GLS regression with the CEO−CFO pay gap as the dependent variable and CEO−CFO power gaps as independent variables
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 0.763 | |||
| (0.628) | ||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 3.615*** | |||
| (0.649) | ||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 1.489*** | |||
| (0.470) | ||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 1.097*** | |||
| (0.382) | ||||
| Gender | 0.144 | −0.109 | 0.212 | 0.129 |
| (0.353) | (0.352) | (0.353) | (0.354) | |
| Education | −0.317* | −0.329* | −0.314* | −0.323* |
| (0.192) | (0.190) | (0.191) | (0.191) | |
| ROA | −0.045** | −0.037* | −0.049** | −0.038* |
| (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | |
| Firm age | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.004 | −0.001 |
| (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
| Firm size | −0.884*** | −0.908*** | −0.866*** | −0.865*** |
| (0.131) | (0.130) | (0.131) | (0.131) | |
| Leverage | −0.523 | −0.157 | −0.585 | −0.357 |
| (0.703) | (0.698) | (0.700) | (0.704) | |
| Board size | 0.142** | 0.157** | 0.134** | 0.128** |
| (0.063) | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.062) | |
| Board nationality mix | −1.362** | −1.526** | −1.420** | −1.335** |
| (0.671) | (0.665) | (0.669) | (0.670) | |
| Board gender ratio | −2.187 | −2.374 | −1.978 | −1.771 |
| (1.526) | (1.505) | (1.514) | (1.519) | |
| Constant | 8.067*** | 7.330*** | 7.950*** | 7.891*** |
| (1.476) | (1.467) | (1.471) | (1.475) | |
| Observations | 1,187 | 1,184 | 1,187 | 1,186 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 0.763 | |||
| (0.628) | ||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 3.615*** | |||
| (0.649) | ||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 1.489*** | |||
| (0.470) | ||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 1.097*** | |||
| (0.382) | ||||
| Gender | 0.144 | −0.109 | 0.212 | 0.129 |
| (0.353) | (0.352) | (0.353) | (0.354) | |
| Education | −0.317* | −0.329* | −0.314* | −0.323* |
| (0.192) | (0.190) | (0.191) | (0.191) | |
| ROA | −0.045** | −0.037* | −0.049** | −0.038* |
| (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.020) | |
| Firm age | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.004 | −0.001 |
| (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
| Firm size | −0.884*** | −0.908*** | −0.866*** | −0.865*** |
| (0.131) | (0.130) | (0.131) | (0.131) | |
| Leverage | −0.523 | −0.157 | −0.585 | −0.357 |
| (0.703) | (0.698) | (0.700) | (0.704) | |
| Board size | 0.142** | 0.157** | 0.134** | 0.128** |
| (0.063) | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.062) | |
| Board nationality mix | −1.362** | −1.526** | −1.420** | −1.335** |
| (0.671) | (0.665) | (0.669) | (0.670) | |
| Board gender ratio | −2.187 | −2.374 | −1.978 | −1.771 |
| (1.526) | (1.505) | (1.514) | (1.519) | |
| Constant | 8.067*** | 7.330*** | 7.950*** | 7.891*** |
| (1.476) | (1.467) | (1.471) | (1.475) | |
| Observations | 1,187 | 1,184 | 1,187 | 1,186 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included |
Note(s): ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; standard errors in parentheses; precise p-values are available from the authors
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