Sub-sample analysis
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US | Non-US | Without environmental initiatives | With environmental initiatives | |
| Variable | ESGC | ESGC | ESGC | ESGC |
| PRisk | 1.0422** | 0.8145** | 1.1478*** | 0.0603 |
| (2.1082) | (2.1325) | (3.2219) | (0.0845) | |
| Constant | −125.2485*** | −123.8454*** | −71.0393*** | −209.5724*** |
| (−5.7799) | (−9.5969) | (−4.9644) | (−6.5477) | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Country effects | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Industry effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4,318 | 8,199 | 10,397 | 2,115 |
| Adj R2 | 0.253 | 0.247 | 0.197 | 0.323 |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-US | Without environmental initiatives | With environmental initiatives | ||
| Variable | ||||
| PRisk | 1.0422 | 0.8145 | 1.1478 | 0.0603 |
| (2.1082) | (2.1325) | (3.2219) | (0.0845) | |
| Constant | −125.2485 | −123.8454 | −71.0393 | −209.5724 |
| (−5.7799) | (−9.5969) | (−4.9644) | (−6.5477) | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year effects | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Country effects | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Industry effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4,318 | 8,199 | 10,397 | 2,115 |
| Adj | 0.253 | 0.247 | 0.197 | 0.323 |
This table reports the results of the impact of firm-level political risk on ESG controversies tested on sub-samples. Columns (1) and (2) demonstrate US and non-US sub-samples and columns (3) and (4) demonstrate firms without and with environmental initiatives sub-samples. Coefficients with ***, ** and *are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses
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