0.546) | (0.789) | (0.812) | |
| 0.043*** | 0.043*** | 0.033*** | 0.033*** | |
| (4.080) | (4.073) | (3.357) | (3.326) | |
| −0.671*** | −0.679*** | −0.742*** | −0.742*** | |
| (−6.441) | (−6.503) | (−7.213) | (−7.208) | |
| 0.118*** | 0.120*** | 0.143*** | 0.144*** | |
| (3.655) | (3.736) | (4.793) | (4.825) | |
| 0.012*** | 0.012*** | 0.012*** | 0.012*** | |
| (3.944) | (4.005) | (4.667) | (4.682) | |
| 0.002 | 0.002 | −0.003 | −0.003 | |
| (0.609) | (0.641) | (−0.850) | (−0.830) | |
| 0.047* | 0.048* | 0.044 | 0.045 | |
| (1.680) | (1.706) | (1.614) | (1.640) | |
| 0.030** | 0.031** | 0.026* | 0.026* | |
| (2.025) | (2.087) | (1.750) | (1.771) | |
| −0.015 | −0.015 | −0.021** | −0.021** | |
| (−1.569) | (−1.537) | (−2.396) | (−2.387) | |
| −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.001 | −0.001 | |
| (−0.139) | (−0.109) | (−0.055) | (−0.032) | |
| −0.019 | −0.020 | −0.021 | −0.022 | |
| (−0.901) | (−0.924) | (−1.031) | (−1.041) | |
| 0.028* | 0.029* | 0.022 | 0.022 | |
| (1.803) | (1.860) | (1.451) | (1.438) | |
| 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.006 | 0.006 | |
| (1.054) | (1.091) | (0.544) | (0.560) | |
| −0.139 | −0.133 | −0.139 | −0.136 | |
| (−1.602) | (−1.529) | (−1.564) | (−1.533) | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | Firm, Year | |
| 17,033 | 17,033 | 18,247 | 18,247 | |
| 0.057 | 0.057 | 0.058 | 0.057 |
Note(s): This table examines the moderating effects of internal institutional ownership and external regulatory violation pressure on the relationship between top executive financial expertise and corporate tax aggressiveness. The dependent variable is the effective tax rate. Institutional_Ownership is measured as the proportion of shares held by institutional investors. Violation is a binary variable equal to one if a firm was subject to formal regulatory action in the prior year, including criticism, warning, reprimand, monetary fine, confiscation of illegal proceeds, revocation of business license (or closure order), market entry ban, or other disciplinary measures, and zero otherwise. Financial_D and Financial_Ratio represent, respectively, the presence and proportion of financially expert executives within the TMT. All independent variables are lagged by one year except for Growth and Loss. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively