Family control, political connections and CSR disclosure – role of audit committees’ compliance
| Variables | CSRD | CSRD |
|---|---|---|
| FC | −2.574*** (0.870) | |
| PC | −3.297*** (0.984) | |
| AUDIT_COM | 1.104** (0.515) | 0.263 (0.624) |
| FC × AUDIT_COM | 0.782*** (0.227) | |
| PC × AUDIT_COM | 3.103*** (1.027) | |
| All controls | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1108 | 1108 |
| Adjusted | 0.385 | 0.384 |
| Variables | ||
|---|---|---|
| −2.574 | ||
| −3.297 | ||
| AUDIT_COM | 1.104 | 0.263 (0.624) |
| 0.782 | ||
| 3.103 | ||
| All controls | Yes | Yes |
| Industry | Yes | Yes |
| Year | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1108 | 1108 |
| Adjusted | 0.385 | 0.384 |
This table presents the regression results examining the moderating effect of audit committees’ compliance (AUDIT_COM) on CSR disclosure in family-controlled and politically connected firms. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1 Table A1. We use AUDIT_COM as an alternative proxy of AUDIT. All regressions control for industry and time fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively
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