Mechanism analysis
| Dependent variable | Bank | Status | Alliances | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Hierarchy | −0.0095** | −0.0153*** | −0.0126** | −0.0126* |
| (0.0043) | (0.0053) | (0.0061) | (0.0073) | |
| Bank | 0.0618*** | |||
| (0.0067) | ||||
| Alliances | 0.0269*** | |||
| (0.0083) | ||||
| Size | 0.0106** | 0.0644*** | 0.1354*** | 0.0637*** |
| (0.0051) | (0.0067) | (0.0064) | (0.0086) | |
| Lev | 0.0660*** | 0.1300*** | 0.1086*** | 0.1076*** |
| (0.0200) | (0.0243) | (0.0246) | (0.0300) | |
| Grossprofit | 0.0141 | −0.0442 | −0.0205 | −0.0291 |
| (0.0227) | (0.0309) | (0.0307) | (0.0382) | |
| Tobinq | 0.0025 | 0.0252*** | 0.0451*** | 0.0248*** |
| (0.0032) | (0.0042) | (0.0044) | (0.0057) | |
| Top1 | −0.0614* | −0.2160*** | −0.3207*** | −0.1419** |
| (0.0334) | (0.0456) | (0.0407) | (0.0585) | |
| FirmAge | 0.1510*** | 0.0588 | 0.0936*** | 0.0819* |
| (0.0300) | (0.0384) | (0.0330) | (0.0472) | |
| Female | −0.0693** | −0.1608*** | −0.0403 | −0.1182** |
| (0.0307) | (0.0387) | (0.0408) | (0.0497) | |
| Tenure_CEO | −0.0121*** | −0.0151*** | 0.0036 | −0.0109*** |
| (0.0022) | (0.0027) | (0.0029) | (0.0036) | |
| Dual | 0.0032 | 0.0605*** | −0.0168** | 0.0635*** |
| (0.0067) | (0.0080) | (0.0084) | (0.0101) | |
| Indep_per | −0.0721 | −0.3822*** | −0.0475 | −0.3495*** |
| (0.0450) | (0.0508) | (0.0623) | (0.0696) | |
| Indep_age | 0.0333 | 0.2344*** | −0.0517 | 0.2376*** |
| (0.0269) | (0.0347) | (0.0347) | (0.0450) | |
| Constant | −0.4211** | −1.0584*** | −2.7198*** | −1.1103*** |
| (0.1708) | (0.2193) | (0.2091) | (0.2794) | |
| Firm FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| R2 | 0.4826 | 0.6480 | 0.3881 | 0.6166 |
| Observations | 42,985 | 42,985 | 23,244 | 23,244 |
| Dependent variable | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| −0.0095** | −0.0153*** | −0.0126** | −0.0126* | |
| (0.0043) | (0.0053) | (0.0061) | (0.0073) | |
| 0.0618*** | ||||
| (0.0067) | ||||
| 0.0269*** | ||||
| (0.0083) | ||||
| 0.0106** | 0.0644*** | 0.1354*** | 0.0637*** | |
| (0.0051) | (0.0067) | (0.0064) | (0.0086) | |
| 0.0660*** | 0.1300*** | 0.1086*** | 0.1076*** | |
| (0.0200) | (0.0243) | (0.0246) | (0.0300) | |
| 0.0141 | −0.0442 | −0.0205 | −0.0291 | |
| (0.0227) | (0.0309) | (0.0307) | (0.0382) | |
| 0.0025 | 0.0252*** | 0.0451*** | 0.0248*** | |
| (0.0032) | (0.0042) | (0.0044) | (0.0057) | |
| −0.0614* | −0.2160*** | −0.3207*** | −0.1419** | |
| (0.0334) | (0.0456) | (0.0407) | (0.0585) | |
| 0.1510*** | 0.0588 | 0.0936*** | 0.0819* | |
| (0.0300) | (0.0384) | (0.0330) | (0.0472) | |
| −0.0693** | −0.1608*** | −0.0403 | −0.1182** | |
| (0.0307) | (0.0387) | (0.0408) | (0.0497) | |
| −0.0121*** | −0.0151*** | 0.0036 | −0.0109*** | |
| (0.0022) | (0.0027) | (0.0029) | (0.0036) | |
| 0.0032 | 0.0605*** | −0.0168** | 0.0635*** | |
| (0.0067) | (0.0080) | (0.0084) | (0.0101) | |
| −0.0721 | −0.3822*** | −0.0475 | −0.3495*** | |
| (0.0450) | (0.0508) | (0.0623) | (0.0696) | |
| 0.0333 | 0.2344*** | −0.0517 | 0.2376*** | |
| (0.0269) | (0.0347) | (0.0347) | (0.0450) | |
| −0.4211** | −1.0584*** | −2.7198*** | −1.1103*** | |
| (0.1708) | (0.2193) | (0.2091) | (0.2794) | |
| Firm FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| 0.4826 | 0.6480 | 0.3881 | 0.6166 | |
| Observations | 42,985 | 42,985 | 23,244 | 23,244 |
Note(s): Table 8 reports the mechanism analysis for the effect of hierarchical culture on independent directors' social status. Columns (1) and (2) examine the bank–firm relationship mechanism, and Columns (3) and (4) test the strategic alliance mechanism. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels and standard errors are reported in parentheses
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