Regression result – baseline findings
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VIF | CSRD | CSRD | CSRD | |
| FC | 1.18 | −2.519*** (0.879) | −2.809*** (0.867) | |
| PC | 1.14 | −3.307*** (0.762) | −3.770*** (0.762) | |
| AUDIT | 1.04 | 0.550** (0.246) | 0.577** (0.248) | 0.558** (0.247) |
| FC × AUDIT | 0.849*** (0.231) | 0.937*** (0.224) | ||
| PC ×AUDIT | 0.676*** (0.188) | 0.871*** (0.184) | ||
| FSIZE | 1.30 | 1.123*** (0.102) | 1.148*** (0.102) | 1.215*** (0.100) |
| ROA | 1.19 | 1.191 (2.420) | 2.716 (2.414) | 0.629 (2.433) |
| LEV | 1.46 | 2.120*** (0.642) | 2.426*** (0.644) | 2.134*** (0.647) |
| CAPIN | 1.16 | 2.013*** (0.562) | 1.698*** (0.560) | 2.238*** (0.563) |
| CASHH | 1.08 | 2.062 (1.331) | 1.690 (1.339) | 1.883 (1.341) |
| KZ | 1.44 | −0.080*** (0.018) | −0.079*** (0.018) | −0.081*** (0.018) |
| AGE | 1.15 | 0.947*** (0.292) | 0.768*** (0.292) | 0.755*** (0.289) |
| BOARD | 1.67 | −0.084 (0.084) | −0.150* (0.083) | −0.080 (0.084) |
| INDBM | 1.45 | 0.660*** (0.252) | 0.748*** (0.253) | 0.478* (0.245) |
| FBM | 1.31 | −0.012 (0.139) | 0.125 (0.136) | 0.078 (0.135) |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Observations | 1108 | 1108 | 1108 | |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.399 | 0.389 | 0.388 |
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.18 | −2.519 | −2.809 | ||
| 1.14 | −3.307 | −3.770 | ||
| 1.04 | 0.550 | 0.577 | 0.558 | |
| 0.849 | 0.937 | |||
| 0.676 | 0.871 | |||
| 1.30 | 1.123 | 1.148 | 1.215 | |
| 1.19 | 1.191 (2.420) | 2.716 (2.414) | 0.629 (2.433) | |
| 1.46 | 2.120 | 2.426 | 2.134 | |
| 1.16 | 2.013 | 1.698 | 2.238 | |
| 1.08 | 2.062 (1.331) | 1.690 (1.339) | 1.883 (1.341) | |
| 1.44 | −0.080 | −0.079 | −0.081 | |
| 1.15 | 0.947 | 0.768 | 0.755 | |
| 1.67 | −0.084 (0.084) | −0.150 | −0.080 (0.084) | |
| 1.45 | 0.660 | 0.748 | 0.478 | |
| 1.31 | −0.012 (0.139) | 0.125 (0.136) | 0.078 (0.135) | |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Observations | 1108 | 1108 | 1108 | |
| Adjusted | 0.399 | 0.389 | 0.388 |
This table reports the results of the baseline regression of family control, political connections and the moderating role of audit committees on CSR disclosure. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1 Table A1. All regressions controlled for industry and time fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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