Table 8.

Family control, political connections and CSR disclosure – role of audit committee characteristics

VariablesAudit committee characteristicsINDACMAEXACFACM
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)
CSRDCSRDCSRDCSRDCSRDCSRDCSRDCSRD
FC−2.059** (0.817) 0.301 (0.533) 0.070 (0.319) 0.270 (0.329) 
PC −2.743*** (0.725) −1.756*** (0.619) −1.419*** (0.371) −1.037*** (0.359)
AUDIT0.610*** (0.233)0.560** (0.234)      
FC × AUDIT0.785*** (0.211)       
PC × AUDIT 0.709*** (0.175)      
INDACM2.130*** (0.227)2.100*** (0.231)1.163*** (0.314)2.038*** (0.249)    
AEXAC0.704*** (0.217)0.718*** (0.218)  0.970*** (0.324)0.732*** (0.246)  
FACM0.807*** (0.212)0.661*** (0.214)    0.663** (0.320)0.666** (0.259)
FC × INDACM  0.019 (0.394)     
PC × INDACM   1.497*** (0.462)    
FC × AEXAC    0.903** (0.444)   
PC × AEXAC     2.025*** (0.479)  
FC × FMAC      0.847** (0.411) 
PC × FMAC       1.032** (0.507)
All controlsYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Industry FEYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Year FEYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Observations11081108110811081108110811081108
Adjusted R20.4610.4570.4910.4430.3440.4040.3240.308
Note(s):

This table presents the regression results examining the moderating effect of audit committee characteristics such as independent directors (INDACM), accounting experts (AEXAC) and female directors (FMAC) in the audit committees on CSR disclosure in family-controlled (FC) and politically connected (PC) firms. All regressions control for industry and time fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively

Source(s): Authors’ own work
[ViewLarge]
This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

or Create an Account

Close Modal
Close Modal