Table 5 Propensity score matching Panel...

Table 5

Propensity score matching

Panel A – Logistic Regressions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	REGIN_REG		REGIN_RESP		REGIN_TIME		REGIN_DOLLAR
Variables	Pre-match	Post-match	Pre-match	Post-match	Pre-match	Post-match	Pre-match	Post-match
Without controlling for corporate governance
SIZE	−0.071*	0.019	−0.017	0.002	0.025	0.028	0.136***	−0.008
SIZE	(−1.86)	(0.52)	(−0.53)	(0.07)	(0.75)	(0.85)	(4.28)	(−0.26)
AGE	0.097***	−0.020	−0.058*	−0.037	−0.007	−0.002	−0.080***	0.007
AGE	(2.65)	(−0.59)	(−1.83)	(−1.21)	(−0.22)	(−0.05)	(−2.69)	(0.24)
ROA	0.131***	0.004	0.035	0.001	−0.018	0.016	−0.013	−0.032
ROA	(3.20)	(0.12)	(1.11)	(0.04)	(−0.58)	(0.50)	(−0.39)	(−1.01)
RETURN	−0.051**	−0.013	0.001	0.001	−0.049**	0.023	−0.044*	0.003
RETURN	(−2.41)	(−0.62)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(−2.37)	(1.05)	(−1.91)	(0.12)
INDCONC	0.143***	−0.003	0.278***	−0.015	0.316***	−0.040*	0.128***	−0.013
INDCONC	(6.53)	(−0.11)	(12.22)	(−0.67)	(13.81)	(−1.72)	(5.41)	(−0.53)
Constant	−0.953***	0.168	−1.430***	0.088	−1.681***	−0.041	−0.975***	0.194
Constant	(−4.12)	(0.64)	(−7.25)	(0.37)	(−8.05)	(−0.16)	(−6.00)	(0.90)
Observations	78,441	38,452	78,422	38,635	78,410	38,904	64,303	31,721
Pseudo R2	0.0888	0.00280	0.0487	0.00377	0.0523	0.00457	0.0471	0.00415
Year fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered std err by firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controlling for corporate governance
SIZE	−0.175***	−0.022	−0.039	0.021	0.003	0.002	0.139***	−0.012
SIZE	(−4.01)	(−0.55)	(−1.01)	(0.55)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(4.01)	(−0.36)
AGE	0.129***	−0.015	−0.066*	−0.004	0.007	−0.016	−0.098***	−0.005
AGE	(3.17)	(−0.38)	(−1.83)	(−0.13)	(0.19)	(−0.44)	(−3.17)	(−0.15)
ROA	0.198***	−0.013	0.047	0.005	0.021	0.020	−0.007	0.005
ROA	(4.10)	(−0.35)	(1.34)	(0.14)	(0.62)	(0.57)	(−0.21)	(0.14)
RETURN	−0.041*	0.002	−0.004	−0.006	−0.096***	−0.000	−0.036	0.005
RETURN	(−1.71)	(0.07)	(−0.16)	(−0.24)	(−3.87)	(−0.01)	(−1.52)	(0.19)
INDCONC	0.079***	−0.036	0.176***	−0.019	0.182***	−0.041	0.126***	−0.002
INDCONC	(3.20)	(−1.46)	(6.82)	(−0.75)	(7.31)	(−1.60)	(5.13)	(−0.07)
CEOTURN	0.032	−0.011	−0.010	0.013	0.038	−0.001	0.025	0.008
CEOTURN	(1.03)	(−0.37)	(−0.36)	(0.44)	(1.38)	(−0.03)	(0.96)	(0.32)
CEODUALITY	0.011	0.004	−0.026	0.004	0.008	0.000	0.036	0.010
CEODUALITY	(0.31)	(0.11)	(−0.79)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.00)	(1.21)	(0.33)
BOARDSIZE	−0.025	−0.022	0.031	0.004	−0.136**	0.024	0.028	0.015
BOARDSIZE	(−0.35)	(−0.32)	(0.49)	(0.06)	(−2.12)	(0.38)	(0.58)	(0.27)
Constant	−1.840**	−0.731	−2.642***	−0.169	−4.354***	0.500	−1.148***	−0.113
Constant	(−2.41)	(−1.01)	(−3.68)	(−0.21)	(−3.70)	(0.39)	(−5.86)	(−0.52)
Observations	61,000	29,718	60,719	29,219	60,955	30,196	59,955	29,552
Pseudo R2	0.105	0.00442	0.0894	0.00673	0.0703	0.00478	0.0491	0.00453
Year fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered std err by firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Panel A – Logistic Regressions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	REGIN_REG		REGIN_RESP		REGIN_TIME		REGIN_DOLLAR
Variables	Pre-match	Post-match	Pre-match	Post-match	Pre-match	Post-match	Pre-match	Post-match
Without controlling for corporate governance
SIZE	−0.071*	0.019	−0.017	0.002	0.025	0.028	0.136***	−0.008
SIZE	(−1.86)	(0.52)	(−0.53)	(0.07)	(0.75)	(0.85)	(4.28)	(−0.26)
AGE	0.097***	−0.020	−0.058*	−0.037	−0.007	−0.002	−0.080***	0.007
AGE	(2.65)	(−0.59)	(−1.83)	(−1.21)	(−0.22)	(−0.05)	(−2.69)	(0.24)
ROA	0.131***	0.004	0.035	0.001	−0.018	0.016	−0.013	−0.032
ROA	(3.20)	(0.12)	(1.11)	(0.04)	(−0.58)	(0.50)	(−0.39)	(−1.01)
RETURN	−0.051**	−0.013	0.001	0.001	−0.049**	0.023	−0.044*	0.003
RETURN	(−2.41)	(−0.62)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(−2.37)	(1.05)	(−1.91)	(0.12)
INDCONC	0.143***	−0.003	0.278***	−0.015	0.316***	−0.040*	0.128***	−0.013
INDCONC	(6.53)	(−0.11)	(12.22)	(−0.67)	(13.81)	(−1.72)	(5.41)	(−0.53)
Constant	−0.953***	0.168	−1.430***	0.088	−1.681***	−0.041	−0.975***	0.194
Constant	(−4.12)	(0.64)	(−7.25)	(0.37)	(−8.05)	(−0.16)	(−6.00)	(0.90)
Observations	78,441	38,452	78,422	38,635	78,410	38,904	64,303	31,721
Pseudo R2	0.0888	0.00280	0.0487	0.00377	0.0523	0.00457	0.0471	0.00415
Year fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered std err by firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controlling for corporate governance
SIZE	−0.175***	−0.022	−0.039	0.021	0.003	0.002	0.139***	−0.012
SIZE	(−4.01)	(−0.55)	(−1.01)	(0.55)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(4.01)	(−0.36)
AGE	0.129***	−0.015	−0.066*	−0.004	0.007	−0.016	−0.098***	−0.005
AGE	(3.17)	(−0.38)	(−1.83)	(−0.13)	(0.19)	(−0.44)	(−3.17)	(−0.15)
ROA	0.198***	−0.013	0.047	0.005	0.021	0.020	−0.007	0.005
ROA	(4.10)	(−0.35)	(1.34)	(0.14)	(0.62)	(0.57)	(−0.21)	(0.14)
RETURN	−0.041*	0.002	−0.004	−0.006	−0.096***	−0.000	−0.036	0.005
RETURN	(−1.71)	(0.07)	(−0.16)	(−0.24)	(−3.87)	(−0.01)	(−1.52)	(0.19)
INDCONC	0.079***	−0.036	0.176***	−0.019	0.182***	−0.041	0.126***	−0.002
INDCONC	(3.20)	(−1.46)	(6.82)	(−0.75)	(7.31)	(−1.60)	(5.13)	(−0.07)
CEOTURN	0.032	−0.011	−0.010	0.013	0.038	−0.001	0.025	0.008
CEOTURN	(1.03)	(−0.37)	(−0.36)	(0.44)	(1.38)	(−0.03)	(0.96)	(0.32)
CEODUALITY	0.011	0.004	−0.026	0.004	0.008	0.000	0.036	0.010
CEODUALITY	(0.31)	(0.11)	(−0.79)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.00)	(1.21)	(0.33)
BOARDSIZE	−0.025	−0.022	0.031	0.004	−0.136**	0.024	0.028	0.015
BOARDSIZE	(−0.35)	(−0.32)	(0.49)	(0.06)	(−2.12)	(0.38)	(0.58)	(0.27)
Constant	−1.840**	−0.731	−2.642***	−0.169	−4.354***	0.500	−1.148***	−0.113
Constant	(−2.41)	(−1.01)	(−3.68)	(−0.21)	(−3.70)	(0.39)	(−5.86)	(−0.52)
Observations	61,000	29,718	60,719	29,219	60,955	30,196	59,955	29,552
Pseudo R2	0.105	0.00442	0.0894	0.00673	0.0703	0.00478	0.0491	0.00453
Year fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered std err by firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Panel B – Stage 2 – Regressions of STRG
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
REGIN_REG	−0.092***				−0.085***
	(−8.615)				(−7.408)
REGIN_RESP		−0.057***				−0.067***
		(−6.468)				(−5.958)
REGIN_TIME			−0.059***				−0.062***
			(−7.264)				(−6.267)
REGIN_DOLLAR				−0.022***				−0.022***
				(−3.104)				(−3.054)
SIZE	−0.036**	0.001	0.000	−0.012	−0.046**	−0.009	−0.009	−0.026
	(−2.275)	(0.084)	(0.014)	(−0.667)	(−2.357)	(−0.465)	(−0.491)	(−1.406)
AGE	−0.103***	−0.117***	−0.121***	−0.147***	−0.126***	−0.144***	−0.141***	−0.161***
	(−5.976)	(−6.372)	(−6.643)	(−6.181)	(−5.683)	(−5.738)	(−5.809)	(−6.611)
ROA	−0.279***	−0.328***	−0.322***	−0.309***	−0.267***	−0.321***	−0.316***	−0.297***
	(−18.661)	(−20.918)	(−20.544)	(−17.047)	(−14.774)	(−17.237)	(−16.820)	(−16.524)
RETURN	0.021***	0.025***	0.023***	0.014**	0.012**	0.018***	0.017***	0.012**
	(4.062)	(4.691)	(4.343)	(2.345)	(2.134)	(2.933)	(2.797)	(2.086)
INDCONC	0.009**	0.006*	0.008**	0.014***	0.014***	0.011***	0.012***	0.012***
	(2.361)	(1.887)	(2.307)	(3.473)	(3.525)	(3.065)	(3.642)	(3.283)
CEOTURN					0.005	0.001	0.003	0.003
					(1.149)	(0.294)	(0.591)	(0.595)
CEODUALITY					−0.003	−0.004	−0.003	−0.001
					(−0.398)	(−0.461)	(−0.359)	(−0.133)
BOARDSIZE					0.026**	0.036***	0.035***	0.031***
					(2.560)	(3.176)	(3.340)	(2.791)
Constant	0.522***	0.352***	0.369***	0.327***	0.359**	0.307**	0.257*	0.347***
	(11.961)	(10.220)	(10.773)	(7.481)	(2.486)	(2.278)	(1.856)	(7.916)

Observations	38,452	38,635	38,904	31,721	29,718	29,219	30,196	29,552
Adj. R-squared	0.492	0.539	0.539	0.546	0.515	0.567	0.568	0.547
Year fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered std err by firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Panel B – Stage 2 – Regressions of STRG
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
REGIN_REG	−0.092***				−0.085***
	(−8.615)				(−7.408)
REGIN_RESP		−0.057***				−0.067***
		(−6.468)				(−5.958)
REGIN_TIME			−0.059***				−0.062***
			(−7.264)				(−6.267)
REGIN_DOLLAR				−0.022***				−0.022***
				(−3.104)				(−3.054)
SIZE	−0.036**	0.001	0.000	−0.012	−0.046**	−0.009	−0.009	−0.026
	(−2.275)	(0.084)	(0.014)	(−0.667)	(−2.357)	(−0.465)	(−0.491)	(−1.406)
AGE	−0.103***	−0.117***	−0.121***	−0.147***	−0.126***	−0.144***	−0.141***	−0.161***
	(−5.976)	(−6.372)	(−6.643)	(−6.181)	(−5.683)	(−5.738)	(−5.809)	(−6.611)
ROA	−0.279***	−0.328***	−0.322***	−0.309***	−0.267***	−0.321***	−0.316***	−0.297***
	(−18.661)	(−20.918)	(−20.544)	(−17.047)	(−14.774)	(−17.237)	(−16.820)	(−16.524)
RETURN	0.021***	0.025***	0.023***	0.014**	0.012**	0.018***	0.017***	0.012**
	(4.062)	(4.691)	(4.343)	(2.345)	(2.134)	(2.933)	(2.797)	(2.086)
INDCONC	0.009**	0.006*	0.008**	0.014***	0.014***	0.011***	0.012***	0.012***
	(2.361)	(1.887)	(2.307)	(3.473)	(3.525)	(3.065)	(3.642)	(3.283)
CEOTURN					0.005	0.001	0.003	0.003
					(1.149)	(0.294)	(0.591)	(0.595)
CEODUALITY					−0.003	−0.004	−0.003	−0.001
					(−0.398)	(−0.461)	(−0.359)	(−0.133)
BOARDSIZE					0.026**	0.036***	0.035***	0.031***
					(2.560)	(3.176)	(3.340)	(2.791)
Constant	0.522***	0.352***	0.369***	0.327***	0.359**	0.307**	0.257*	0.347***
	(11.961)	(10.220)	(10.773)	(7.481)	(2.486)	(2.278)	(1.856)	(7.916)

Observations	38,452	38,635	38,904	31,721	29,718	29,219	30,196	29,552
Adj. R-squared	0.492	0.539	0.539	0.546	0.515	0.567	0.568	0.547
Year fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered std err by firm	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note(s): This table presents the results of the propensity score matching approach. We create an indicator variable equal to one for firms with higher levels of regulatory intensity (treated firms) if they belong to the 4^th quartile of the sample distribution of REGIN_REG/REGIN_RESP/REGIN_TIME/REGIN_DOLLAR and zero otherwise (control firms). In the first stage, we employ logistic regression to predict the propensity score using the same set of control variables with and without the control for corporate governance. Panel A displays the results. We revisit our baseline regressions using the matched sample in the second stage. Panel B displays the results. Refer to Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. We winsorize all continuous variables at the upper and lower 1% of the sample distribution. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively

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