Table 4.

Baseline regression: firm-level political risk and ESG controversies

 (1)(2)(3)(4)
VariableESGCESGCESGCESGC
PRisk1.0029***0.9809***0.3494**0.3364**
(3.1806)(3.1289)(2.0688)(2.1535)
MTB−2.0341***−2.0186***−0.6843***−0.6728***
(−11.5790)(−11.4953)(−2.7674)(−2.6712)
LEV−3.6893*−3.4949−2.2150−1.7633
(−1.6997)(−1.6031)(−1.1862)(−0.9016)
RD6.82046.7251−5.2939−5.7323
(1.4656)(1.4456)(−0.6008)(−0.6217)
ROA−16.8370***−16.9759***−9.3566***−9.7342***
(−6.8481)(−6.9188)(−3.4283)(−3.5342)
CAPX0.2794**0.2810**−0.0036−0.0046
(2.1821)(2.1938)(−0.0275)(−0.0362)
SIZE6.7959***6.7822***−0.3073−0.1456
(13.5241)(13.4710)(−0.5404)(−0.2361)
CashVOLT15.9788***15.8884***−4.4325−4.5860
(4.8694)(4.8430)(−0.7630)(−0.7885)
StockVOLT0.01190.01130.03480.0336
(1.1943)(1.1129)(1.2602)(1.2372)
BSIZE3.0631*2.8974*3.01522.9999*
(1.8299)(1.7222)(1.6232)(1.7288)
GDP−0.10530.0642
(−0.4271)(0.2416)
INF0.5312*0.6841**
(1.8415)(2.2034)
UNEMP0.54320.6326*
(1.4874)(1.7290)
CoC−1.88403.7402
(−0.5126)(1.0943)
GOVEF8.6883*7.5977
(1.8193)(1.1836)
REGQ1.15942.2330
(0.3661)(0.7149)
EPU−2.7641*−3.3738**
(−1.7049)(−2.0539)
Constant−98.4451***−100.0873***11.61821.1135
(−15.4100)(−7.5863)(1.0741)(0.0570)
Year effectsYesYesYesYes
Firm effectsNoNoYesYes
Country effectsYesYesYesYes
Industry effectsYesYesYesYes
Observations12,51712,51712,51712,517
Adj R20.2350.2360.4030.404
Note(s):

This table reports the regression results for the impact of firm-level political risk on ESG controversies. Column (1) shows the regression results for the impact of firm-level political risk on ESG controversies after controlling for both firm-level financial and governance variables. Column (2) shows the regression results of the main model specified in equation (2). The regressions shown in Columns (1) and (2) are controlled for year, country and industry fixed effects. The regressions shown in Columns (3) and (4) are tested under firm fixed effects along with year, country and industry fixed effects, respectively. Under these fixed effect conditions, Column (3) shows the regression results for the impact of firm-level political risk on ESG controversies after controlling for both firm-level financial and governance variables. Column (4) shows the regression results of the main model specified in equation (2). The independent and control variables are winsorised at the 1 and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. Coefficients with ***, ** and *are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All variables are defined in the  Appendix 1

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