Robustness check with the CEO pay slice as the dependent variable, CEO−CFO power gaps as independent variables, and the CEO−CFO celebrity gap as the mediating variable
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CPS | CPS | CPS | CPS | CPS | CPS |
| CEO−CFO celebrity gap | 0.019*** | 0.018*** | 0.017*** | 0.018*** | 0.018*** | 0.016*** |
| (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 0.295** | 0.161 | ||||
| (0.116) | (0.117) | |||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 0.678*** | 0.566*** | ||||
| (0.125) | (0.130) | |||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 0.279*** | 0.155* | ||||
| (0.087) | (0.090) | |||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 0.196*** | 0.152** | ||||
| (0.070) | (0.069) | |||||
| Gender | 0.157** | 0.166*** | 0.110* | 0.171*** | 0.158** | 0.131** |
| (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) | |
| Education | −0.024 | −0.023 | −0.026 | −0.026 | −0.026 | −0.027 |
| (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.035) | |
| ROA | −0.005 | −0.005 | −0.004 | −0.006 | −0.004 | −0.004 |
| (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
| Firm age | −0.002 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.002 | −0.001 |
| (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
| Firm size | −0.174*** | −0.173*** | −0.170*** | −0.168*** | −0.170*** | −0.165*** |
| (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.029) | |
| Leverage | 0.149 | 0.157 | 0.232* | 0.153 | 0.180 | 0.248* |
| (0.128) | (0.127) | (0.127) | (0.127) | (0.128) | (0.127) | |
| Board size | 0.026** | 0.028** | 0.029** | 0.027** | 0.024** | 0.029*** |
| (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | |
| Board nationality mix | −0.286** | −0.286** | −0.320*** | −0.289** | −0.284** | −0.316*** |
| (0.123) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.121) | |
| Board gender ratio | −0.096 | −0.172 | −0.144 | −0.091 | −0.070 | −0.156 |
| (0.278) | (0.279) | (0.275) | (0.277) | (0.277) | (0.276) | |
| Constant | 0.898*** | 0.892*** | 0.749*** | 0.856*** | 0.882*** | 0.735*** |
| (0.270) | (0.269) | (0.268) | (0.269) | (0.269) | (0.267) | |
| Observations | 1,075 | 1,075 | 1,072 | 1,075 | 1,075 | 1,072 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CPS | CPS | CPS | CPS | CPS | CPS |
| CEO−CFO celebrity gap | 0.019*** | 0.018*** | 0.017*** | 0.018*** | 0.018*** | 0.016*** |
| (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 0.295** | 0.161 | ||||
| (0.116) | (0.117) | |||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 0.678*** | 0.566*** | ||||
| (0.125) | (0.130) | |||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 0.279*** | 0.155* | ||||
| (0.087) | (0.090) | |||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 0.196*** | 0.152** | ||||
| (0.070) | (0.069) | |||||
| Gender | 0.157** | 0.166*** | 0.110* | 0.171*** | 0.158** | 0.131** |
| (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) | |
| Education | −0.024 | −0.023 | −0.026 | −0.026 | −0.026 | −0.027 |
| (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.035) | |
| ROA | −0.005 | −0.005 | −0.004 | −0.006 | −0.004 | −0.004 |
| (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
| Firm age | −0.002 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.002 | −0.001 |
| (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
| Firm size | −0.174*** | −0.173*** | −0.170*** | −0.168*** | −0.170*** | −0.165*** |
| (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.029) | |
| Leverage | 0.149 | 0.157 | 0.232* | 0.153 | 0.180 | 0.248* |
| (0.128) | (0.127) | (0.127) | (0.127) | (0.128) | (0.127) | |
| Board size | 0.026** | 0.028** | 0.029** | 0.027** | 0.024** | 0.029*** |
| (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | |
| Board nationality mix | −0.286** | −0.286** | −0.320*** | −0.289** | −0.284** | −0.316*** |
| (0.123) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.121) | |
| Board gender ratio | −0.096 | −0.172 | −0.144 | −0.091 | −0.070 | −0.156 |
| (0.278) | (0.279) | (0.275) | (0.277) | (0.277) | (0.276) | |
| Constant | 0.898*** | 0.892*** | 0.749*** | 0.856*** | 0.882*** | 0.735*** |
| (0.270) | (0.269) | (0.268) | (0.269) | (0.269) | (0.267) | |
| Observations | 1,075 | 1,075 | 1,072 | 1,075 | 1,075 | 1,072 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
Note(s): ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; standard errors in parentheses; precise p-values are available from the authors
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