Table 4

Impact of board attributes on CSD

Dep. Var. = DISVOL
(1)(2)(3)(4)
GENDIV0.5520.1510.6250.254
(0.933)(0.280)(1.089)(0.484)
BDSIZE0.122***0.127***0.085***0.096***
(4.026)(4.199)(2.934)(3.318)
INDPDIR0.107−0.630−0.084−0.764
(0.192)(−1.166)(−0.144)(−1.396)
COMPRN0.664***0.595***0.648***0.622***
(3.202)(3.432)(3.095)(3.661)
AUDCOMIND0.1010.1790.0170.177
(0.138)(0.226)(0.025)(0.223)
CYBERPOLICY0.442***0.1150.417***0.084
(5.500)(0.909)(5.070)(0.701)
CRISKIND  0.2800.581***
  (1.344)(2.735)
SIZE  0.0490.055
  (1.158)(1.201)
LEV  0.2460.286
  (0.708)(0.849)
ROA  −0.737−0.595
  (−1.441)(−1.232)
MTB  0.009*0.008*
  (1.837)(1.759)
Intercept0.7661.417*0.4440.695
(1.019)(1.782)(0.485)(0.670)
Year FENoYesNoYes
Industry FENoYesNoYes
Cluster byFirmFirmFirmFirm
Observations630630630630
Adjusted R20.2570.3710.2810.389

Note(s): The table presents the results of the board attributes affecting CSD. Column 1 presents the results without controlling for firm-level financial attributes (control variables), year, and industry fixed effects (FE), whereas Column 2 reports results that include year and industry FE. Column 3 presents the results, including both independent and control variables, but excluding year and industry FE. Column 4 presents the complete baseline model, encompassing all independent and control variables, year, and industry FE. The definitions of variables are given in the  Appendix. Robust two-tailed t-statistics clustered by the firm are presented in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively

Source(s): Authors’ own work

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