Table 6.

Corporate governance code, environmentally sensitive firms and CSR disclosure – role of CGC and institutional investors

VariablesCorporate governance code (CGC)Institutional investors
Family controlPolitical connectionsFamily controlPolitical connections
Before CGCAfter CGCBefore CGCAfter CGCLowHighLowHigh
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)
CSRDCSRDCSRDCSRDCSRDCSRDCSRDCSRD
FC−0.074 (0.985)−2.511 (1.630)−1.944 (1.185)−7.119*** (0.895)
PC−2.099** (1.002)−4.370*** (1.159)−5.415*** (1.306)−0.079 (1.138)
AUDIT1.684*** (0.194)1.395*** (0.283)1.616*** (0.194)1.264*** (0.496)0.135 (0.330)1.172*** (0.359)0.901*** (0.212)2.135*** (0.226)
FC × AUDIT0.146 (0.310)1.036** (0.515)0.810** (0.367)2.443*** (0.268)
PC × AUDIT0.646** (0.311)1.272*** (0.496)1.520*** (0.397)0.100 (0.360)
All controlsYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Industry FEYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Year FEYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Observations715715715393646462646462
Adjusted R20.4730.4080.4650.5130.3860.4700.4730.523
Note(s):

This table presents the regression results examining whether the moderating effect of audit committees on CSR disclosure differs between family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms, as well as between politically connected and non-politically connected firms, before and after the implementation of the corporate governance code (CGC) and firms with low and high institutional investors. Based on the median value, we set 1 for the higher value and 0, otherwise, to classify high and low institutional ownership. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in  Appendix 1 Table A1. All regressions control for industry and time fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively

Source(s): Authors’ own work

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