Family firms, minority investor protection and stock market reaction
| Dependent variable | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Independent | (I) | (II) | (III) |
| variables | Cumulative abnormal return (%) | ||
| (Intercept) | −0.00798 (0.018) | −0.05080 (0.031) | −0.04902 (0.035) |
| Family firm | −0.00136 (0.004) | −0.00292 (0.004) | −0.00291 (0.004) |
| Dual class | −0.00897 (0.010) | −0.01053 (0.009) | −0.01182 (0.009) |
| Family firm × dual class | 0.02172 (*) (0.012) | 0.02303 (**) (0.012) | 0.02461 (**) (0.012) |
| Voting rights restrictions | −0.00682 (*) (0.004) | −0.00817 (**) (0.003) | −0.00827 (**) (0.003) |
| Opting-out | 0.00430 (0.004) | 0.00648 (0.005) | 0.00668 (0.005) |
| Board independence | −0.00299 (0.009) | −0.00548 (0.009) | −0.00531 (0.009) |
| Sales volatility | −0.03180 (*) (0.018) | −0.03161 (*) (0.018) | |
| ln(market capitalization) | 0.00304 (*) (0.002) | 0.00258 (0.002) | |
| Trading volume | 0.00000 (0.000) | ||
| Tobin’s Q | 0.00347 (0.002) | ||
| Fixed effects | Industry | Industry | Industry |
| Multiple R2 | 14.3% | 20.0% | 20.7% |
| Dependent variable | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Independent | (I) | ( | ( |
| variables | Cumulative abnormal return (%) | ||
| (Intercept) | −0.00798 (0.018) | −0.05080 (0.031) | −0.04902 (0.035) |
| Family firm | −0.00136 (0.004) | −0.00292 (0.004) | −0.00291 (0.004) |
| Dual class | −0.00897 (0.010) | −0.01053 (0.009) | −0.01182 (0.009) |
| Family firm × dual class | 0.02172 ( | 0.02303 ( | 0.02461 ( |
| Voting rights restrictions | −0.00682 ( | −0.00817 ( | −0.00827 ( |
| Opting-out | 0.00430 (0.004) | 0.00648 (0.005) | 0.00668 (0.005) |
| Board independence | −0.00299 (0.009) | −0.00548 (0.009) | −0.00531 (0.009) |
| Sales volatility | −0.03180 ( | −0.03161 ( | |
| ln(market capitalization) | 0.00304 ( | 0.00258 (0.002) | |
| Trading volume | 0.00000 (0.000) | ||
| Tobin’s | 0.00347 (0.002) | ||
| Fixed effects | Industry | Industry | Industry |
| Multiple | 14.3% | 20.0% | 20.7% |
The table presents OLS coefficient estimates for cumulative abnormal return. The sample is based on 350 firm-year observations for events related to the popular initiative “against rip-off salaries.” White standard errors are reported in parentheses, and significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively
Sharing content requires targeting cookies to be enabled. Please update your cookie preferences to use this feature.