Selected carbon assurance studies
| Author | Method | Theory | Microfoundations analysis | Adoption of carbon/GHG assurance | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Macro facts and outcomes | Organizational factors and outcomes | Individual conditions and actions | ||||
| Alkebsee et al. (2025) | Quantitative, multi-country secondary data study | Professionalization | Institutional affiliation | Carbon emission performance | Assurance provider reputation (greater experience, training and higher education as well as strict ethical standards and control) | External GHG assurance |
| Bui et al. (2021) | Quantitative, New York Stock Exchange | Implicit | Higher-quality financial reporting, less earnings management, gender diversity and ethical orientation | Carbon assurance | ||
| Chithambo and Tauringana (2014) | Quantitative research, sample of 210 FTSE 350 | Social-political and Economic-based | Company size, age and carbon disclosures | GHG disclosures and assurance | ||
| Comyns (2018) | Qualitative case study, two European MNCs and one US-based MNC | Institutional | Standardized procedures for data collection and assurance of GHG emissions | GHG reporting and quality | ||
| Dal Nial et al. (2025) | Quantitative experiment, Malaysian investors | Implicit | Socially responsible investment (SRI) | Investors' personality traits (extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness and neuroticism) and type of assuror | GHG assurance | |
| Datt et al. (2019) | Quantitative, US companies | Legitimacy | Legitimacy threats | The levels of GHG emissions, Firm size | External carbon assurance | |
| Datt et al. (2020) | Quantitative research, CDP 3,635 firm–year observations | Agency | Legitimacy, stakeholder pressure and climate protection | Carbon governance (carbon committee and employee incentives) | Carbon assurance | |
| Datt et al. (2022) | Quantitative, 58 countries | Legitimacy, Stakeholder and Institutional | Unstandardized practices | Multifaceted carbon assurance standards | Carbon assurance | |
| Datt et al. (2024) | Quantitative, 44 countries | Implicit | Firm's carbon emissions and cost of equity capital | Choice of the assurance provider | Carbon assurance | |
| Datt et al. (2018) | Quantitative; 44 countries | Legitimacy, stakeholder, signaling, information asymmetry and institutional | Openness of the economy and climate protection policy | Carbon risk exposure, environmental committee; carbon incentives, carbon reduction activities and carbon transparency | Choice of assurance provider | Carbon assurance |
| Dutta and Dutta (2021) | Quantitative; 228 firm–year observations from listed Finnish companies | Stakeholder, agency and information asymmetry | External assurance, internal professions and climate disclosures | Carbon assurance | ||
| Ekasingh et al. (2019) | Quantitative; Australian companies | Implicit | Characteristics of the teams and team member elaborations | GHG assurance | ||
| Fan et al. (2021) | Quantitative research; 4,573 observations from 21 countries | Information asymmetry | Carbon information asymmetry (GHG emissions and energy structure) | Independent carbon assurance | ||
| Green and Li (2012) | Quantitative experiment, with 80 assurers, preparers and shareholders in Australia | Implicit | Expectation gap in the GHG emissions assurance setting by preparers, assurers and shareholders | GHG assurance | ||
| Green and Taylor (2013) | Survey; about 53 preparers, users and assurers in Australia | Implicit | Ethics and integrity of the assurer as well as the assurance, GHG emissions and regulatory knowledge | GHG assurance provider quality | ||
| Green and Zhou (2013) | Quantitative; 43 countries – in Europe, Asia Pacific, North America and South Africa | Implicit | Carbon assurance practices across multiple countries | Carbon assurance practices at the firm level | Carbon assurance | |
| Green et al. (2017) | Quantitative; 25 corporate officers responsible for voluntary assurance of GHG emissions in Australia | Implicit | Team and team leaders' assurance knowledge, reputation, objectivity and independence | GHG assurance | ||
| Koutoupis et al. (2024) | Quantitative; 49 countries | Agency | Cost of debt | GHG assurance | ||
| Luo and Zhang (2024) | Quantitative; 6,033 firm–year observations from 35 countries | Climate uncertainty, carbon-intensive sectors with greater innovation, supply chain, management and carbon performance | Carbon-intensive companies | Carbon assurance | ||
| Luo et al. (2023) | Quantitative; 9,902 observations from 38 countries | Signaling and credibility | Stakeholder orientation, social trust and intensive vs. non-carbon-intensive industries | Carbon disclosures | Carbon assurance | |
| Martinov-Bennie (2012) | Conceptual paper | Implicit | Rigorous governance framework and management systems | GHG reporting and assurance | ||
| Martinov-Bennie and Hoffman (2012) | Qualitative interviews with 10 carbon assurance stakeholders | Implicit | The government's “public interest” justification for the introduction of the audit determination | GHG audits | ||
| Olson (2010) | Conceptual paper | Implicit | Cross-functional skills with operational and process knowledge and accounting | GHG reporting and independent audit | ||
| Rohani et al. (2023) | Quantitative; 170 US companies | Legitimacy and outside-in management | Addressing stakeholder concerns | Carbon emissions | Carbon assurance | |
| Safiullah and Nguyen (2024) | Quantitative research; 2,455 firm–year US observations | Implicit | Trade credit | Carbon assurance | ||
| Tang (2019) | Qualitative, secondary data from China | Legitimacy and institutional | Governmental green funding, balancing GDP growth and ecosystem protection, public pressure and sentiment | Carbon auditing | GHG statement verification, assessment of low-carbon investment, evaluation of carbon performance, compliance attestation and evaluation of the effectiveness of carbon institutions | Carbon auditing |
| Tang and Luo (2014) | Quantitative; 45 firms from Australia and New Zealand | Implicit | Carbon mitigation at the macro level | Carbon mitigation at the firm level | GHG accounting and assurance | |
| Trotman and Trotman (2015) | Qualitative interviews with 29 Australian carbon assurance practitioners | Agency, institutional and resource dependence | Interests of shareholders and nature of the industry | Development and checking of carbon assurance processes, risk management, compliance with regulations, accuracy and completeness of the data and cost reductions | Internal assurance of GHG reporting | |
| Velte (2024) | Quantitative; 978 firm–year observations from European Union companies | Stakeholder and critical mass | Carbon change committees, critical mass of female board members and carbon-related executive compensation | Carbon assurance | ||
| Zhang et al. (2020) | Qualitative and quantitative methods based on secondary data of steel companies in China | Carbon footprint | Improved corporate carbon auditing system and evaluation mechanism and carbon performance (energy saving and emissions reduction) | Carbon audit evaluation | ||
| Zhou et al. (2016) | Quantitative; 2,194 observations (955 of them with assurance) from 32 countries | Stakeholder | Shareholder and stakeholder culture | International GHG assurance | ||
| Simic et al. (2024) | Quantitative research, 1,326 firm–year observations from the United Kingdom | Stakeholder and legitimacy | Corporate sustainability incentive terms in executive compensation packages | Carbon assurance | ||
| Saa et al. (2025) | Quantitative; 2,310 firm–year observations from six African companies | Resource-based view, legitimacy and stakeholder | Executive compensation and corporate carbon performance | Carbon assurance and performance | ||
| Luo and Pan (2025) | Quantitative; 2,107 companies in 32 countries | Signaling theory | Carbon-intensive sectors | Corporate investment efficiency | Carbon assurance | |
| Author | Method | Theory | Microfoundations analysis | Adoption of carbon/GHG assurance | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Macro facts and outcomes | Organizational factors and outcomes | Individual conditions and actions | ||||
| Quantitative, multi-country secondary data study | Professionalization | Institutional affiliation | Carbon emission performance | Assurance provider reputation (greater experience, training and higher education as well as strict ethical standards and control) | External GHG assurance | |
| Quantitative, New York Stock Exchange | Implicit | Higher-quality financial reporting, less earnings management, gender diversity and ethical orientation | Carbon assurance | |||
| Quantitative research, sample of 210 FTSE 350 | Social-political and Economic-based | Company size, age and carbon disclosures | GHG disclosures and assurance | |||
| Qualitative case study, two European MNCs and one US-based MNC | Institutional | Standardized procedures for data collection and assurance of GHG emissions | GHG reporting and quality | |||
| Quantitative experiment, Malaysian investors | Implicit | Socially responsible investment (SRI) | Investors' personality traits (extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness and neuroticism) and type of assuror | GHG assurance | ||
| Quantitative, US companies | Legitimacy | Legitimacy threats | The levels of GHG emissions, Firm size | External carbon assurance | ||
| Quantitative research, CDP 3,635 firm–year observations | Agency | Legitimacy, stakeholder pressure and climate protection | Carbon governance (carbon committee and employee incentives) | Carbon assurance | ||
| Quantitative, 58 countries | Legitimacy, Stakeholder and Institutional | Unstandardized practices | Multifaceted carbon assurance standards | Carbon assurance | ||
| Quantitative, 44 countries | Implicit | Firm's carbon emissions and cost of equity capital | Choice of the assurance provider | Carbon assurance | ||
| Quantitative; 44 countries | Legitimacy, stakeholder, signaling, information asymmetry and institutional | Openness of the economy and climate protection policy | Carbon risk exposure, environmental committee; carbon incentives, carbon reduction activities and carbon transparency | Choice of assurance provider | Carbon assurance | |
| Quantitative; 228 firm–year observations from listed Finnish companies | Stakeholder, agency and information asymmetry | External assurance, internal professions and climate disclosures | Carbon assurance | |||
| Quantitative; Australian companies | Implicit | Characteristics of the teams and team member elaborations | GHG assurance | |||
| Quantitative research; 4,573 observations from 21 countries | Information asymmetry | Carbon information asymmetry (GHG emissions and energy structure) | Independent carbon assurance | |||
| Quantitative experiment, with 80 assurers, preparers and shareholders in Australia | Implicit | Expectation gap in the GHG emissions assurance setting by preparers, assurers and shareholders | GHG assurance | |||
| Survey; about 53 preparers, users and assurers in Australia | Implicit | Ethics and integrity of the assurer as well as the assurance, GHG emissions and regulatory knowledge | GHG assurance provider quality | |||
| Quantitative; 43 countries – in Europe, Asia Pacific, North America and South Africa | Implicit | Carbon assurance practices across multiple countries | Carbon assurance practices at the firm level | Carbon assurance | ||
| Quantitative; 25 corporate officers responsible for voluntary assurance of GHG emissions in Australia | Implicit | Team and team leaders' assurance knowledge, reputation, objectivity and independence | GHG assurance | |||
| Quantitative; 49 countries | Agency | Cost of debt | GHG assurance | |||
| Quantitative; 6,033 firm–year observations from 35 countries | Climate uncertainty, carbon-intensive sectors with greater innovation, supply chain, management and carbon performance | Carbon-intensive companies | Carbon assurance | |||
| Quantitative; 9,902 observations from 38 countries | Signaling and credibility | Stakeholder orientation, social trust and intensive vs. non-carbon-intensive industries | Carbon disclosures | Carbon assurance | ||
| Conceptual paper | Implicit | Rigorous governance framework and management systems | GHG reporting and assurance | |||
| Qualitative interviews with 10 carbon assurance stakeholders | Implicit | The government's “public interest” justification for the introduction of the audit determination | GHG audits | |||
| Conceptual paper | Implicit | Cross-functional skills with operational and process knowledge and accounting | GHG reporting and independent audit | |||
| Quantitative; 170 US companies | Legitimacy and outside-in management | Addressing stakeholder concerns | Carbon emissions | Carbon assurance | ||
| Quantitative research; 2,455 firm–year US observations | Implicit | Trade credit | Carbon assurance | |||
| Qualitative, secondary data from China | Legitimacy and institutional | Governmental green funding, balancing GDP growth and ecosystem protection, public pressure and sentiment | Carbon auditing | GHG statement verification, assessment of low-carbon investment, evaluation of carbon performance, compliance attestation and evaluation of the effectiveness of carbon institutions | Carbon auditing | |
| Quantitative; 45 firms from Australia and New Zealand | Implicit | Carbon mitigation at the macro level | Carbon mitigation at the firm level | GHG accounting and assurance | ||
| Qualitative interviews with 29 Australian carbon assurance practitioners | Agency, institutional and resource dependence | Interests of shareholders and nature of the industry | Development and checking of carbon assurance processes, risk management, compliance with regulations, accuracy and completeness of the data and cost reductions | Internal assurance of GHG reporting | ||
| Quantitative; 978 firm–year observations from European Union companies | Stakeholder and critical mass | Carbon change committees, critical mass of female board members and carbon-related executive compensation | Carbon assurance | |||
| Qualitative and quantitative methods based on secondary data of steel companies in China | Carbon footprint | Improved corporate carbon auditing system and evaluation mechanism and carbon performance (energy saving and emissions reduction) | Carbon audit evaluation | |||
| Quantitative; 2,194 observations (955 of them with assurance) from 32 countries | Stakeholder | Shareholder and stakeholder culture | International GHG assurance | |||
| Quantitative research, 1,326 firm–year observations from the | Stakeholder and legitimacy | Corporate sustainability incentive terms in executive compensation packages | Carbon assurance | |||
| Quantitative; 2,310 firm–year observations from six African companies | Resource-based view, legitimacy and stakeholder | Executive compensation and corporate carbon performance | Carbon assurance and performance | |||
| Quantitative; 2,107 companies in 32 countries | Signaling theory | Carbon-intensive sectors | Corporate investment efficiency | Carbon assurance | ||
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