Robustness check with the CEO−CFO pay gap as the dependent variable, CEO−CFO power gaps as independent variables, and the CEO−CFO celebrity gap as the mediating variable
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap |
| CEO−CFO celebrity gap | 0.081*** | 0.080*** | 0.072** | 0.076*** | 0.077*** | 0.066** |
| (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 0.895 | 0.143 | ||||
| (0.657) | (0.665) | |||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 3.736*** | 3.311*** | ||||
| (0.698) | (0.730) | |||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 1.271*** | 0.648 | ||||
| (0.488) | (0.505) | |||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 1.022*** | 0.812** | ||||
| (0.389) | (0.389) | |||||
| Gender | 0.589 | 0.617* | 0.330 | 0.654* | 0.591 | 0.398 |
| (0.361) | (0.361) | (0.359) | (0.360) | (0.360) | (0.362) | |
| Education | −0.187 | −0.185 | −0.194 | −0.191 | −0.193 | −0.199 |
| (0.197) | (0.197) | (0.195) | (0.196) | (0.196) | (0.194) | |
| ROA | −0.031 | −0.032 | −0.027 | −0.036* | −0.027 | −0.026 |
| (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | |
| Firm age | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 | −0.002 | 0.001 |
| (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
| Firm size | −1.311*** | −1.310*** | −1.292*** | −1.285*** | −1.290*** | −1.265*** |
| (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.164) | (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.164) | |
| Leverage | −0.559 | −0.524 | −0.122 | −0.551 | −0.395 | −0.031 |
| (0.716) | (0.716) | (0.711) | (0.714) | (0.716) | (0.713) | |
| Board size | 0.110* | 0.117* | 0.127** | 0.115* | 0.104 | 0.123* |
| (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | |
| Board nationality mix | −1.716** | −1.718** | −1.888*** | −1.730** | −1.710** | −1.872*** |
| (0.690) | (0.690) | (0.682) | (0.688) | (0.688) | (0.681) | |
| Board gender ratio | −2.560 | −2.766* | −2.841* | −2.548 | −2.444 | −2.742* |
| (1.560) | (1.566) | (1.541) | (1.556) | (1.556) | (1.547) | |
| Constant | 8.702*** | 8.658*** | 7.900*** | 8.521*** | 8.629*** | 7.834*** |
| (1.517) | (1.516) | (1.505) | (1.514) | (1.513) | (1.504) | |
| Observations | 1,073 | 1,073 | 1,072 | 1,073 | 1,073 | 1,072 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap | CEO−CFO pay gap |
| CEO−CFO celebrity gap | 0.081*** | 0.080*** | 0.072** | 0.076*** | 0.077*** | 0.066** |
| (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | |
| CEO−CFO ownership power gap | 0.895 | 0.143 | ||||
| (0.657) | (0.665) | |||||
| CEO−CFO prestige power gap | 3.736*** | 3.311*** | ||||
| (0.698) | (0.730) | |||||
| CEO−CFO expert power gap | 1.271*** | 0.648 | ||||
| (0.488) | (0.505) | |||||
| CEO−CFO structural power gap | 1.022*** | 0.812** | ||||
| (0.389) | (0.389) | |||||
| Gender | 0.589 | 0.617* | 0.330 | 0.654* | 0.591 | 0.398 |
| (0.361) | (0.361) | (0.359) | (0.360) | (0.360) | (0.362) | |
| Education | −0.187 | −0.185 | −0.194 | −0.191 | −0.193 | −0.199 |
| (0.197) | (0.197) | (0.195) | (0.196) | (0.196) | (0.194) | |
| ROA | −0.031 | −0.032 | −0.027 | −0.036* | −0.027 | −0.026 |
| (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.021) | |
| Firm age | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 | −0.002 | 0.001 |
| (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
| Firm size | −1.311*** | −1.310*** | −1.292*** | −1.285*** | −1.290*** | −1.265*** |
| (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.164) | (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.164) | |
| Leverage | −0.559 | −0.524 | −0.122 | −0.551 | −0.395 | −0.031 |
| (0.716) | (0.716) | (0.711) | (0.714) | (0.716) | (0.713) | |
| Board size | 0.110* | 0.117* | 0.127** | 0.115* | 0.104 | 0.123* |
| (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.063) | |
| Board nationality mix | −1.716** | −1.718** | −1.888*** | −1.730** | −1.710** | −1.872*** |
| (0.690) | (0.690) | (0.682) | (0.688) | (0.688) | (0.681) | |
| Board gender ratio | −2.560 | −2.766* | −2.841* | −2.548 | −2.444 | −2.742* |
| (1.560) | (1.566) | (1.541) | (1.556) | (1.556) | (1.547) | |
| Constant | 8.702*** | 8.658*** | 7.900*** | 8.521*** | 8.629*** | 7.834*** |
| (1.517) | (1.516) | (1.505) | (1.514) | (1.513) | (1.504) | |
| Observations | 1,073 | 1,073 | 1,072 | 1,073 | 1,073 | 1,072 |
| Number of years | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Industry classification code | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
Note(s): ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; standard errors in parentheses; precise p-values are available from the authors
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