Exogenous shock effect of the global financial crisis and Paris Agreement
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| Variable | ESGC | ESGC |
| PRisk | 3.1688** (2.4084) | 1.3606*** (2.9992) |
| Post GFC | 5.4950*** (3.9326) | |
| PRisk*Post GFC | −2.3301* (−1.7413) | |
| Post Paris | −2.7753** (−2.4039) | |
| PRisk*Post Paris | −0.6154 (−1.1336) | |
| Constant | −113.7765*** (−11.6140) | −109.2095*** (−11.6876) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Industry effects | Yes | Yes |
| Country effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 11,035 | 11,887 |
| Adj R2 | 0.231 | 0.233 |
| (1) | (2) | |
|---|---|---|
| Variable | ||
| PRisk | 3.1688** (2.4084) | 1.3606*** (2.9992) |
| Post | 5.4950*** (3.9326) | |
| PRisk*Post | −2.3301* (−1.7413) | |
| Post Paris | −2.7753** (−2.4039) | |
| PRisk*Post Paris | −0.6154 (−1.1336) | |
| Constant | −113.7765*** (−11.6140) | −109.2095*** (−11.6876) |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Industry effects | Yes | Yes |
| Country effects | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 11,035 | 11,887 |
| Adj | 0.231 | 0.233 |
This table reports the exogenous shock effect of the global financial crisis (GFC) and the Paris Agreement on the relationship between political risk and ESG controversies. This demonstrates the interaction effect of the global crisis with political risk on ESG controversies and the interaction effect of the Paris Agreement with political risk on ESG controversies. Column (1) depicts the results of the GFC interaction effect with PRisk on ESGC for the full sample. Column (2) reports the interaction effect of Paris with PRisk on ESGC for the full sample. Coefficients with ***, ** and * are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses
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