Corporate governance code, environmentally sensitive firms and CSR disclosure – role of CGC and institutional investors
| Variables | Corporate governance code (CGC) | Institutional investors | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Family control | Political connections | Family control | Political connections | |||||
| Before CGC | After CGC | Before CGC | After CGC | Low | High | Low | High | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
| CSRD | CSRD | CSRD | CSRD | CSRD | CSRD | CSRD | CSRD | |
| FC | −0.074 (0.985) | −2.511 (1.630) | −1.944 (1.185) | −7.119*** (0.895) | ||||
| PC | −2.099** (1.002) | −4.370*** (1.159) | −5.415*** (1.306) | −0.079 (1.138) | ||||
| AUDIT | 1.684*** (0.194) | 1.395*** (0.283) | 1.616*** (0.194) | 1.264*** (0.496) | 0.135 (0.330) | 1.172*** (0.359) | 0.901*** (0.212) | 2.135*** (0.226) |
| FC × AUDIT | 0.146 (0.310) | 1.036** (0.515) | 0.810** (0.367) | 2.443*** (0.268) | ||||
| PC × AUDIT | 0.646** (0.311) | 1.272*** (0.496) | 1.520*** (0.397) | 0.100 (0.360) | ||||
| All controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 715 | 715 | 715 | 393 | 646 | 462 | 646 | 462 |
| Adjusted | 0.473 | 0.408 | 0.465 | 0.513 | 0.386 | 0.470 | 0.473 | 0.523 |
| Variables | Corporate governance code ( | Institutional investors | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Family control | Political connections | Family control | Political connections | |||||
| Before | After | Before | After | Low | High | Low | High | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
| −0.074 (0.985) | −2.511 (1.630) | −1.944 (1.185) | −7.119 | |||||
| −2.099 | −4.370 | −5.415 | −0.079 (1.138) | |||||
| 1.684 | 1.395 | 1.616 | 1.264 | 0.135 (0.330) | 1.172 | 0.901 | 2.135 | |
| 0.146 (0.310) | 1.036 | 0.810 | 2.443 | |||||
| 0.646 | 1.272 | 1.520 | 0.100 (0.360) | |||||
| All controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 715 | 715 | 715 | 393 | 646 | 462 | 646 | 462 |
| Adjusted | 0.473 | 0.408 | 0.465 | 0.513 | 0.386 | 0.470 | 0.473 | 0.523 |
This table presents the regression results examining whether the moderating effect of audit committees on CSR disclosure differs between family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms, as well as between politically connected and non-politically connected firms, before and after the implementation of the corporate governance code (CGC) and firms with low and high institutional investors. Based on the median value, we set 1 for the higher value and 0, otherwise, to classify high and low institutional ownership. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1 Table A1. All regressions control for industry and time fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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