Family control, political connections and CSR disclosure
| Variables | (Family firms) | (Non-family firms) | (Politically connected firms) | (Non-politically connected firms) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CSRD | CSRD | CSRD | CSRD | |
| FC | −5.952*** (1.879) | −2.912*** (0.988) | ||
| PC | −5.765*** (2.097) | −5.061*** (0.835) | ||
| AUDIT | 0.516 (0.351) | 0.782** (0.337) | 0.561 (0.459) | 0.894*** (0.281) |
| FC × AUDIT | 1.658*** (0.479) | 0.980*** (0.266) | ||
| PC × AUDIT | 1.453*** (0.498) | 0.963*** (0.217) | ||
| All controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 577 | 531 | 272 | 836 |
| Adjusted | 0.322 | 0.527 | 0.629 | 0.402 |
| Variables | (Family firms) | (Non-family firms) | (Politically connected firms) | (Non-politically connected firms) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| −5.952 | −2.912 | |||
| −5.765 | −5.061 | |||
| 0.516 (0.351) | 0.782 | 0.561 (0.459) | 0.894 | |
| 1.658 | 0.980 | |||
| 1.453 | 0.963 | |||
| All controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 577 | 531 | 272 | 836 |
| Adjusted | 0.322 | 0.527 | 0.629 | 0.402 |
This table presents the regression results examining whether the moderating effect of audit committees on CSR disclosure differs between family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms, as well as between politically connected and non-politically connected firms. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1 Table A1. All regressions control for industry and time fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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