Table 4

Robustness check with alternative sample specification

Dependent variableStatus_BStatus_BM
(1)(2)
Hierarchy−0.0541**−0.0496*
(0.0269)(0.0271)
Size0.0682**0.0698**
(0.0345)(0.0348)
Lev0.5008***0.4824***
(0.1267)(0.1277)
Grossprofit0.18500.2159
(0.1631)(0.1648)
Tobinq0.00420.0000
(0.0215)(0.0217)
Top1−0.0507−0.0797
(0.2277)(0.2297)
FirmAge0.11280.1252
(0.2251)(0.2261)
Female−0.3387*−0.3238
(0.1993)(0.2010)
Tenure_CEO−0.0947***−0.0939***
(0.0140)(0.0141)
Dual0.1960***0.1881***
(0.0420)(0.0422)
Indep_per−0.9765***−1.0200***
(0.2627)(0.2652)
Indep_age0.19090.2098
(0.1844)(0.1859)
Constant5.2890***5.1413***
(1.1859)(1.1960)
Firm FEYESYES
Year FEYESYES
R20.67890.6733
Observations29,14729,147

Note(s): Table 4 examines whether the effect of hierarchical culture persists among busy independent directors. Busy directors are defined as those holding three or more board seats in the same year. Column (1) uses the arithmetic mean of the degree centrality of busy independent directors as the dependent variable. Column (2) replaces the mean with the median degree centrality to address concerns about outliers. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels and standard errors are reported in parentheses

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