GLS regression with the CEO−CFO pay gap as the dependent variable, the CEO−CFO power gaps as independent variables, as well as the CEO−CFO celebrity gaps as the mediating variable
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap |
| CEO−CFO celebrity gap | 0.105*** | 0.103*** | 0.096*** | 0.100*** | 0.101*** | 0.091*** |
| (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.032) | (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.032) | |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 0.926 | 0.218 | ||||
| (0.649) | (0.657) | |||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 3.702*** | 3.269*** | ||||
| (0.698) | (0.729) | |||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 1.264*** | 0.638 | ||||
| (0.488) | (0.505) | |||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 1.034*** | 0.826** | ||||
| (0.390) | (0.390) | |||||
| Gender | 0.605* | 0.633* | 0.350 | 0.671* | 0.608* | 0.422 |
| (0.360) | (0.361) | (0.359) | (0.360) | (0.359) | (0.361) | |
| Education | −0.211 | −0.207 | −0.216 | −0.216 | −0.219 | −0.222 |
| (0.196) | (0.196) | (0.194) | (0.196) | (0.196) | (0.194) | |
| ROA | −0.030 | −0.031 | −0.025 | −0.034* | −0.025 | −0.024 |
| (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | |
| Firm age | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.003 | −0.001 | 0.001 |
| (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
| Firm size | −1.328*** | −1.326*** | −1.309*** | −1.303*** | −1.308*** | −1.283*** |
| (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.164) | (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.164) | |
| Leverage | −0.548 | −0.524 | −0.093 | −0.534 | −0.389 | −0.004 |
| (0.715) | (0.715) | (0.712) | (0.713) | (0.715) | (0.713) | |
| Board size | 0.110* | 0.117* | 0.127** | 0.115* | 0.103 | 0.124** |
| (0.063) | (0.064) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | |
| Board nationality mix | −1.676** | −1.676** | −1.876*** | −1.690** | −1.667** | −1.859*** |
| (0.687) | (0.687) | (0.681) | (0.685) | (0.685) | (0.680) | |
| Board gender ratio | −2.410 | −2.647* | −2.691* | −2.386 | −2.275 | −2.600* |
| (1.555) | (1.563) | (1.540) | (1.551) | (1.552) | (1.548) | |
| Constant | 8.510*** | 8.490*** | 7.714*** | 8.320*** | 8.422*** | 7.643*** |
| (1.511) | (1.510) | (1.503) | (1.509) | (1.507) | (1.501) | |
| Observations | 1,075 | 1,075 | 1,072 | 1,075 | 1,075 | 1,072 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap |
| CEO−CFO celebrity gap | 0.105*** | 0.103*** | 0.096*** | 0.100*** | 0.101*** | 0.091*** |
| (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.032) | (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.032) | |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 0.926 | 0.218 | ||||
| (0.649) | (0.657) | |||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 3.702*** | 3.269*** | ||||
| (0.698) | (0.729) | |||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 1.264*** | 0.638 | ||||
| (0.488) | (0.505) | |||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 1.034*** | 0.826** | ||||
| (0.390) | (0.390) | |||||
| Gender | 0.605* | 0.633* | 0.350 | 0.671* | 0.608* | 0.422 |
| (0.360) | (0.361) | (0.359) | (0.360) | (0.359) | (0.361) | |
| Education | −0.211 | −0.207 | −0.216 | −0.216 | −0.219 | −0.222 |
| (0.196) | (0.196) | (0.194) | (0.196) | (0.196) | (0.194) | |
| ROA | −0.030 | −0.031 | −0.025 | −0.034* | −0.025 | −0.024 |
| (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | |
| Firm age | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.003 | −0.001 | 0.001 |
| (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
| Firm size | −1.328*** | −1.326*** | −1.309*** | −1.303*** | −1.308*** | −1.283*** |
| (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.164) | (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.164) | |
| Leverage | −0.548 | −0.524 | −0.093 | −0.534 | −0.389 | −0.004 |
| (0.715) | (0.715) | (0.712) | (0.713) | (0.715) | (0.713) | |
| Board size | 0.110* | 0.117* | 0.127** | 0.115* | 0.103 | 0.124** |
| (0.063) | (0.064) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | |
| Board nationality mix | −1.676** | −1.676** | −1.876*** | −1.690** | −1.667** | −1.859*** |
| (0.687) | (0.687) | (0.681) | (0.685) | (0.685) | (0.680) | |
| Board gender ratio | −2.410 | −2.647* | −2.691* | −2.386 | −2.275 | −2.600* |
| (1.555) | (1.563) | (1.540) | (1.551) | (1.552) | (1.548) | |
| Constant | 8.510*** | 8.490*** | 7.714*** | 8.320*** | 8.422*** | 7.643*** |
| (1.511) | (1.510) | (1.503) | (1.509) | (1.507) | (1.501) | |
| Observations | 1,075 | 1,075 | 1,072 | 1,075 | 1,075 | 1,072 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
Note(s): ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; standard errors in parentheses; precise p-values are available from the authors
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