GLS regression with the CEO−CFO celebrity gap as the dependent variable and CEO−CFO power gaps as independent variables
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CEO−CFO celebrity gap | CEO−CFO celebrity gap | CEO−CFO celebrity gap | CEO−CFO celebrity gap |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 1.044* | |||
| (0.608) | ||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 1.235* | |||
| (0.661) | ||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 0.713 | |||
| (0.458) | ||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 0.689* | |||
| (0.365) | ||||
| Gender | −0.822** | −0.936*** | −0.817** | −0.851** |
| (0.337) | (0.340) | (0.338) | (0.336) | |
| Education | −0.188 | −0.205 | −0.194 | −0.197 |
| (0.184) | (0.184) | (0.184) | (0.184) | |
| ROA | −0.017 | −0.014 | −0.018 | −0.012 |
| (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | |
| Firm age | 0.013* | 0.012* | 0.012* | 0.010 |
| (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
| Firm size | 1.286*** | 1.288*** | 1.299*** | 1.297*** |
| (0.151) | (0.151) | (0.151) | (0.151) | |
| Leverage | −0.389 | −0.278 | −0.409 | −0.310 |
| (0.670) | (0.675) | (0.670) | (0.672) | |
| Board size | 0.144** | 0.141** | 0.138** | 0.131** |
| (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.059) | |
| Board nationality mix | 0.217 | 0.191 | 0.209 | 0.223 |
| (0.644) | (0.646) | (0.644) | (0.644) | |
| Board gender ratio | −0.444 | −0.227 | −0.163 | −0.087 |
| (1.466) | (1.461) | (1.458) | (1.458) | |
| Constant | 0.764 | 0.475 | 0.679 | 0.727 |
| (1.416) | (1.426) | (1.418) | (1.415) | |
| Observations | 1,075 | 1,072 | 1,075 | 1,075 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CEO−CFO celebrity gap | CEO−CFO celebrity gap | CEO−CFO celebrity gap | CEO−CFO celebrity gap |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 1.044* | |||
| (0.608) | ||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 1.235* | |||
| (0.661) | ||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 0.713 | |||
| (0.458) | ||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 0.689* | |||
| (0.365) | ||||
| Gender | −0.822** | −0.936*** | −0.817** | −0.851** |
| (0.337) | (0.340) | (0.338) | (0.336) | |
| Education | −0.188 | −0.205 | −0.194 | −0.197 |
| (0.184) | (0.184) | (0.184) | (0.184) | |
| ROA | −0.017 | −0.014 | −0.018 | −0.012 |
| (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | |
| Firm age | 0.013* | 0.012* | 0.012* | 0.010 |
| (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
| Firm size | 1.286*** | 1.288*** | 1.299*** | 1.297*** |
| (0.151) | (0.151) | (0.151) | (0.151) | |
| Leverage | −0.389 | −0.278 | −0.409 | −0.310 |
| (0.670) | (0.675) | (0.670) | (0.672) | |
| Board size | 0.144** | 0.141** | 0.138** | 0.131** |
| (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.059) | |
| Board nationality mix | 0.217 | 0.191 | 0.209 | 0.223 |
| (0.644) | (0.646) | (0.644) | (0.644) | |
| Board gender ratio | −0.444 | −0.227 | −0.163 | −0.087 |
| (1.466) | (1.461) | (1.458) | (1.458) | |
| Constant | 0.764 | 0.475 | 0.679 | 0.727 |
| (1.416) | (1.426) | (1.418) | (1.415) | |
| Observations | 1,075 | 1,072 | 1,075 | 1,075 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included |
Note(s): ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; standard errors in parentheses; precise p-values are available from the authors
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