Table 8.1 Example of conditions for... | Emerald Publishing

Table 8.1

Example of conditions for vulnerabilities related to detectability in a data flow (as defined in LINDDUN) to be relevant.

Vulnerability/ies (Wuyts, 2015)	Conditions for relevance	Rationale
A Side channel analysis (D_df2) is based on timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, etc. It can be used as a source of information which can be exploited to detect the communication.	Do any actions lead to generate footprints in the communication channel? (e.g., Timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks)	If there are no actions generating footprints in the communication channel, the vulnerability is not relevant.
B Transmitted data can become detectable when there is no or insufficient dummy traffic (D_DF4) sent at some lower layer of the communication network, such that messages fail to appear random for all parties except the sender and the recipient(s).	Is data traffic in the channel very low?	If the traffic is not low, this vulnerability may not be relevant.
C When weak information hiding techniques (D_df3) are used, steganalysis attacks (D_df8) are possible (detecting messages hidden using steganography).	Channel not encrypted?	If channel is not encrypted, low entropy of unencrypted data facilitates steganography attacks.
D Detectability of a data flow may happen if the system uses a covert channel in the wrong way (D_df6, D_df7, D_df12, D_df13).	Covert channel used to avoid detectability?	If covert channel is not used these vulnerabilities are not relevant.
E The detectability threat can occur because of a weak spread spectrum communication (D_df5), resulting in deficiencies in the establishment of secure communications (allowing eavesdropping (D_df9)), insufficient resistance to natural interference and jamming (D_df10), and insufficient resistance to fading (D_df11).	Is the communication channel wireless?	These vulnerabilities are relevant if the communication is performed on a wireless channel.

Vulnerability/ies (Wuyts, 2015)	Conditions for relevance	Rationale
A Side channel analysis (D_df2) is based on timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, etc. It can be used as a source of information which can be exploited to detect the communication.	Do any actions lead to generate footprints in the communication channel? (e.g., Timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks)	If there are no actions generating footprints in the communication channel, the vulnerability is not relevant.
B Transmitted data can become detectable when there is no or insufficient dummy traffic (D_DF4) sent at some lower layer of the communication network, such that messages fail to appear random for all parties except the sender and the recipient(s).	Is data traffic in the channel very low?	If the traffic is not low, this vulnerability may not be relevant.
C When weak information hiding techniques (D_df3) are used, steganalysis attacks (D_df8) are possible (detecting messages hidden using steganography).	Channel not encrypted?	If channel is not encrypted, low entropy of unencrypted data facilitates steganography attacks.
D Detectability of a data flow may happen if the system uses a covert channel in the wrong way (D_df6, D_df7, D_df12, D_df13).	Covert channel used to avoid detectability?	If covert channel is not used these vulnerabilities are not relevant.
E The detectability threat can occur because of a weak spread spectrum communication (D_df5), resulting in deficiencies in the establishment of secure communications (allowing eavesdropping (D_df9)), insufficient resistance to natural interference and jamming (D_df10), and insufficient resistance to fading (D_df11).	Is the communication channel wireless?	These vulnerabilities are relevant if the communication is performed on a wireless channel.